Michael Tooley, Abortion and infanticide (1)
Overview of the Essay on Abortion and Infanticide
Author: Michael Tooley
Published in: Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn, 1972)
Central Question: The morality of abortion and infanticide
Main Arguments
Fundamental Ethical Objections
Traditional view: Fetuses and infants have a right to life.
Tooley challenges this by discussing the properties necessary for a serious right to life.
Sets forth a moral principle defining these properties.
Properties Required for a Right to Life
Claims that human fetuses and infants do not meet the required properties for having a serious right to life.
Concludes abortion and infanticide may be considered morally acceptable.
Contrasts this with the possible rights of certain non-human animals, which may possess the properties granting them a right to life.
Abortion and Infanticide Examination
The Liberal Position
Challenges in defining a non-arbitrary cutoff point for when life begins.
Highlights conservative concerns regarding the moral relevance of different developmental stages.
Infanticide Moral Challenges
Discusses how the morality of infanticide forces deeper reflection on personhood and rights.
Infanticide raises strong emotional responses akin to taboos like incest and cannibalism, suggesting societal rather than rational basis for opposition.
Terminology
Person vs. Human Being
Defines 'person' as a moral concept synonymous with having a serious moral right to life.
Critiques the interchangeable use of "person" and "human being" in contemporary discussions.
Draws distinctions between entities with rights and those with a right to life, advocating for clarity in definitions.
Arguments About Cutoff Points
Essential Questions on Personhood
What properties confer personhood?
When does a member of Homo sapiens acquire these properties?
Critique of Common Cutoff Points
Conception: Arbitrary as it does not reflect significant moral properties.
Human Form: Developmental milestone that is emotionally persuasive but lacks moral weight.
Ability to Move: Suggests agency; however, adult humans can lack such abilities yet retain rights.
Viability: Capability to exist independently does not confer moral status.
Birth: A starting point for rights, but lack of moral significance is noted.
Conservative Position and Its Challenges
Potentiality Principle
Conservatives argue fetal potential confers rights, but this principle is challenged.
Tooley questions the moral implications of fetal potentiality when compared to non-human animals.
Moral Symmetry Principle
Asserts that the moral impermissibility of killing a human fetus cannot solely rely on its potentiality.
Draws parallels with newborn animals and their potentialities, emphasizing moral distinctions.
Conclusion
Self-Consciousness Requirement
Tooley's ultimate claim: Serious right to life requires possessing the concept of self and continuity of experiences.
Questions the timeline of self-concept acquisition among humans and other species.
Suggests potential moral implications for our treatment of non-human animals.
Recommends a cautious approach to moral decision-making around infanticide based on the stages of awareness.