Substantive Due Process — Quick Reference Notes

Substantive Due Process — Quick Reference Notes

• Core idea

  • Substantive Due Process (SDP) protects certain liberty interests deemed fundamental; government must have a substantial justification to infringe them. It is not a universal right to receive government services; it guards against unjustified intrusions on core personal liberties.

• Fundamental rights and privacy

  • Some rights are treated as fundamental (require closer scrutiny): marriage, family, intimate relationships, bodily autonomy, and certain end-of-life decisions.
  • Right to marry is a fundamental liberty; racial classifications in marriage laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
  • Privacy in intimate conduct evolves: Griswold → Eisenstadt → Lawrence over Bowers. Bowers v. Hardwick was overruled by Lawrence v. Texas.

• Levels of scrutiny (conceptual)

  • Strict scrutiny: applied to fundamental rights or suspect classifications (often race). Government must show a compelling interest and narrowly tailored means.
  • Heightened scrutiny: used in some family-related cases (e.g., Moore) where state interests are weighed with heightened care.
  • Rational basis: used when rights are not fundamental; legitimate state interests suffice.

• Notable cases and holdings (selected essentials)

  • Loving v. Virginia (1967) — $388\ ext{U.S.}\,1\ (1967)$: Anti-miscegenation laws violate Equal Protection and Due Process; marriage is a fundamental right.
  • Zablocki v. Redhail (1978) — $434\ \text{U.S.}\ 374\ (1978)$: Right to marry protected; strict scrutiny applied to marriage-related restrictions.
  • Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977) — $431\ \text{U.S.}\ 494\ (1977)$: Extended-family living arrangements receive heightened protection; invalidates narrow family definitions.
  • Pierce (parens patriae context) cited (parens rights of parents) in shaping SDP discussions on family.
  • Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989) — $491\ \text{U.S.}\ 110\ (1989)$: Plurality critiques historical-tradition method for defining liberty in paternal rights; debate over how to define family interests.
  • Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) — $478\ \text{U.S.}\ 186\ (1986)$: Historically rooted moral disapproval used to justify sodomy prohibition; not a fundamental right under SDP at the time.
  • Lawrence v. Texas (2003) — $539\ \text{U.S.}\ 558\ (2003)$: Overruled Bowers; private, consensual same-sex conduct protected under liberty; DP framing used (not solely EP).
  • Casey v. Planned Parenthood (1992) — $505\ \text{U.S.}\ 833\ (1992)$: Not a direct SDP holding on contraception; emphasizes liberty to define personal existence and autonomy in marriage, procreation, contraception, etc.
  • Romer v. Evans (1996) — $517\ \text{U.S.}\ 620\ (1996)$: Struck down sexual-orientation-based classifications under EP; DP considerations also inform later analyses.
  • Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (Mass. 2003) — state constitutional right to same-sex marriage recognized (state level; used to motivate national debates).
  • Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health (1990) — $497\ \text{U.S.}\ 261\ (1990)$: Right to refuse life-sustaining treatment; requires clear and convincing evidence of patient wishes; parental or surrogate rights discussed.
  • Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) — $521\ \text{U.S.}\ 702\ (1997)$: No fundamental SDP right to assisted suicide; law must be rationally related to legitimate state interests; leaves room for democratic process and policy debate.
  • DeShaney v. Winnebago County (1989) — $489\ \text{U.S.}\ 189\ (1989)$: State has no general affirmative obligation to protect individuals from private violence; SDP does not create a general safety duty.
  • Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (2005) — discussed as procedural considerations for police duty; not a broad SDP entitlement.
  • Estelle v. Gamble (1976) and Youngberg v. Romeo (1982) — SDP in contexts of special relationships and state-provided care; informs limits of state obligation.
  • Casey, Snyder, Eisenstadt, Griswold references indicate the evolving understanding of liberty and privacy in SDP contexts.

• End-of-life decisions and “right to die”

  • Cruzan establishes a competent individual's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, but with a high evidentiary standard for the patient’s wishes.
  • Washington v. Glucksberg rejects a broad right to assisted suicide; allows states to prohibit assisted suicide if rationally related to legitimate interests (life preservation, medical ethics, protecting vulnerable groups).
  • Dissenting and competing views explore whether SDP should recognize a broader right to die and how procedural protections should be crafted.

• Framing and method in SDP

  • History and tradition vs. dynamic/growing liberty concepts: Stevens (dynamic approach) vs. Scalia (historical-tradition approach) debate; how to identify which liberties are protected is contested.
  • The Court warns against unlimited reliance on foreign law or abstract historical tradition; emphasizes maintaining a living Constitution with democratic feedback.

• Morality, public policy, and state interests

  • Moral disapproval as a state interest is not automatically a legitimate interest under EP or DP; must be more than mere morality to justify a law.
  • Laws reflecting broad moral judgments (e.g., certain sexual conduct) require careful scrutiny and often fail under EP/DP when used to punish private intimate behavior.

• Practical themes for exam

  • Distinguish when SDP is invoked (private/autonomous decisions) vs. when EP is invoked (equal protection concerns with classifications).
  • Identify the level of scrutiny applicable and the resulting outcome for key cases.
  • Recognize the ongoing tension between historical tradition and contemporary understandings of liberty; know examples of where the Court shifted position (e.g., Bowers to Lawrence).

• Quick recall prompts

  • What is the fundamental right at issue in Loving v. Virginia and how does it relate to the 14th Amendment?$14^{ ext{th}}$ Amendment; strict scrutiny for racial classifications in marriage.
  • How did Lawrence v. Texas change the treatment of private sexual conduct under SDP? Private, consensual adult conduct is protected; overruled Bowers.
  • What standard does Cruzan require to terminate life-sustaining treatment? Clear and convincing evidence of patient wishes.
  • How does DeShaney influence the scope of government obligation to protect individuals from private harm? No general affirmative duty; only in narrow “special relation” contexts.