Notes on Chapter 13: Federalism and Immigration in Canada

Chapter 13 Notes: Federalism and Immigration in Canada

• Topic and scope

  • Explores how immigration is managed within Canada’s federal regime (a concurrent-jurisdiction issue under the Constitution).

  • Focus on the shift from Ottawa-dominated governance (late 19th–20th centuries) to a federalized regime where both federal and provincial governments are legitimate actors with intergovernmental relations, institutions, and programs.

• Key ideas and definitions

  • Immigration: the process by which individuals change their country of residence, long-term or short-term. Includes border control, immigrant selection, naturalization, settlement, and integration policies.

  • International immigration vs. internal migration: international refers to crossing borders; internal migration refers to movement within Canada (e.g., provinces).

  • Immigrant integration: process through which international immigrants adapt to their new country; can target short-term needs (housing), mid-/long-term needs (credential recognition), and host-society needs (welcoming capacity).

  • Canada as a settler state: historical pattern of settler recruitment and the colonial context; governments have been active in recruiting newcomers and managing geographic settlement patterns.

  • Migration policy areas intersect with education, healthcare, labour market management, etc.

• Constitutional foundations and regime change

  • 1867 British North America Act (Constitution Act, 1867): immigration is a concurrent jurisdiction; Parliament may legislate about immigration, and provinces may legislate for immigration within their boundaries (Section 95).

  • When federal and provincial laws conflict, federal law prevails (preponderance to Parliament’s acts).

  • Immigration governance due to shifting intergovernmental power: from Ottawa-dominated to a federalized regime with both levels actively involved in the 1990s onward.

  • Federalization defined: emergence of new institutional actors or modified status of actors with strong legitimacy inside a regime, leading to provinces becoming central players in immigration governance (Paquet, 2019).

• The empirical picture: immigration in Canada (aggregate and distribution)

  • 2017: 286,479 international immigrants became permanent residents of Canada (Canada, 2018).

  • International immigration definition used in the chapter (IOM reference): process of changing country of residence; long- or short-term.

  • 2018 distribution of permanent immigrants by province (Table 13.1): most immigrants concentrated in four provinces:

  • Ontario: ≈ $137{,}430$ (≈ 43 ext{%} of total)

  • Quebec: ≈ $51{,}130$ (≈ 16 ext{%})

  • British Columbia: ≈ $44{,}870$ (≈ 14 ext{%})

  • Alberta: ≈ $42{,}025$ (≈ 13 ext{%})

  • Other provinces: Manitoba $15{,}225$; Saskatchewan $15{,}510$; Newfoundland and Labrador $1{,}530$; Prince Edward Island $2{,}135$; Nova Scotia $5{,}965$; New Brunswick $4{,}610$.

  • Total permanent immigration intake (2018): $320{,}430$; Provincial population (2018): $36{,}934{,}058$.

  • Territorial numbers (2018) for context: Northwest Territories = 260; Nunavut = 30; Yukon = 305 (noted as examples in a footnote).

  • Distribution reflects overall population distribution and internal migration dynamics; mobility rights under the Canadian Charter (Section 6) reinforce internal mobility.

• Composition of immigration and provincial differences

  • Three main administrative categories of the national immigration program:

  • Economic: skills, education, credentials, work experience; labour-market demands.

  • Family: joining family, spouses, relatives, often via sponsorship.

  • Resettled refugees/humanitarian: protected persons, humanitarian admissions.

  • Some provinces rely more on economic immigration, others on family or humanitarian pathways.

  • Provincial nuances: Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan rely more on Provincial Nominee Programs (PNPs) to attract economic immigrants; others rely more on federal programs.

  • These categories are useful heuristics to map province benefits, but do not perfectly reflect reality (economic-category immigrants often include spouses/children of principal applicants).

  • Figure 13.1 (described): shows how provinces’ intake by administrative category differs; some provinces emphasize economic immigration more than others.

  • Provincial distribution implications: host-society services (healthcare, education) see different demand patterns across provinces; this has fiscal consequences.

