Summary of J.L Mackie's 'Evil and Omnipotence"
PARA 1:
God cannot be proved by rational proof. Some theologians can accept this, and still claim that god exists. This is because being unable to rationally prove god’s existence is an external problem.
However, through the problem of evil and suffering, the idea of god is contradicted. There are several parts of the essential theological doctrine which are inconsistent: god’s omnipotence, omni-benevolence and omniscience. This is because evil leads to an illogical conclusion of god which demolishes the assumption of god. This is an internal problem, as the inconsistent triad contradicts the existence of god, thus a theologian has to overcome problems within their own doctrine; their problems are intrinsic to their doctrine.
PARA 2:
The problem of evil is only a problem for someone who believes that there is a god that is both omnipotent and wholly good. When solving a problem, one can either come up with theoretical, or existential (practical) solutions. The problem of evil is a logical problem, which needs to be solved rationally, not a scientific problem which can be solved by further observations. Thus, Mackie dismisses the solutions provided by theologians, who parry the problem with statements such as “evil is something to be faced and overcome, not merely discussed”, as these solutions are all practical approaches. The problem we then come to face is that the problem of evil cannot be solved through practical solutions, as evil in itself is theoretical.
PARA 3:
In the simplest form of the problem, there are three premises:
God is good
God is omnipotent
Evil exists
As pointed out in the theory of the inconsistent triad, there seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions; they are mutually exclusive in the sense that if two of them are true, the third is seemingly false. The problem of evil cannot be resolved because of inner contradictions between premises. Thus, a theologian cannot consistently adhere to all three propositions, yet they must in order to defend the existence of a classical god.
PARA 4:
Having said this, the contradiction between these three propositions is not at first obvious. In order to show this, the three premises above must be clarified:
God is good→ ‘good’ will always try to destroy evil as far as it can
Irenean theodicy would argue against this→ god uses evil so humans can develip into the image + likeness of god
God is omnipotent→ god has ‘full’ omnipotence*
Evil exists
This is because ambiguity leads to false solutions.
Mackie argues that the propositions that a good omnipotent god’s existence is incompatible with the existence of evil.
*full omnipotence vs limited omnipotence:
full omnipotence: god can do anything (including stuff that would be logically impossible e.g. a chair so heavy god cannot pick it up, which is paradoxical)
limited omnipotence: god can only do what is logically possible
PARA 5:
Now that the problem is fully outlined, it can be solved, in the sense that if you lose one of the premises, the problem of evil will not arise (e.g. admit that god is not wholly good, or not quite omnipotent, or that evil does not exist, or that good is not opposed to the kind of evil that exists, or that there are limits to what an omnipotent thing can do).
however, theologians do not want to do this, as if you change the premises, then god cannot be God.
ultimately, all adequate solutions to the problem avoid the problem all together, and they adopt less extreme beliefs about god.
PARA 6:
There have been a number of adequate solutions of the problem of evil, such as:
denying god’s omnipotence
limit omnipotence until omnipotence until omnipotence doesn’t mean omnipotence
Buddhist option: evil is an illusion, and things that we call evil are not really evil, but just change → this is because everything is transient
Augustine → evil is simply a privation of good, and a tangible evil which is opposed to good doesn’t exist.
The Pope argues that it is simply a lack of understanding of the universe on our part; in the grand scheme of things, evil is always good
by accepting these solutions, the problem of evil does not arise for you, however you might then have other problems to face (i.e. is god is no longer God)
PARA 7:
Often, these adequate solutions are only almost adopted; the solutions are not consistent, but are instead contradictory:
→ The thinkers who restrict god’s power present the power of god as limited, but keep the label “omnipotent”, which means once they’ve moved past the issue of evil, they backtrack and claim god’s full omnipotence again.
→ those who say that evil is an illusion may also be thinking, inconsistently, that this illusion is itself an evil
→ those claiming that evil is merely a privation of good may inconsistently think that the privation of good is an evil.
modifying what they claim; the pope says that evil is only apparent and in the grand scheme of things it is fine, BUT then treats evil as a real thing.
the issue is when the thinker is now saying there is something, when originally, they said there was nothing
PARA 8:
Ultimately, the problem is that people want to hold onto the three established premises, despite denouncing them to get around the problem.
You cant just backtrack to God’s original qualities once you have solved the problem of evil.
PARA 9:
There are other, fallacious solutions, which say they hold onto all three premises, but logically reject at least one of them.
PARA 10:
The issue Mackie has with the fallacious solutions is that they either reject one of the premises, or they are vague about the meaning of the premises. Sometimes, they reassert propositions, or bring back the original meaning to make the proofs work, which is inconsistent.
PARA 11:
Sometimes, it is suggested that evil is necessary as a counterpart to good, and that in order to have good, one must have evil, and vice versa. It argues that good must have a logical counterpart (i.e. evil) for it to exist
(god cannot exist without evil/ evil is necessary as a counterpart to good)
→PARA 12:
However, this sets a limit to what god can do, and says that god cannot create good without creating evil.
