POSC 010 Notes
bring scantron n bluebook
10/20 Lecture
How to count votes
Most states use plurality rule; the most votes win; doesn’t need a majority; needs at least 3 candidates; if it’s 2, then that creates a majority and wouldn’t work
Occasionally, majority rule, 50%+1, runoffs
Does either always pick “best” winner?
Condorcet paradox: no best answer, clear individual preference, every candidate loses to at least one other ex.) a>b, b>c, but c>a
Condorcet winner: candidate that beats other candidates on one-on-on, no democratic voting method guarantees one exists, institutions (agenda, plurality rule) decide when preferences don’t
What presidents want
Reelection (first term) and keeping the party in power
Legacy, which depends on partisan majorities
Three constituencies pull in different directions
Presidential constituencies
National: the only nationally elected office; sets the agenda; gets the blame for bad things and credit for good things (weigh states equally?)
Partisan: the party wants policy far from the national median
Congressional: nothing passes without congress; divided government bites
Presidential nominations: history
1796-1824: congressional caucuses
1840s: national conventions of party delegates
Early 1900s: primaries in some states, elites still choose
1968 Chicago →Democratic Reforms→ 1972: voters choose
Presidential nomination today
Primaries: most states, select or instruct delegates
Caucuses: few states; vote w/ feet; low turnout, stands there, too inconvenient, non-anonymous
Superdelegates: democratic officials, =15%, unpledged; can’t decide the first ballot since 2016
Invisible primary: money and endorsements before any vote
2024: Nominee w/o primaries
Biden won 2024 primary almost unopposed
After June debate, he withdrew (7/21/24)
Delegates nominated Harris in virtual roll call in early August
Electoral College
Each state: electors (representatives + senators (+3 for DC) = 538
Proportionate to state population
270 to win; winner-take-all in 48 states
Popular vote not required: 1876, 1888, 2000, 2016
Small states get disproportionate weight (Wyoming vs. California)
What the Electoral College does
National constituency in theory
Some states matter far more than others
Swing states get visits, federal funding bumps, trade favors; ex.) hard for california to vote republican since it’s not a swing state
Presidents visit swing states
Campaigns can ignore California and Wyoming
10/22 Reading
Bianco 148-159
Proposal recieves majority vote, pres veto, then pass by both houses by 2/3 (287 in House, 67 in Senate)
Pres must act within 10 days, if leg in session, bill becomes law automatically
Pres veto power is limited, so then Congress can pack a bill w/ things pres dont like, as long as they have some things that pres likes
ex.) 1995 bill detered frivolous lawsuit; pres veto was irrelevant after more than 2/3 house n senate supported, after clinton tried to veto, support for the bill was firm and the only effect was that they had to vote twice
What does the pres want?
2nd factor that affects pres’ bargaining deals w his preferences; ex. keeping the status quo
veto power is useful for pres happy w status quo— as long as congress members can’t assemble 2/3 majority in both chambers
veto is weak for pres that wants to change existing policies
3rd factor: timing of veto
pres has to consider if they wanna use veto at end of congressional term or other time
by sending proposal to pres late in session, members of congress can sometimes gain first-mover advantage— reducing pres’ influence over what proposals look like
timing matters bc members are busier at end of term than beginning or middle
members have to go home and campaign for reelection
legislation is also huge priority at end of term
legislators must enact annual federal budget; w.o new budget, govt’s ability to spend money expires each yr on 10/1
proposals not enacted by end of term (ex. proposal passed by house but not senate must start at beginning of legislative process in next congress)
usually could negotiate to get all 3’s support, but no time at end of term
members are likely to ignore vetoes piece of legislation not cus they don;t care but bc theres too much to do
veto is a blocking power— it’s a way of persuading congress members to act
congress’ first-mover advantage forces president to sign proposals far from ideal and what the president couldve obtained earlier
FPJM Ch 13
1. The Constitutional Design: "Separate Institutions Sharing Power"
The Core Principle: The U.S. Constitution was deliberately designed by the framers to avoid placing absolute power in the hands of a single individual. Chapter 13 highlights that the president operates in a system of "separate institutions sharing power."
Application to Your Argument: Unilateral policymaking bypasses the careful system of checks and balances established by the Founders. When a president sets policy independently (such as through sweeping executive actions or aggressive assertions of inherent power), it subverts the legislative role of Congress—the branch explicitly created to represent diverse local and national constituencies.
2. The Dangers of Inherent and Unchecked Executive Power
The Concept: While Chapter 13 discusses Inherent Executive Power (powers claimed by presidents that are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, usually justified during emergencies or crises), it also underscores the constant tension this creates with democratic accountability.
Application to Your Argument: Allowing a president to set policy unilaterally opens the door to overreach. Historical precedent shows that unchecked executive power can lead to abuses, a lack of transparency, and a subversion of the rule of law. A democratic republic requires policies to be forged through open debate, legislative consensus, and institutional compromise rather than executive fiat.
