Chapter 3: What Makes You You

Chapter 3: What Makes You You

Introduction

  • The chapter explores the question of personal identity, questioning whether physical aspects or psychological aspects determine what makes an individual who they are.

  • The author asserts that neither bodily facts nor mental facts provide a definitive answer, leaving the question open and potentially unanswerable.

  • The chapter is structured into several sections:
      - Section 2: Clarifying the question of personal identity.
      - Section 3: Considering various potential answers.
      - Section 4: A close examination of the idea that one’s body defines their identity, with arguments against this view.
      - Section 5: Addressing psychological accounts of personal identity and their shortcomings.
      - Section 6: Discussing the suggestion that one’s soul may define their identity.
      - Section 7: Rejection of the notion that a combination of bodily and psychological accounts can yield a satisfactory answer.

2. Clarifying the Question of Personal Identity

  • Clarification of the key inquiry: What makes you, the person you are?

  • The focus is on identifying conditions under which we can affirm that two individuals at different times are numerically the same person.

Exploring Identity Through Examples

  • Example of identifying a child in a birthday photo:
      - The child resembles the adult but has different physical and psychological traits.
      - Key question: What makes the child in the picture the same person as the adult?

  • Aim: Fill in the blank in this formulation: "A at time t is the same person as B at time t* if and only if ___"

Ambiguity of 'Same'

  • The word 'same' holds two meanings in discourse:
      - Qualitative Same: Similar characteristics, e.g., color or model of cars.
      - Numerically Same: One and the same entity, e.g., Cassius Clay is Muhammad Ali.

  • The chapter focuses on numerical sameness between individuals.

  • Distinction importance: Qualitative differences do not negate identity. One may change physically or mentally yet remain the same individual (numerically).

Avoiding Simple Accounts

  • A satisfactory account cannot simply rely on superficial identifiers (like fingerprints).

  • Example (LEAVE NO TRACE): After losing fingerprints, one remains numerically the same individual, contradicting a fingerprint-based identity account.

3. Some Promising and Unpromising Answers

3.1 Physical Accounts
Fingerprints Account

  • Claims that two individuals are the same if they have indistinguishable fingerprints.

  • Critique: Does not account for identity after loss of fingerprints.

  • Statistical issues arise because two individuals could, by coincidence, have identical fingerprints.

DNA Account

  • Proposal: Identity is defined by having indistinguishable DNA.

  • Advantages over fingerprints include the constancy of DNA during changes.

  • Critique: Identical twins have indistinguishable DNA but are distinct individuals.

Same Body Account

  • Proposal: Identity is defined by having the same body.

  • Definitions: Refers to the whole body's numeric sameness, not just parts.

  • Advantage: Avoids problems of fingerprint and DNA accounts by asserting that identity remains the same with a numerically unchanged body.

  • Critique: Bodies can change over time yet remain the same numerically.

3.2 Psychological Answers

  • Psychological features include memories, beliefs, personality, and current perceptual experiences.

Psychological Matching Account

  • Proposal: Two persons at different times are the same if their psychological features are identical.

  • Critique: This proposal is overly demanding, as people change their memories and experiences constantly.

Psychological Overlap Account

  • Suggests identity arises if psychological features mostly overlap.

  • Critique: Fails to recognize the identity of people who have grown over longer periods (e.g., childhood to adulthood transformations).

Psychological Descendant Account

  • Proposition: A person at time t is the same as B at time t* if A is either a psychological ancestor or descendant of B.

  • Advantage: Accounts for both gradual change and sustained identity.

4. Against the Same Body Account

Argument From Conjoined Twins

  • Using Abby and Brittany Hensel as a case study, the account fails to acknowledge their distinct identities despite sharing a body.

  • Conjoined twins exemplify that sharing a body does not equate to being the same individual.

Argument From Body Swaps

  • A hypothetical body swap scenario underlines the insufficiency of the Same Body Account, leading to wrong conclusions about identity.

