Criminal Procedure: Stop and Frisk

Introduction to Stop and Frisk\n* Three types of citizen-police encounters:\n * Exchanging pleasantries and greetings.\n * Requiring inquiry based on reasonable suspicion.\n * Arrest based on probable cause.\n\n### The Terry Legal Standard\n* Basis: Established by Terry v. Ohio, $392$ U.S. $1$ ($1968$).\n* Stop: Permitted upon "reasonable suspicion" of criminality.\n * Unusual circumstances indicate potential criminal activity.\n * Allows a brief stop and limited inquiry.\n * Requires less evidence than probable cause.\n* Frisk: Permitted if there's an objectively reasonable fear that the subject may be armed and dangerous.\n * Allows a limited pat-down of outer clothing for weapons.\n * Not automatic; requires specific fear.\n* Process:\n * Brief stop/conversation may resolve suspicion or necessitate a frisk.\n * Frisk may end suspicion or produce probable cause for arrest.\n* Fourth Amendment: A stop is considered a seizure; a frisk is a search, both must be reasonable.\n* Invalid Actions: Stops or frisks based on mere hunch or insufficient facts violate the Fourth Amendment.\n * A weapon-like lump found justifies search of interior clothing.\n\n### Facts Indicating Unusual Conduct\n* Information can be derived from:\n * Officer’s observation.\n * Fellow officer’s knowledge.\n * Citizen’s complaint.\n * Informant’s information (especially if corroborated, Alabama v. White, $1990$).\n * Police dispatcher.\n * A combination of sources.\n* Automobile Application: Officer needs reasonable suspicion that the vehicle harbors a criminal, contains contraband, or an occupant is unlawfully armed.\n\n### Officer Status and Flight\n* Officer Identification: Subject must be aware they are dealing with a police officer. If not uniformed, officer must properly identify.\n* Flight as Unusual Conduct:\n * Mere flight upon seeing an officer, without more, is insufficient for a stop and frisk.\n * Flight combined with other factors (e.g., high crime area) may permit a stop and frisk (Illinois v. Wardlow, $2000$).\n\n### Reason to Believe Armed and Dangerous\n* Frisk is not automatic; it requires a reasonable fear that the person is armed and dangerous.\n* Suspected drug traffickers are often presumed to be armed.\n* Investigation must not dispel the fear that the subject may be armed and dangerous.\n\n### Limitations on Frisk and Additional Search\n* Insufficient grounds: Reputation alone, or vague observations without objective signs of criminality, are insufficient for a stop or frisk (Sibron v. New York, $1968$).\n* If basic stop is unreasonable, subsequent frisk is also unreasonable (Shackelford v. State, $1991$).\n\n### Terry Stops Under a Drug Courier Profile\n* Definition: A group of behaviors/characteristics indicating potential drug smuggling/possession.\n* Usage: May justify a stop and sometimes a frisk based on reasonable and articulable suspicion.\n* Limitations: Cannot be used as substantive evidence of guilt.\n* Duration: Brief detention and inquiry allowed; prolonged detention becomes an illegal arrest (Florida v. Royer, $1990$).\n\n### The Plain Feel Doctrine\n* Standard: During a lawful frisk, an object is seizable if its touch or feel immediately indicates its criminal nature (e.g., firearm, knife, obvious drugs).\n* Limitation: No manipulation of the object is permitted; manipulation constitutes an illegal search beyond the scope of a frisk (Minnesota v. Dickerson, $1993$).\n\n### Expansion of Stop and Frisk Beyond Terry's Genesis\n* Courts have approved stops/seizures even without specific fear of being armed or dangerous in certain contexts:\n * Seizure of luggage (Florida v. Royer, $1983$).\n * Frisk of vehicle interior after traffic stop (Michigan v. Long, $1983$).\n * Ordering passengers from a vehicle during a traffic stop without individualized suspicion or fear (Maryland v. Wilson, $1997$).\n * Vehicle occupants (drivers/passengers) are considered "seized" during such stops (Brendlin v. California, $2007$).\n* Allows officers to enter interstate buses to converse with passengers and ask for consent to search bags/persons, even without initial suspicion (United States v. Drayton, $2002$).\n* If stopped, subject is generally not required to provide identification unless state law requires it and there is suspicion of criminal activity (Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District, $2004$).\n\n### Summary\n* Suspicious persons can be briefly seized based on less than probable cause.\n* Frisk is permitted if there is a fear the person may be armed.\n* Profiles can aid in identification but require reasonable, articulable suspicion.\n* Investigation must resolve or confirm initial suspicion rapidly.