3. Checks on Presidential Authority (The Veto, Appointments, and Impeachment)
The Concept: The text details the specific constitutional checks placed on the executive branch. Presidents cannot pass laws alone; they require congressional legislation, Senate confirmation for key appointments and treaties, and are subject to the ultimate legislative check of impeachment.
Application to Your Argument: The existence of these mandatory checks proves that the framers intended for policy to be a collective, multi-branch endeavor. If a president could easily enact major policy changes unilaterally, these constitutional checks would be rendered meaningless, transforming the presidency from a co-equal branch into a dominant, quasi-monarchical office.
4. Crisis Management vs. Routine Policymaking
The Concept: Chapter 13 opens by examining The Presidency as Crisis Management. In times of war, national security threats, or sudden economic shocks, the public and institutions often look to the president for fast, decisive action.
Application to Your Argument: While temporary, swift executive action may be necessary during genuine national emergencies, critics and political analysts warn against normalizing unilateralism for everyday domestic and economic policy. Permanent unilateral policy-setting conflates emergency crisis response with normal democratic governance, cutting out the voice of the people expressed through their elected legislators.
Noble
Statutory Constraints and Delegation: Presidents can only act within authority already delegated by Congress and cannot create entirely new programs or regulatory frameworks without a statutory basis.
Durability Problems: Unilateral executive actions lack permanence because future presidents can easily rescind or undo their predecessors' executive orders overnight.
The "Green Lantern" Theory: This concept exposes the misconception that presidents can bypass institutional barriers at will, emphasizing that bypassing Congress undermines the system of checks and balances.
Separation of Powers & Constitutional Design: The Framers deliberately designed a system where lawmaking authority rests with Congress to prevent unilateral tyranny and ensure national safety through collective deliberation.
10/22 Lecture
Limited office on Paper
Constitution gives president no lawmaking power
Vague Article II: “executive power”
Powers grow through practice, crisis, and delegation
Today: most powerful office in practice
Formal Powers
Inform and persuade: State of the Union, speeches, no real check
Presidential veto: return the bill, override needs 2/3 of both chambers; no line-term veto (struck down 1998)
Recommend legislation, but Congress can ignore it
Pardons for federal crimes, no real check
Presidential appointments: cabinet, White House staff, EOP, judges, Senate confirms many
Pres is Commander in chief: troops without a declaration, but notify in 48 hrs, 60 day limit
Head of State: recieves ambassadors; Logan Act
Congress declares war, funds troops, ratifies treaties
Inherent Executive Power
Not in text, but claimed and upheld
Executive orders: directives w force of law
Executive privilege: withhold information from Congress
Unilateral Tools
Executive orders to executive officers
Proclamations to people outside government (pardons, tariffs)
National Security directives
Executive agreements, treaties without Senate
Is it Constitutional
Yes
1930s-1940s: broad unilateral power in foreign affairs
Later: domestic actions upheld too (internment)
Rising since 1945: demands, courts, agencies, gridlock
Public cost of Unilateral Action
Do voters punish presidents for going it alone
Reeves&Rogowski
Can justifications help?
Same experiment, add a reason
“Congress won’t act”
“I feel strongly”
“National Security is at Issue”
Going public (Kernell)
Pressure Congress by mobilizing the public
Works worse when polarized: presidential involvement polarizes the issue
Presidents talk to their own side
Wrap up
formal power few n checked, informal n unilateral grown
Unilateral is legal but carries cost unless justified by gridlock
going public polarizes the expectation gap frustrates everyone
Lecture 10/29 The Bureaucracy: Is the “Deep State” Real?
Laws are not self-executing
2025 order ends birthright citizenship, deemed unconstitutional; wasn’t self-executing so hard to implement
Who would check parents’ status? Documents? Which forms?— Trump isn’t gonna do it himself
Clean Air Act says “reduce pollution”, EPA sets the numbers
Someone has to turn text into action
Why delegate?
Expertise: Congress can’t master nuclear safety and food inspection— too much info to focus on, so they make agencies
Workload: 535 people can’t make every decision
Flexibility: adapt without new law
Consistency across the country
Price: unelected officials with real discretion; president appoints and constituents get no say
Three Eras
Federalist (1789-1829): “respectability,” Washington hires the competent elite
Jacksonian (1829-1883): spoils system, “to the victor belong the spoils”— picked based on whether they helped Jackson get reelected
Progressive Era to today: merit system, exams, protection from political firing
From Spoils to Merit
1881: Garfield shot by a disappointed office-seeker
1883: Pendleton Act: competitive exams, no political removals
Outgoing presidents “blanketed in” their own appointees under merit protection
New Deal: =80% of federal jobs under merit protection
1960s bureaucracy grows
Who’s “the bureaucracy”?
