Crimes Act – Aggravated Assaults, Strangulation, Dangerous-Act Offences, Neglect & Homicide

Aggravated Wounding – Crimes Act 1961, s $191$

• ​Purpose

  • Extends basic assault/ injury offences where defendant harms a person and does so to facilitate or escape another imprisonable offence – the lecturer calls it the “double-whammy – hurting someone to get away with crime”.
  • Reflects higher moral blameworthiness → maximum penalties up to $14$ years (sub-s 1) and $7$ years (sub-s 2).

• ​Elements (sub-s 1)

  1. Status requirement – “Everyone” (any person capable of committing an offence).
  2. Mens rea for ulterior purpose – intent to:
     • (a) commit/ facilitate an imprisonable offence;
     • (b) avoid detection/ arrest for self;
     • (c) enable flight after an offence.
  3. Actus reus (harm requirement) – defendant:
     • wounds;
     • maims;
     • disfigures;
     • causes grievous bodily harm (GBH);
     • stupefies;
     • renders unconscious; or
     • “by any violent means” renders person incapable of resistance.
  4. Causation – harm must be caused “in the commission” of the ulterior purpose.

• ​Sub-s 2 (lower tariff $7$ years)

  • Same ulterior intent, but resulting harm only “injures” (≅ actual bodily harm).
  • Mirrors s $188$/$189$ structure: seriousness drops with lesser result, not with lesser intent.

• ​Missing mens rea for the harm

  • Statute silent on mental element for wounding etc. – courts remedied in R v Te Hei:
    → read in intent or recklessness for the harm; whereas ulterior purpose (a-c) must be intent only.
  • Policy: very high tariff, so strict liability rejected.

• ​Special point – stupefying

  • R v Sturm: impossible to “recklessly stupefy”; practical effect = must be intentional.

• ​Definitions clarified in cases

  • Sturm (stupefy): cause mental/nervous effect that seriously interferes with ability to resist, short of full unconsciousness.
  • R v Crossland (violent means): pointing loaded revolver & genuine threat = “violent means” even without bodily contact.
  • R v Claridge: swinging an iron bar at prison officer while escaping = violent means; fall while struggling treated as part of same “whole attack”.

• ​Link to underlying offence

  • R v Wati (aggravated assault parallel): if jury acquits on the underlying crime (e.g.
    riot), cannot sustain aggravated count; must be some evidence of commission/attempt or arrest avoidance.

• ​Ethical / policy significance

  • Justifies high sentence because offender combines serious violence with obstruction of justice, challenging core rule-of-law values.

Strangulation / Suffocation – Crimes Act 1961, s $189A$ (inserted $2018$)

• ​Legislative driver

  • Family Violence Death Review Committee: victims of intimate partner homicide were $7$ × more likely to have been strangled previously → strangulation a predictor of femicide.
  • Previous charges (e.g. male assaults female, max $2$ years) seen as inadequate deterrent; new offence aims to align tariff with “threat to kill”.

• ​Actus reus “reads backwards”

  1. Defendant blocks nose/mouth or applies pressure to throat/neck (manually or with aid).
  2. This impedes normal breathing, blood circulation, or both.

• ​Mens rea (judicial gloss – “basic + specific intent”)

  • Basic: act of blocking/pressure must be intentional (not careless).
  • Specific: impeding breathing/blood flow done intentionally or recklessly (foreseeing risk and proceeding anyway).

• ​Penalty: up to $7$ years’ imprisonment.

• ​Contemporary debates

  • UK law now excludes consent as defence to “sexual choking”; NZ retains general consent doctrine but risk of fatal outcome relevant to s $63$ limitation.
  • Public-health concern: loss of oxygen $(\approx 8\,\text{s})$ may cause traumatic brain injury; repeated episodes linked to stroke in young women; surveys show ≈ $50\%$ of under-22s report experience, often without prior discussion or consent.

Other Dangerous-Act Offences (Crimes Act, sub-part 8 – assaults/injuries)

Discharging Firearm etc. with Intent – s $198$

• s $198(1)$ – With intent to cause bodily harm, defendant:
  • discharges firearm,
  • sends explosive package,
  • sets fire to property, etc. ⇒ max $14$ years.
• s $198(2)$ – With intent to injure or reckless disregard for safety, same acts ⇒ max $7$ years.
• Mirrors intentional vs. reckless split seen elsewhere.

Throwing Acid or Corrosive Substance – s $199$

• With intent to injure/maim/disfigure, throws or applies corrosive, caustic or injurious substance ⇒ max $14$ years.
• No lesser subsection: Parliament placed acid attacks near top of seriousness scale – response to gender-based violence (“honour” attacks, IPV).

Poisoning – s $200$

• s $200(1)$ – With intent to cause GBH, administers poison/noxious substance ⇒ max $14$ years.
• s $200(2)$ – With intent to cause “inconvenience or annoyance” (e.g. laxatives in cookies), or for any unlawful purpose ⇒ max $3$ years.
• Raises evidential issues: what counts as “poison” or “noxious”? Likely objective, expert evidence required.