• The Canada–Quebec dynamic and intergovernmental bargaining

  • Quebec’s mobilization for more immigration powers stems from linguistic realities; English-speaking provinces also seek greater input into economic immigration.

  • Quiet Revolution (1960s) and demographic changes made immigration a tool for modernization and national identity management; led to tensions with Ottawa over francophone status.

  • Intergovernmental agreements began in 1971; Meech Lake era attempts failed; 1991 Canada–Quebec Accord on Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens granted Quebec unprecedented powers to select immigrants and deliver integration services; included a financial transfer to Quebec to ensure service comparability and accessibility for all immigrants in Quebec, regardless of origin.

  • Canada–Quebec Accord specifics:

  • Quebec selects international immigrants via federal arrangements; delivers integration services within Quebec.

  • Financial transfer: base amount of 90$ million$, indexed to intake/population and other factors; transfer cannot decrease; 2018 transfer ≈ 490$ million$ (Béchard, 2018).

  • Consequences: most immigrants to Quebec are now selected under provincial criteria and settle with provincial services; this transfer has reduced intergovernmental conflict since the 1990s but is often criticized as asymmetrical (Quebec receiving more funding per immigrant than other regions spend per capita).

  • Tensions: criticisms around asymmetry; Ontario’s 2003 negotiations and 2015 irregular migration issues revived concerns about equity and balance across provinces.

• Provincial input, selection and the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP)

  • Late 1990s onward: English-speaking provinces (notably Manitoba) demanded greater input into Canada’s immigration program to better address regional labor-market needs; federal policy responded with the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP).

  • PNP allows provinces to select a portion of economic immigrants based on local needs; operates alongside federal programs and Quebec’s selection mechanism.

  • 2017 data: 49,724 individuals entered Canada as provincial nominees; about 30% of all economic immigrants that year (Canada, 2018); in “have-not” provinces, provincial nominees accounted for between 60% and 96% of economic immigrants.

  • Since late 1990s, PNPs run in parallel with federal intake; outside Quebec, many immigrants settle in a province after being selected by the province or by federal processes.

  • Intergovernmental dynamics: province-building using immigration, creating administrative units, departments, strategies; premiers champion immigration for regional development.

  • Two notable outcomes: (1) creation of PNPs as levers to address regional labor markets; (2) increased horizontal coordination and consultation across governments (Schertzer, 2015).

  • 2015–2017 trajectory: growing role of provinces in immigration policy shaping and funding allocation.

  • Two-step immigration path: many provincial nominees arrive with temporary status before permanent residency.

• Intergovernmental relations architecture and institutions

  • Historically, immigration was mostly bilateral and administrative; with federalization, higher-level forums emerged.

  • Forum of Ministers Responsible for Immigration (FMRI) established in 2002; all provinces and territories participate (Quebec as observer).

  • FMRI structure includes four executive permanent tables: Federal, Provincial, and Territorial (FPT) ministers table; FPT deputy ministers table; FPT assistant deputy minister table; FPT policy and planning table.

  • Provincial-territorial secretariat established to support communications and policy analysis on immigration; hosts rotate among provinces.

  • FMRI participation indicates a functioning multilateral institutional structure for intergovernmental relations (IGR) in immigration; regional bodies (Conference of Western Premiers, Forum of the Federation) appear episodically.

• Irregular border crossings and the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA)

  • Since 2015, irregular border crossings intensified due to U.S. immigration policy; claimants cross at crossings outside regular ports of entry (e.g., Roxham Road in Quebec).

  • STCA requires asylum claims to be made in the first safe country of arrival; cross-border irregulars exploit routes to bypass regular entry points.

  • 2017 data: 20,953 individuals crossed irregularly; over 90% occurred in Quebec (Schertzer and Paquet, 2019).

  • Intergovernmental response: Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Irregular Migration established (federal ministers, Quebec, Ontario, Toronto mayor; later expanded).

  • Operational outcomes: governments have managed arrivals and maintained public trust; refugee determination remains federally administered and costly, but irregular flows force provinces to participate more directly.

  • Geography and burden: irregular migration concentrates in Quebec and Ontario; Ontario tensions with federal government increased under Premier Doug Ford (2018).

