Coercive Diplomacy – Exam Notes

August $1990$ : Iraq invades Kuwait ➜ triggers UN‐led coercive diplomacy (sanctions, embargo, asset freeze, ultimatum).
Concept: use threat of force to change behaviour; potential lower cost than war.
Historical awareness: Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, de Callières.
Practitioners saw value & risk: threats can succeed or backfire into war.
Modern era: air power & nuclear weapons sharpen distinction between hurt vs destroy ➜ need refined theory.

Thomas Schelling: conflicts are bargaining; goal is exploitation of potential force.
Coercive diplomacy aims to reverse actions already begun (vs deterrence, which prevents new actions).
Defensive (undo aggression) or offensive (blackmail for gains).
Requires clear communication, limited use of force, crisis management.
Advantages: lower cost, fewer casualties, but seductive & risky—failure forces choice between backing down or war.

Five critical success factors

Asymmetry of motivation: coercer must show it cares more than target.
Limited, clear demands: stop vs undo—keep asks essential & non-humiliating.
Credible, potent threats: capability + will to inflict unacceptable cost.
Incentives: combine "sticks" with "carrots" to ease compliance.
Sense of urgency: choose between try-and-see (gradual) or ultimatum (deadline).

Case: U.S. “Gunboat Diplomacy” toward Japan $1852$ – $1854$

Objective: open Japanese ports.
Method: Commodore Perry’s steam warships, shows of force, 8-month pause ➜ intimidation + trade/tech incentives.
Outcome: Treaty of Kanagawa—limited compliance (2 ports, aid to sailors).
Lesson: clear limited demands, credible threat, incentives, ample deliberation time.

Case: U.S. coercion of Japan $1938$ – $1941$

Initial measures: partial embargoes, credit cuts—unclear goals.
July $1941$ : total oil embargo ➜ existential threat to Japan.
U.S. demands (Nov $26$ , $1941$ ) effectively ultimatum: full troop withdrawal from China.
Asymmetry reversed: Japan more motivated to resist ➜ chose war (Pearl Harbor).

Internal Japanese debate: civilians seek compromise; military prioritises honor, resources.
American misread (“notorious bluffers”), poor incentives, ignored crisis-management principles.
Result: coercive diplomacy failed; triggered Pacific War.

Case: Cuban Missile Crisis $1962$

Discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba ➜ Kennedy opts for blockade (try-and-see variant).
Managed escalation: avoided deadlines, sought negotiation, both leaders restrained militaries.
Oct $27$ : rising risks (U-2 downing, conflicting messages) ➜ U.S. shifts to ultimatum (24 h) plus incentives (no-invasion pledge, secret Jupiter removal).
Khrushchev accepts ➜ missiles withdrawn; coercive diplomacy succeeds.

Analysis I

Success hinges on complex psychological, political, cultural motives—not simple rationality.
Faces bureaucratic rivalry, honor, wishful thinking, miscalculation.
Limiting objectives (missiles only; a few ports) often essential.

Analysis II

Credible threats necessary but not sufficient; excessive demands strengthen resistance (Pearl Harbor).
Incentives raise odds: trade offers (1854), no-invasion & Jupiter swap (1962).
Urgency: short deadlines add stress; can aid or hinder (24 h in 1962 aided, weeks in 1941 provoked).

Analysis III – Contextual factors

Public opinion & media: minor $1850$ s, major $1940$ s, critical $1960$ s TV age.
Technology: from sail to steam ➜ air power ➜ nuclear; faster intel & decision cycles shorten reaction time.
Number of relevant actors expands over time (regional ➜ global stakes).
Nuclear weapons multiply potential costs; mismanaged coercion risks catastrophe.
Modern studies (Art & Cronin et al.) show mixed record; success rare, context-dependent.

Key Takeaways

Coercive diplomacy = diplomacy backed by threat of force to change ongoing actions.
Optimal design: limited clear demand, credible threat, viable incentive, demonstrated higher motivation, calibrated urgency.
Always ensure opponent has a face-saving exit; missteps can escalate to war.