This argues that good needs evil as a counter part, which restricts god’s omnipotence, and thus labels god with limited omnipotence, which goes against the claim that god is fully omnipotent.
omnipotence means to do what is logically possible (limited omnipotence) thus one cannot ask god to get rid of evil if god is good- thus evil needs to exist
Having said this, limited omnipotence is not the only idea of omnipotence; some claim that omnipotence means to be able to do the logically impossible, because the laws of logic were created by god, so he myst be able to break them.
This is inconsistent with the idea that good cannot exist without evil as if god isn’t bound by logic, then god doesn’t necessarily NEED evil, to exist.
→PARA 13:
this solution denies that evil is opposed to good in our original. this changes the original definition of good and evil (in that they will always try to destroy each other) and good vs evil becomes the same as big vs small in the sense that they depend on each other but are not logically opposed → getting rid of its ontological existence (as something that exists by itself)
when the term ‘great’ is used relatively, as a condensation of ‘greater than so-and-so’ and small is used correspondingly, greatness and smallness are counterparts and cannot exist without each others. good and evil do not exist, they are simply relative to each other.
→ PARA 14
BUT there is also big/ small in an absolute sense, and are not logically necessary counterparts: either quality could exist without the other. In theory, there would be no logical impossibility in everything being small or in everything being great.
→PARA 15
You cannot have greatness and smallness as being necessary counterparts AND as being mutually opposed forces or objects for support or attack
If evil and goodness are relative, you are depriving evil and good of an existence by themselves, and therefore they do not exist
If evil and goodness are absolute, you are saving the existence of evil, but you lose the counterpart of evil (goodness)
Thus, you cannot have both premise 1 and premise 2.
→ PARA 16:
Mackie uses the example of ‘redness’ and ‘non-redness’, to compare the quality of good and its necessary counterpart, and logical opposite, evil. He argues that redness can only occur if non-redness also occurs. In this case he argues that similarly, both good and evil need to exist in order to see each quality.
But, unless evil is merely the privation of good, they are not logical counterparts, and they are not fighting qualities.
We observe and give names to qualities only if they have real opposites, and red and non-red are not ontological, but just needs of language and thought. God could have made everything good, but we would not notice it.
NB: ontological principal- something that exists without us perceiving its existence
→PARA 17:
If we concede that evil IS an ontological principle, it only provides a solution if someone is willing to say that evil is overwhelmed by goodness. If evil exists ontologically, there should only be enough to serve as a counterpart to good. In order to justify evil, there needs to only be a tiny bit, but no one would be able to accept this, as there is lots of evil in the world.
“evil is necessary as a means to good”
→PARA 18:
Evil cannot be a means to an end as it would limit god’s omnipotence as it means that god cannot make good by itself, and is thus imposing a restriction on what god can/ cannot do. the idea that evil is a means to an end means that god is restricted by causal laws.
“the universe is better with some evil in it than it could be if there were no evil”
→PARA 19:
the solution can either be supported by an aesthetic analogy (the contrast between good and evil makes the good appear better), or by the idea that a world in progress is better than one that is already perfect
→ PARA 20
Mackie argues that the problem of this argument is that they equate evil to pain and disease.
→ PARA 21
But, this is too simple/ shallow Mackie argues that there is a first order of good (good 1), which includes happiness/ pleasure. This means that there then must be a first order of evil (evil1), which is the opposite, i.e. pain and disease. From this first order of evil, a seconf order of good (good 2) is formed. which comes from combating/ challenging the first order of evil, and this includes qualities such as resilience and heroism. good 2 outweighs good 1 + evil 1
→ PARA 22
so far, this is a good answer bc evil 1 is justified because it brings about good 2, which is better than evil 1.
However, it changes the premise that good is opposed to evil. This is a good attempt, explaining that god tries to maximise good 2.
god’s goodness is an example of third order goodness (good 3)
→ PARA 23
BUT in this solution, second order good is not ontological/ a substance, but simply a means to 1st order good. Therefore it loses its existence, and is simply a biproduct. thus, you lose the existence of evil, and it simply becomes a means
→PARA 24
god doesnt care about getting rid of evil, just about making good 2. But, this is not what you would expect from a benevolent god.
→PARA 25
a good 2 could, equally have a second order of evil (evil 2). This might mean that evil 1 + good 2 could = evil 2. This type of solution gives way to a worse type of evil → a benevolent god would like to get rid of evil 2, but it is still there
→ PARA 26
furthermore, even if there is an evil 2, there must then be a third order good (good 3). This theory generates an infinite regress, which is illogical and impossible.
“evil is due to human free will”
→ PARA 27
summarises Augustine’s theodicy
→PARA 28
we are acting upon the assumption that it’s better for humans to have free will and be bad than not have it and be good.
good 1 + 2 and evil 1 + 2 are all needed to justify freedom
→ PARA 29
this solution is unsatisfactory bc of the incoherence of the notion of freedom of will, but doesnt have enough time to write abt it here
→ PARA 30
asks the question, why didn’t god make people always freely choose good. God was given the option to make people free and choose the right decision every time, yet he didn’t.