Study Notes on Aid Programs in Afghanistan
Introduction to Aid Programs in Afghanistan
Article: \"To win 'hearts and minds' in Afghanistan, some aid programs worked better than others\" by Jason Lyall and Rebecca Wolfe (Published February 19, 2018)
Context: Examination of U.S. aid effectiveness in Afghan conflict.
Budget Context: The 2019 White House budget allocated $16.8 billion for foreign assistance aimed at reducing conflict.
Importance of foreign assistance for U.S. security interests, particularly in conflict zones like Afghanistan.
Economic Interventions to Counter Insurgency
Objective: To win the “hearts and minds” of populations in conflict affected countries (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq).
Types of Interventions:
Livelihood training
Employment programs
Cash-for-work opportunities
Increasingly, unconditional cash transfers to specific populations.
Rationale:
Poverty leads to vulnerability to insurgent recruitment.
Improving economic prospects is believed to help redirect support towards the government and away from insurgents.
Economic development raises opportunity costs for joining armed rebellion.
Findings from the INVEST Program in Afghanistan
Researchers: Jason Lyall, Kosuke Imai, and Yang-Yang Zhou
Focus: Evaluated the Introducing New Vocational Education and Skills Training (INVEST) program in Kandahar, which provided vocational training and cash transfers.
Study Design:
Sample: 2,597 youths randomly assigned to four groups.
Group 1: Vocational training only.
Group 2: Cash transfer only ($75 via cellphone).
Group 3: Both vocational training and cash.
Group 4: Control group (no intervention).
Measurement of outcomes occurred two weeks after, and again seven to nine months post-program.
1. Economic Impact
Effect of Vocational Training:
Modest improvement: Participants reported more cash earned and more days worked compared to non-participants by the seven to nine month mark.
Effect of Cash Transfers:
Little to no increase in economic activity.
Those receiving cash with vocational training did not show additional benefits compared to training alone.
2. Support for Combatants
Hypothesis: Economic well-being improvement would reduce support for violence.
Findings:
Minimal relationship between improved economic conditions and support for the Afghan Government or Taliban.
No change in support for combatants post-program, irrespective of who received vocational training.
Cash transfer recipients expressed higher support for Taliban compared to non-recipients in the follow-up survey, showing a possible backlash against unmet job expectations.
3. Combined Intervention Insights
Combination of Vocational Training and Cash Transfers:
Reason for increased support for government:
Both economic signals likely demonstrate government responsiveness to immediate needs.
Participants showed:
16.7% decrease in willingness to engage in pro-Taliban actions.
20 percentage-point decrease in belief that using violence against the state is legitimate.
Increased belief in government competence and responsiveness.
Policy Implications
Importance of Multi-layered Policies:
Policy suggestions: Pairing short-term cash interventions with long-term vocational training for better results in counterinsurgency efforts.
Recognizes multidimensional reasons for reasons people support insurgents, addressing both short-term economic needs and long-term grievances.
Final Thought: Economic interventions should signal government commitment to welfare to effectively influence citizens' beliefs and behaviors towards supporting the state over insurgents.