Neglect & Failure-to-Protect Offences

Ill-Treatment / Neglect of Child or Vulnerable Adult – s $195$

• Applies where defendant intentionally engages in course of conduct or fails to discharge a legal duty (list in sub-s 2) and that omission is a major departure (gross negligence) from reasonable standard.
• Harms covered: suffering, injury, adverse health effects, mental disorder/disability.
• Max penalty $10$ years.
• Designed to capture prolonged maltreatment where discrete acts hard to prove; combines intentional conduct + gross-negligence standard.

Failure to Protect Child/Vulnerable Adult – s $195A$ (2012)

• Pure omission offence. Elements:
  1. Defendant has frequent contact with victim and is person described in sub-s 2 (parent, household member, staff, etc.).
  2. Knows victim at risk of death/GBH/sexual assault from another’s unlawful act or omission.
  3. Fails to take reasonable steps to protect.
• Max $10$ years.
• Policy controversy: intended to stop bystander inaction in child-abuse tragedies; critics say it criminalises abused partners unable to safely intervene. Possible avenues: evidential burdens, duress-like arguments.

Homicide Overview

Statutory Layout (Part 8 Crimes Act)

ss 158–169  Definition & classification of homicide
ss 150A, 151–157  Duties tending to preservation of life
ss 170–178  Infanticide & concealment
ss 179–181  Suicide-related offences

• Offences we focus on: murder (s $167$/$168$), manslaughter (s $171$), infanticide (s $178$).
• Duties (ss $150A$–$157$) crucial because homicide can be committed by omission once a statutory duty exists.

Historical Backdrop – Common-Law Murder

• Coke (17th c.) → “unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being under the King’s peace with malice aforethought”.
• Malice types:
  1. Express – intent to kill.
  2. Implied – intent to cause GBH + reckless indifference to life.
  3. Constructive – killing during violent felony or resisting arrest (no actual intent to kill required).
• Manslaughter divided into:
  • Unlawful-act (act) manslaughter.
  • Gross-negligence (omission) manslaughter.
• NZ statutes largely preserve substance but codify wording.

Basic Decision Tree in NZ (exam structure!)

1. Is there a homicide? – s $158$ definition, causation, “person”.
2. Is it culpable? – s $160(2)$ lists five modes (unlawful act, omission, combination with violence, etc.). Any defence (self-defence, etc.) makes it non-culpable.
3. Classification
   • If mens rea fits ss $167$ or $168$ → Murder (life imprisonment unless manifestly unjust).
   • If infanticide conditions met (post-natal mental disturbance) → Infanticide (max $3$ years).
   • Otherwise → Manslaughter (up to life; wide judicial discretion).

“Person”, Life & Death – Key Concepts

• Person – s $158$ “human being”; corporations cannot commit homicide (R v Murray Wright); directors can be parties.
• Age / sanity – ss $21$–$22$:
  • Under $10$: no criminal liability; $10$–$14$: only if Crown proves capacity to know act was wrong.
• Life begins – s $159(1)$: child must have “proceeded in a living state from its mother”.
  • Separate offences: killing unborn child, injuring unborn child, procuring miscarriage.
• Death definition
  • Auckland Area Health Board v AG: irreversible cessation of all brain-stem function = death.
  • Switching off life-support does not “cause” death; merely withdraws artificial maintenance.

Causation Principles (re-applied to homicide)

• Factual: “but-for test”.
• Legal: defendant’s act must be an operating and substantial cause (≠ sole or main).
• Acceleration doctrine – s $164$: hastening death of someone who is already dying still counts as causing death.
• Omissions – causal if victim would or would probably not have died had duty been performed (R v Kuka).
• Novus actus interveniens (NAI)
  • Must be independent, unforeseeable and immediate cause; courts reluctant to find NAI (Jordan – “palpably wrong” medical treatment an exception).
• Statutory codification
  • s $164$ (acceleration), s $165$ (death preventable by treatment), s $166$ (death caused by treatment given in good faith) – all reiterate that original assailant remains liable.
  • Year-and-a-day rule abolished $2019$; still applies to pre-amendment deaths.

Duties Tending to the Preservation of Life (ss $150A$–$157$)

• s 150A – sets mens rea for breach of duty/unlawful-act homicide: defendant must be major departure from standard of care reasonable person would exercise (≅ gross negligence).
• Specific duties create basis for manslaughter by omission:
  • Parents/guardians (s $152$), employers (s $154$), persons undertaking dangerous acts or in charge of dangerous things (ss $156$–$157$), etc.

Exam & Practical Connections

• Always map homicide fact pattern through:
  $\text{Homicide}\;? \;\rightarrow\; \text{Culpable}\;? \;\rightarrow\; \text{Murder / Infanticide / Manslaughter}$
• Cross-reference non-fatal assaults (s $191$ etc.) when defendant injures in course of other crime.
• Section overlap: same facts might support aggravated wounding and attempted murder – Crown will choose according to evidence on mens rea.
• Public-policy threads: IPV, gender-based violence, consent limits, protection of vulnerable persons, corporate liability gaps.