15 cabinet departments (State, Treasury, Defense)
Independent Agencies: EPA, NASA, CIA
Regulatory commissions: FCC, SEC, the Fed, boards, staggered terms. federal reserve
Government corporations: USPS, Amtrak; corporations that act like businesses
Two kinds of bureaucrats
Career Civil servants: millions; hired on merit; stay across administrations— federal employees qualified for the job
Political appointees:=4000; serve at the president’s pleasure
Careerists=continutiy and expertise; appointees=democratic direction
Built-in friction: careerists prioritize process and appointees prioritize speed
Rulemaking
Administrative Procedure Act (1946)
Notice of proposed rule in Federal Register→ public comment→response→ final rule
Final rules have force of law
Agency Loss
Elected officials (principals) can’t fully monitor bureaucrats (agents)
ex.) boss hires employee/agent but won’t know if they acc do it
Agency loss- what principals want versus what agents do
Sources: information asymmetry, multiple principals, preference divergence, vague statues
Congress: Police Patrol vs Fire Alarms
Tools: statutes, appropriations, hearings, confirmations, investigations
Police Patrol: proactive, expensive monitoring
Fire alarm: let affected groups and the press sound the alarm
Congress prefers alarm cus more efficient
Presidents and courts
President: appointments, removal (limited for independents), executive orders, budget
Schedule F: reclassify career jobs as removable (2020; rescinded; revived 2025)
Courts (APA): strike rules that are arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, or procedurally defective
Chevron deference (1984) overturned by Loper Bright (2024)
The Paradox
Americans dislike “the bureaucracy”
But love national parks, medical research, air traffic control
Expertise vs. control, stability vs. responsiveness, efficiency vs safeguards
Wrapup
delegation is unavoidable: expertise, workload, flexibility, consistency
Spoils→ merit; appointees vs careerists
Rulemaking under APA; agency loss
Control: patrols/alarms, appointments/ Schedule F, judicial review
Lecture 11/3: Election Day— Elections and Participation: Who Decides Who Decides?
What’s on the Ballot?
435 House seats, 35 Senate seats, 36 governors
California: governor, statewide offices, propositions
Midterm pattern: President’s party usually loses seats
If there’s a tie in senate, vp steps in
Elections help fix principal-agent problem
Agents shirk: vote against you, serve donors, skip work
Possible because of information asymmetry
Electoral accountability: threat of removal
Three functions: selection, responsiveness, fire-alarm oversight
Who could vote?
1789: states decide→white male property owners
1800-1840: property tests fall for white men (counts as democratization, politicians had to be more responsive)
15th amendment (1870) race
19th amendment (1920) sex
24th (1964) Poll taxes
26th (1971) age 18
Voting Rights Act (1965)- effectively enfranchised based on race
Who does vote?
Presidential turnout ~60-65%; midterms much lower
Higher: older, more educated, higher-income, white
Officials respond to who votes → others disengage → gap widens
Paradox of Voting
Your vote never decides the outcome; voting costs time
vote bc we fought for the rights, only chance to speak up about politics
Expressive benefits: duty, identity
Social pressure: overestimating impact; group loyalty
Costs are lower for the resourced →explains participation gap
How voters decide
Party ID: strongest predictor—2024: 95% of democrats, 94% of republicans voted with their party
Prospective: promises; Retrospective: performance, economy
Candidate traits as shortcuts: veteran, teacher, “one of us”
Party ID is a perceptual screen, not just tribalism
How candidates decide
Median voter theorem: candidates converge to the middle to win elections
Primaries pull outward; pivoting is costly
Polarization and base mobilization push against convergence
2024: voters placed Trump closer to themselves than Harris
Elections as coordination
Aggregate preferences into a clear choice
Establishes a mandate
Enables peaceful transfer of power
Create legitimacy, but only if losers accept result
Wrap up: elections create accountability thru selection, responsiveness, alarms
franchise expanded slowly, participation still unequal
paradox of voting, low chance to change outcome but party id dominates choice
median voter theorem vs primaries and polarization
Lecture 11/5: Public Opinion and Polling: What happened on Tuesday?
What is public opinion?
Citizens’ attitudes about issues, leaders, institutions
The link in the principal-agent chain: officials must be responsive enough
Two-way: leaders follow opinion and shape it
Expressed via polls, votes, calls, protest, donations, media
Personal Sources
Self-interest, economic and cultural (What’s the Matter with Kansas?)