• Performance, legitimacy, and democratic accountability

  • Performance: federalization has allowed better alignment with federalism principles; provinces gain a voice in national policy goals (FMRI), and PNPs provide place-based policy levers; integration of Syrian refugees in 2015 is an example of a rapid, coordinated response.

  • Limitations and imbalances: intergovernmental relations in immigration remain nascent and unequal; Ottawa retains greater policy-making and fiscal capacities; structural asymmetries persist (federal dominance in immigration policy, border control, and the capacity to finance settlement programs).

  • Fiscal and capacity gaps: provinces historically lacked policy capacity in immigration; over time they’ve built capacity but remain not equal partners with the federal government; provincial demands and competitive federalism persist (Quebec vs rest; Ontario and Atlantic provinces).

  • Competitive federalism has driven province-building (emphasizing economic development and demographic growth); Ottawa’s 2012 settlement-service changes under the Harper government reflected a shift toward centralized program design and cost containment, provoking intergovernmental tensions.

  • Legitimacy: the federal-administration model has gained legitimacy by demonstrating adaptability to demographic and geographic complexities of the federation; but transparency and broad-based democratic input remain limited: decision-making often occurs at executive levels with limited public accountability.

  • Notable policy instruments tied to legitimacy: 1991 Canada–Quebec Accord; PNP and multilateral frameworks; Atlantic Immigration Pilot; city-level inclusion (Toronto) and targeted francophone hiring under Atlantic Immigration Pilot show moves toward broader stakeholder inclusion but are still limited in scope.

• What the regime implies for Canadian federalism

  • The federalized immigration regime illustrates that constitutional changes are not strictly necessary for federalism to evolve; policy adaptations and intergovernmental practices can reshape governance through bilateral and multilateral arrangements.

  • The regime balances unity and diversity by empowering provinces to address local needs while maintaining a national framework for security, border control, and national standards.

  • Ongoing challenges include potential unilateral Ottawa actions, fiscal imbalances, and ensuring democratic accountability and transparency for citizens and non-state actors.

• The conclusion of the chapter

  • As of 2020, immigration governance operates under a federalized regime in which both orders of government coordinate on policy while pursuing their interests to balance unity and diversity.

  • Canada’s federalism shows adaptability to change, but the system remains imbalanced in power, capacity, and resources across orders of government.

  • The system is presently dominated by executive federalism, with immigration policy largely centralized in the federal executive; more work is needed to make intergovernmental relations truly democratic and accountable.

• Notable data points and references (selected)

  • Immigrant intake by province (2018): Ontario ≈ $137{,}430$; Quebec ≈ $51{,}130$; British Columbia ≈ $44{,}870$; Alberta ≈ $42{,}025$; Manitoba ≈ $15{,}225$; Saskatchewan ≈ $15{,}510$; Newfoundland and Labrador ≈ $1{,}530$; Prince Edward Island ≈ $2{,}135$; Nova Scotia ≈ $5{,}965$; New Brunswick ≈ $4{,}610$; Total ≈ $320{,}430$; Population totals (2018): ≈ $36{,}934{,}058$.

  • 2017 international immigrants to Canada: $286{,}479$ permanent residents.

  • Economic immigration dominates, but provincial composition is uneven and reflects labour-market needs and geographic distribution.

  • 2015 Syrian refugees: rapid intake showcased intergovernmental coordination and capacity to respond to humanitarian surges.

  • 2017 irregular border crossings:  $20{,}953$ individuals; > 90 ext{%} in Quebec; task force established to coordinate across federal and provincial lines.

  • Canada–Quebec Accord (1991): Quebec’s unique immigration and integration powers; transfer clause and guaranteed funding; 2018 transfer ≈ $490{,}000{,}000$; transfer cannot decrease; ongoing criticisms about asymmetry.

  • Canada–Ontario Immigration Agreement (2017): Ontario funding increase for integration; distinct from written agreement (ad hoc funding).

  • Provincial Nominee Program (PNP): 2017 stats: $49{,}724$ provincial nominees; around 30 ext{%} of all economic immigrants; composition varies by province; 2015 data show 76 ext{%} of provincial nominees already held temporary status when admitted (two-step immigration).