  • Definitions introduced for clarity regarding body types before and after swapping.

5. Against the Psychological Descendant Account

Arguments from Discontinuity
TOTAL AMNESIA Case Study

  • Discusses loss of identity through complete memory loss, presenting problems for the descendant account.

TOTAL BLACKOUT Case Study

  • Minjun's case illustrates that an unconscious individual cannot be considered a psychological descendant of a conscious one.

Argument from Fission

  • DOUBLE TROUBLE represents a case where an individual's memories and perceptions duplicate into two people, challenging the coherence of the Psychological Descendant Account.

6. Souls

The Same Soul Account

  • The proposition that having the same soul equates to being the same person.

  • Critique: Fails to provide a substantive framework for identity and raises questions about how souls interact with personhood.

7. Combining the Psychological and Bodily Accounts

Body-And-Mind Account

  • Proposal that having the same body and being a psychological ancestor/descendant dictates identity.

  • Affinities over previous theories (e.g., recognizing conjoined twins as two different individuals).

Body-Or-Mind Account

  • Allows for either bodily sameness or psychological linkage to define personal identity.

  • Yet results in conflicts in scenarios involving individuals with shared identities or swapped bodies.

8. Conclusion

  • Explored multiple theories regarding personal identity, all insufficient in accounting for identity.

  • Reflective implications on ethical and identity-related issues in personal identity remain unresolved, leading to significant questions about existence and scenarios of identity replication.

Reflection Questions

  1. Defend the Same Body Account against the Conjoined Twins argument.

  2. Assess a Same Brain Account in contrast with a Same Body Account.

  3. Consider defenses for the Psychological Descendant Account against the Blackout Argument.

  4. Propose a superior hybrid account that addresses current theoretical shortcomings.

Sources

  • Notable philosophers referenced: John Locke, Derek Parfit, Heather Demarest, among others.

  • Additional resources range from YouTube links to philosophical literature.

  1. Defend the Same Body Account against the Conjoined Twins argument.

    • A potential defense of the Same Body Account is that identity is tied to the biological organism as a whole, regardless of the individual's experiences or psychological traits. In the case of conjoined twins like Abby and Brittany Hensel, although they share a body, each twin has distinct experiences, memories, and personalities that affirm their individual identities. The Same Body Account could argue that their connectedness does not negate their separate identities, highlighting that the definition of identity should focus on the holistic view of the body rather than psychological or experiential standpoints.

  2. Assess a Same Brain Account in contrast with a Same Body Account.

    • A Same Brain Account could argue that identity is defined through the continuity of mental processes tied to a specific brain. However, this account faces challenges similar to the psychological accounts, particularly when considering cases like the aforementioned conjoined twins, who may share brain functions but still maintain distinct identities. The Same Body Account asserts that identity derives from a unified physical organism, allowing for individuality even amid shared biological structures, whereas the Same Brain Account may struggle to accommodate cases where mental functions overlap but individual identities exist.

  3. Consider defenses for the Psychological Descendant Account against the Blackout Argument.

    • To defend the Psychological Descendant Account against the Blackout Argument (where an individual's consciousness is completely absent), one could argue that identity can exist in a latent form. For instance, if a person’s psychological characteristics can be restored or re-emerged after a blackout, they can still be considered a descendant of their previous self. This suggests that identity might not hinge solely on continuous awareness but also on a deeper psychological continuity that can accommodate periods of unconsciousness or memory loss.

  4. Propose a superior hybrid account that addresses current theoretical shortcomings.

    • A superior hybrid account could integrate both bodily and psychological aspects, suggesting that identity results from the combination of a stable physical entity (same body) and the unique psychological features that are continuously evolving. This Body-Psychological Continuity Account would assert that as long as there remains a physical continuity of the body, alongside a sufficient overlap of psychological traits, the individual maintains their identity. Such a synthesis would account for cases of memory loss, psychological development, and even instances of shared bodies, allowing for more comprehensive reflections on identity.