Evaluate the view that since 2010 the UK has seen a return to cabinet government.

Weaker Counterargument: The revival of collective ministerial responsibility (CMR) suggests a return to cabinet government.
Explanation: Ministers have increasingly resigned when they disagree with government policy, showing cabinet-level accountability and deliberation.
Evidence: David Davis (2018) resigned over Brexit disagreements; Robin Cook (2003) over Iraq; Anneliese Dodds (2025) over foreign aid cuts; 10 ministers resigned during partygate (2022), forcing Johnson to resign—implying collective power and cabinet influence.
Stronger Argument: PMs often override CMR to maintain their authority and avoid cabinet dissent.
Explanation: Selective enforcement of CMR and failure to sack disloyal ministers suggest a presidential, not cabinet-led, model.
Evidence: Theresa May did not sack Johnson for policy criticisms; disloyalty was tolerated for political expedience—undermining any true return to cabinet government.

Weaker Counterargument: A rise in individual ministerial resignations shows ministers are held accountable and that cabinet roles matter.
Explanation: Numerous ministers have stepped down over personal or departmental failings, implying a reassertion of ministerial standards and accountability within cabinet structures.
Evidence: Amber Rudd (2018), Braverman (2022), Pincher (2022), Williamson, Siddiq, Gwynne, and Louise Haigh—all resigned independently, reinforcing cabinet-based responsibility.
Stronger Argument: These resignations often occur under pressure from media or public, not cabinet enforcement—while PMs still centralise decision-making.
Explanation: PMs dominate through patronage, reshuffles, and controlling personnel to neutralise threats and ensure loyalty, not genuine collective governance.
Evidence: Johnson appointing Dominic Cummings (2019), Sunak's 2023 reshuffle (Braverman out, Cleverly and Lord Cameron in), all demonstrate that cabinet roles are tools of PM dominance, not evidence of equal cabinet government.

Paragraph 3 – Some pushback on policy vs informal dominance

Weaker Counterargument: Cabinet pushback has sometimes forced PMs to reverse or moderate policies, showing checks on PM power.
Explanation: When ministers challenge key decisions, PMs may be forced to compromise, indicating cabinet influence.
Evidence: Sunak backtracked on restricting graduate visas in 2024 due to cabinet opposition; Liz Truss faced internal resistance and market backlash over her Mini Budget, which forced a reversal and her resignation.
Stronger Argument: These instances are exceptions to a broader trend of informal executive control over cabinet.
Explanation: PMs often bypass cabinet using informal methods, like sofa government or agenda manipulation, sidelining collective deliberation.
Evidence: Blair's sofa cabinet, Wilson refusing to discuss devaluation, Macmillan avoiding resignation discussions; all cabinet committees (bar 2) are chaired by the PM, ensuring they dominate the agenda.