Values: liberals care/fairness; conservatives loyalty/authority/sanctity (sacred like family values)
Information: most know little, rationally ignorant; “top-of-the-head” answers
Social Sources
Socialization: family first, lifelong
Your political cohort: events at 18-25 stick; Change often comes by generational replacement
Media framing; opinion leaders
Political sources
Partisanship: identity or running tally? Both
Same economy looks better when your party holds the White House
Ideology: liberal/conservative labels have grown; consistency has risen
Many hold “inconsistent” views, labels are simplifications
How Opinions Move
Elite cues (vaccines)
Framing and salience immigration as economics vs culture
Same-sex marriage: =70% opposed (1990s) → ~70% support
Facts rarely move attitudes (Hopkins, Sides, Citrin)
Thermostatic Public Opinion
Public preferences shift opposite to government action
Policy moves left → public asks for “less” → and vice versa
Public prefers moderate, status-quo-ish policy
Helps explain midterm losses for president’s party
Is Polling Broken?
1936 Literary Digest: 2.4 million responses, predicted Landon; FDR won 46 states
Phone and car owners in Depression = Sampling Bias
Gallup: a smaller, representative sample got it right
Every poll = sample + questionaire + mode
Sampling
Ideal: random sample, everyone has equal chance
Reality: no list of all Americans; nobody has to answer
Sampling Bias: method excludes groups
Non-response bias: answerers =/ non-answerers
if smb thinks its sketchy, they may answer differently
Margin of Error
Random sampling error only, +- 3 to 4
48 to 45 with 3% MOE, gap could be 0 to 9, either could lead
A “surge” from 46 to 48 is noise
Report ranges, not points
So, broken?
2024 error was the lowest since 1998; 2018 and 2022 were good
Misses cluster in presidential races with Trump on the ballot
Leads <=3 points; >3 usually right
Feels broken: close races, headlines without uncertainty, 70% read as 100%
Wrap up
Opinions from interest, values, socialization, partisanship
Elite cues, framing, and thermostat moves it
polls: sample, questionnaire, mode; bias vs random error; weighting
polling isn’t broken
Lecture 13, 11/10: Courts Overview
State Courts
Vast majority of cases: burglary, assault, contracts, torts
tort: damages, bulk of cases
Each state: trial courts → intermediate appeals → state supreme court
39 states elect at least some judges
California: elected trial judges; appointed appellate judges face retention votes
Federal Courts
94 district courts: trials under federal law
13 circuit (appeals) courts: review law, not facts
Appointing Judges
All federal judges: president nominates, senate confirms
Life tenure; salary continues after retirement
Removal only thru impeachment
Nominations are now partisan prizes: Garland 2016, Kavanaugh 2018, Barrett 2020
Supreme Court
9 justices, by statute, not the Constitution
Chief Justice + 8 associates; majority rule
Chief (if in the majority) assigns the opinion; else the senior justice does
concurrence: agree with the holding, not the reasoning
dissent: disagree with the holding
Supreme Court Jurisdiction and Cert
Discretionary docket since 1925: had to give attention to every case till 1925
Writ of certiorari: Court agrees to hear an appeal
Rule of 4: 4 justices to grant cert
Granted for circuit splits and constitutional questions
Original jurisdiction: state vs state, ambassadors, US vs a State
Judicial Review
Power to strike acts of Congress or the president as unconstitutional
Not in the text
Marbury v Madison (1803): “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”
How to read the constitution
Originalism: intentions of those who wrote and ratified it
Textualism: what the words most plausibly mean
Living constitutionalism: meaning in light of the whole nation history
Stare Decisis: “let the decision stand". follow precedent
Procedure
Briefs; amicus curiae briefs from friends of the court
Oral argument: audio, no cameras
private conference and vote
opinion announced; precedent set
wrap up
state courts do most of work; federal: district → circuit → supreme
Appointment for life; nominations politicized
cert and rule of four; judicial review since marbury
4 interpretive approaches
Lecture 14 11/12, Strategy in the Courts
Imagine a gun-control case
Congress bans certain semi-automatic rifles
challenged under 2nd amendment
How will each justice decide
Legal Model
Justices follow the law: text, precedent, accepted rules
Personal politics dont matter, judges are referees
Outcome depends on how they read Constitution and past cases
Attitudinal Model
Justices vote based on ideology
Conservatives prefer gun rights; liberals gun control
Law is flexible enough to justify either
Strategic Model
Justices care about policy and consequences
Anticipate public opinion, Congress, the president, the Court’s reputation
Compromise to protect legitimacy or hold a majority
Outcome depends on how popular the ban is
Courts and the separation of power
Constitutional amendment
Court-curbing legislation / statutory revision
Nonimplementation
Jurisdiction stripping
Adding seats, common in lower courts, taboo at top since 1937
What motivates justices?
Policy preferences
Public opinion and legitimacy
Fear of nonimplementation
Autonomy from other branches
Wrap up
Legal, attitudinal, strategic, evidence favors ideeology plus strategy
Checks: amendments, statutes, nonimplementation, jurisdiction seats
Motivations": policym opinion, implemntatin, autonomy