Foot Notes

🧠 Philosopher: Philippa Foot

Reading: Free Will as Involving Determinism
Focus: Against the claim that free will requires determinism

🔑 Main Argument: Free Will Doesn’t Require Determinism

Foot rejects the idea that actions must be causally determined by our character or psychology to count as free or responsible. She challenges other philosophers (like Hobart, Nowell-Smith, Hume, and Ayer) who argue that if actions aren’t determined, they can’t be genuinely ours or morally significant.

🧱 How She Supports Her Argument

1. Hobart’s “Self-Moving Legs” Example (Against FWDC)

   • Hobart says if an action isn't determined by character, it's like your legs moving on their own — not something you do.

   • Foot’s reply: Even undetermined actions can still be done intentionally. What matters is whether someone identifies with the action (e.g. says “I want to do this”), not whether it follows from prior psychological causes.

2. Nowell-Smith’s Inexplicability Argument

   • He claims undetermined actions are inexplicable, so they can’t be the agent’s own actions.

   • Foot’s reply: We can still partly explain actions (e.g. “he had a thought”) without needing strict causal laws. Partial explanation is enough — we don’t always need full predictability.

3. Nowell-Smith’s Rationality Argument

   • He argues that rational action requires being determined by motives.

   • Foot’s reply: Having a motive doesn’t mean being determined by it. Motives (like intentions or character traits) don’t cause actions like physical forces. You can act with motives without being determined by them.

4. Motives ≠ Causes

   • Motives like “vanity” or “kindness” don’t work like causes.

   • Example: A person can act out of vanity without being generally vain. So motives explain what kind of action it is, not what caused it in a strict sense.

5. Against Hume on Moral Responsibility

   • Hume says if actions don’t come from permanent traits, we can’t praise or blame people.

   • Foot disagrees: We often praise people for one-time actions, not just patterns. Responsibility doesn’t require a “durable” personality trait.

6. Against Ayer on Chance and Accident

   • Ayer claims if an action wasn’t determined, it’s a matter of chance, so we can’t be responsible.

   • Foot says: Just because something isn’t caused doesn’t make it accidental or random. "Accidental" and "uncaused" aren’t the same thing — undetermined choices can still be deliberate.

🦵 Hobart’s “Self-Moving Legs” Example (Against Free Will Without Determinism)

🧠 Claim: Hobart says that if your action isn’t caused by your character or motives, then it’s just like your legs moving on their own — totally random and not really your action.

🧍Example:

Let’s say Jordan suddenly punches a wall.

• If that punch wasn’t caused by anger, stress, or any internal motive — it would feel like the punch just happened “out of nowhere.”

• Hobart would say: That’s not free will. That’s just something happening to Jordan, like a leg twitch.

🧑‍🏫 Foot’s Reply:
No, wait — even if Jordan’s action wasn’t caused by something specific, he could still identify with it:

• He takes responsibility, and recognizes it as his own act.

• That’s enough for it to count as intentional, free, and authentic — not just like self-moving legs.

❓ Nowell-Smith’s Inexplicability Argument

🧠 Claim: If an action is undetermined, we can’t explain it — and if we can’t explain it, it’s not truly owned by the person.

🎭 Example:

Imagine Rosa suddenly decides to skip work and go to the beach.

• If her choice wasn’t caused by stress, or boredom, or anything — Nowell-Smith would say: “We can’t explain why she did that. So it’s just a random act, not something she really chose.”

🧑‍🏫 Foot’s Reply:
No — just because it wasn’t fully caused doesn’t mean we can’t say something meaningful:

• That’s a partial explanation. It’s enough to show Rosa wasn’t just acting randomly.

• In real life, we often explain things partially without needing full-blown scientific predictability.

🧠 Nowell-Smith’s Rationality Argument

🧠 Claim: Rational actions — like choosing to study for an exam — must be determined by motives, or they don’t make sense.

📚 Example:

Eli chooses to stay in and study instead of going to a party.

• Nowell-Smith says: That choice makes sense only if his motive (wanting to do well on the test) determined his action.

• If it didn’t, it wouldn’t be rational — it would be random.

🧑‍🏫 Foot’s Reply:
Hold on — having a motive doesn’t mean your action was determined like dominoes falling.

• The motive helps make sense of the choice, but it didn’t force it.

• People can act with motives without being trapped or pre-programmed by them.

✨ TL;DR:

🧩 Key Concepts

📝 Sample In-Class Prompt Breakdowns

🔹 “Why does Foot reject the claim that free will requires determinism?”

Foot thinks that actions can still be done intentionally and responsibly without being caused by a person’s character or motives. She shows that we often explain actions without needing full predictability and that people can act with motives that don’t cause their actions in a strict sense. So determinism isn’t required for free will.

🔹 “How does Foot respond to Hobart’s example of self-moving legs?”

Foot says Hobart’s example is misleading. When someone acts freely, they often say things like “I want to do this” and resist interference. That’s enough to show they’re acting intentionally — even if their action wasn’t determined by prior causes. So the analogy with self-moving legs doesn’t prove anything.

📄 1. Study Sheet: Philippa Foot — Free Will Summary

👤 Who is Philippa Foot?

• 20th-century British philosopher

• Known for work in ethics and founding modern virtue theory

• Argued against the view that free will depends on being determined by character

🧠 Goal in “Free Will as Involving Determinism”
To show that we don’t need determinism (even by character or motive) to have free will or moral responsibility.