Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism

2 Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism

Introduction

  • Heinrich Hertz Quotation: Highlights the importance of distinguishing the reality of nature from human descriptions.
  • Historical Context: The discussion refers to the context of logical positivism as an early dominant philosophy of science, and its critique by scientific realists.
  • Aim: To analyze and criticize the main arguments for scientific realism while introducing the alternative view called constructive empiricism.

§1. Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism

§1.1 Statement of Scientific Realism
  • Definition: Scientific realism posits that scientific theories provide a true, faithful account of the world and that scientific endeavors yield discoveries.
  • Naïve Interpretation: It may falsely suggest that contemporary theories are necessarily correct, but scientific realists acknowledge evolving theories may not universally hold true.
  • Two Important Questions:
    1. What is a scientific theory?
    2. What does a scientific theory do?
  • Thus, Scientific Realism:
    • A more nuanced statement defines scientific realism as: "Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true."
  • Wilfrid Sellars:
    • Claims that having good reason to hold a theory also means having good reasons to believe in the existence of the theory's postulated entities.
  • Brian Ellis's View:
    • Scientific realism suggests theoretical statements are generalized true descriptions of reality.
  • Hilary Putnam's Definitions:
    • A realist holds that theory sentences can be true or false, determined by something external to our perceptions and language.
§1.2 Alternatives to Realism
  • Anti-Realism: The opposing view argues that the aim of science does not require literal truth in its theories; empirical adequacy is sufficient.
  • Realist vs. Anti-Realist Approaches:
    • Realists: Propose theories asserting truth.
    • Anti-Realists: Display theories and argue for their virtues without committing to truth, such as empirical adequacy.
§1.3 Constructive Empiricism
  • Literal Construal: A theory’s claims (like ‘There are electrons’) must be understood in literal terms, as claims about real existence.
  • Empirically Adequate Theories: A theory is said to be empirically adequate if it accurately describes observable phenomena: "saves the phenomena."
  • Acceptance: Involves a commitment beyond mere belief; it also entails engaging with the phenomena using the theory’s framework.

§2. The Theory/Observation ‘Dichotomy’

  • Logical Positivism: Dominated philosophy of science until challenged by realists like Grover Maxwell, who argued against the strict theory/observation distinction.
  • Categorical Distinction Mistakes: The terms ‘theoretical entity’ and ‘observable’ should not conflate theoretical terms with observable entities.
  • Maxwell's Arguments: Asserts both that language is theory-laden and that we can not neatly separate observable from unobservable phenomena.

§3. Inference to the Best Explanation

  • Sellars, Smart, and Harman's Views:
    • They argue that rational inference leads to scientific realism; a good explanation supports the existence of unobservable entities.
  • Rule of Inference to the Best Explanation:
    • If hypothesis H better explains evidence E than H′, we should infer H.
  • Objections:
    1. The naturalness of rules requires assumption of belief in one hypothesis over another.
    2. The inference does not necessarily lead to acceptance of unobservable entities; empirical adequacy might be sufficient.

§4. Limits of the Demand for Explanation

  • Smart's Argument for Realism: Asserts only realism adequately explains distinctions in theories (correct vs. useful).
  • Anti-Realist Counter: The usefulness of theories can be explained without asserting their truth.
  • Demand for Explanations: Unending demands lead to unrealistic expectations such as hidden variables in physics.

§5. The Principle of the Common Cause

  • Reichenbach's Principle: Suggests statistical correlations require unobservable common causes, compelling scientific realism.
  • Critique: Many observable correlations can be linked without requiring such entities, and this has no necessity within modern physics.
  • Regress of Common Causes: We can keep demanding new common causes indefinitely without satisfying the original question.
  • Tactical vs. Demanding Roles: Searches for common causes can be accepted as a practical methodological guide without committing to a metaphysical framework.

§6. Limits to Explanation: A Thought Experiment

  • Sellars’ Critique: Postulates unobservable micro-structure as necessary to explain variations in observable phenomena.
  • Counterarguments:
    • Observable implications arise naturally from hypotheses should be acknowledged, reflecting no necessity of hidden structures.
  • Realist Demands on Explanation: Not all phenomena require deeper explanatory levels, especially when empirical gains are absent.

§7. Demons and the Ultimate Argument

  • Putnam’s Indispensability Arguments: Highlights that while theories may be indispensable for scientific advancement, this does not establish their truth fully.
  • Criticism of Verificationism: Claims that verificationism unnecessarily conflates all hypotheses with identical empirical content.
  • Ultimate Argument: Posits realism as explaining the success of science without it being a sheer miracle.
  • Biological Perspective: Recognizes the survival of successful scientific theories, reminiscent of Darwinian competition among species in nature.