  • IRPA (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act): Sections 8, 9, 10 are particularly important for intergovernmental relations and provincial input; Section 8 enables immigration agreements; Section 9 concerns provincial selection and permanent residency within bilateral agreements; Section 10 mandates annual consultation on immigration flows and integration.

  • 13 bilateral intergovernmental immigration agreements active as of 2019; agreements do not set fixed annual immigrant numbers; renegotiation possible; except the Canada–Quebec Accord which requires agreement from both orders for amendments or cancellations.

  • Notable institutions: FMRI (Forum of Ministers Responsible for Immigration) established in 2002; assesses policy and coordination; provincial-territorial secretariat supports communications and policy analysis.

• Glossary (selected terms from the end of the chapter)

  • framework legislation: A general enabling statute that authorizes authorities to create policies via regulations.

  • immigrant integration: The process by which international immigrants adapt to their new country of residence.

  • international immigration: The process of moving across national borders to reside in a country, long or short term.

  • internal migration: Movement of people within a country (e.g., between provinces).

• Notable caveats and context

  • Territories are excluded from much of the discussion due to smaller populations and lower immigrant shares, and because the focus is on provinces’ intergovernmental dynamics.

  • The text emphasizes that immigration policy is not static; it evolves with political actors, economic needs, demographic shifts, and intergovernmental bargaining dynamics.

• Connections to broader themes

  • The chapter ties immigration governance to broader questions of federalism, intergovernmental relations, and legitimacy in a diverse federation.

  • It highlights how regional needs (labor markets, language) drive policy changes, institutional innovations, and funding arrangements.

  • It discusses the ethical and political implications of asymmetry, transparency, and representation for cities, minority language communities, and non-state actors in the federation.

• Topic and Scope: Federalism and Immigration in Canada

  • Explores the management of immigration within Canada's federal system, a concurrent jurisdiction under the Constitution.

  • Highlights the shift from Ottawa-dominated governance to a federalized regime where both federal and provincial governments are legitimate actors in immigration management, involving intergovernmental relations, institutions, and programs.

• Key Ideas and Definitions

  • Immigration: The process of individuals changing their country of residence, encompassing border control, selection, naturalization, settlement, and integration policies.

  • International Immigration vs. Internal Migration: International refers to crossing national borders, while internal migration is movement within Canada (e.g., between provinces).

  • Immigrant Integration: The process by which international immigrants adapt to their new country, addressing short-term (housing), mid-/long-term (credential recognition), and host-society needs.

  • Canada as a Settler State: Emphasizes the historical role of government in recruiting newcomers and managing their geographic settlement.

  • Federalization: The emergence of new institutional actors or modified status of existing actors with strong legitimacy, making provinces central players in immigration governance (post-1990s).

• Constitutional Foundations

  • The 1867 British North America Act (Constitution Act, 1867) established immigration as a concurrent jurisdiction (Section 95), meaning both federal and provincial governments can legislate on it, with federal law prevailing in cases of conflict.

• Composition and Provincial Differences in Immigration

  • Three main administrative categories: Economic (skills, education, labor needs), Family (sponsorship), and Resettled Refugees/Humanitarian.

  • Provinces differ in their reliance on these categories; some, like Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan, heavily utilize Provincial Nominee Programs (PNPs) to attract economic immigrants.

• The Canada–Quebec Dynamic

  • Quebec's unique linguistic and demographic concerns led to the 1991 Canada–Quebec Accord on Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens.

  • Granted Quebec significant powers to select immigrants and deliver integration services, accompanied by a financial transfer (e.g., $\$490$ million in 2018) to ensure service comparability. This accord aims to reduce intergovernmental conflict but faces criticism for asymmetry.

• Provincial Input and the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP)

  • Established in the late 1990s in response to English-speaking provinces' demands for greater input to address regional labor-market needs.

  • Allows provinces to select a portion of economic immigrants; in 2017, provincial nominees accounted for approximately 30 ext{%} of all economic immigrants nationally.

  • Fosters