Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism
2 Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism
Introduction
- Heinrich Hertz Quotation: Highlights the importance of distinguishing the reality of nature from human descriptions.
- Historical Context: The discussion refers to the context of logical positivism as an early dominant philosophy of science, and its critique by scientific realists.
- Aim: To analyze and criticize the main arguments for scientific realism while introducing the alternative view called constructive empiricism.
§1. Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism
§1.1 Statement of Scientific Realism
- Definition: Scientific realism posits that scientific theories provide a true, faithful account of the world and that scientific endeavors yield discoveries.
- Naïve Interpretation: It may falsely suggest that contemporary theories are necessarily correct, but scientific realists acknowledge evolving theories may not universally hold true.
- Two Important Questions:
- What is a scientific theory?
- What does a scientific theory do?
- Thus, Scientific Realism:
- A more nuanced statement defines scientific realism as: "Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true."
- Wilfrid Sellars:
- Claims that having good reason to hold a theory also means having good reasons to believe in the existence of the theory's postulated entities.
- Brian Ellis's View:
- Scientific realism suggests theoretical statements are generalized true descriptions of reality.
- Hilary Putnam's Definitions:
- A realist holds that theory sentences can be true or false, determined by something external to our perceptions and language.
§1.2 Alternatives to Realism
- Anti-Realism: The opposing view argues that the aim of science does not require literal truth in its theories; empirical adequacy is sufficient.
- Realist vs. Anti-Realist Approaches:
- Realists: Propose theories asserting truth.
- Anti-Realists: Display theories and argue for their virtues without committing to truth, such as empirical adequacy.
§1.3 Constructive Empiricism
- Literal Construal: A theory’s claims (like ‘There are electrons’) must be understood in literal terms, as claims about real existence.
- Empirically Adequate Theories: A theory is said to be empirically adequate if it accurately describes observable phenomena: "saves the phenomena."
- Acceptance: Involves a commitment beyond mere belief; it also entails engaging with the phenomena using the theory’s framework.
§2. The Theory/Observation ‘Dichotomy’
- Logical Positivism: Dominated philosophy of science until challenged by realists like Grover Maxwell, who argued against the strict theory/observation distinction.
- Categorical Distinction Mistakes: The terms ‘theoretical entity’ and ‘observable’ should not conflate theoretical terms with observable entities.
- Maxwell's Arguments: Asserts both that language is theory-laden and that we can not neatly separate observable from unobservable phenomena.
§3. Inference to the Best Explanation
- Sellars, Smart, and Harman's Views:
- They argue that rational inference leads to scientific realism; a good explanation supports the existence of unobservable entities.
- Rule of Inference to the Best Explanation:
- If hypothesis H better explains evidence E than H′, we should infer H.
- Objections:
- The naturalness of rules requires assumption of belief in one hypothesis over another.
- The inference does not necessarily lead to acceptance of unobservable entities; empirical adequacy might be sufficient.
§4. Limits of the Demand for Explanation
- Smart's Argument for Realism: Asserts only realism adequately explains distinctions in theories (correct vs. useful).
- Anti-Realist Counter: The usefulness of theories can be explained without asserting their truth.
- Demand for Explanations: Unending demands lead to unrealistic expectations such as hidden variables in physics.
§5. The Principle of the Common Cause
- Reichenbach's Principle: Suggests statistical correlations require unobservable common causes, compelling scientific realism.
- Critique: Many observable correlations can be linked without requiring such entities, and this has no necessity within modern physics.
- Regress of Common Causes: We can keep demanding new common causes indefinitely without satisfying the original question.
- Tactical vs. Demanding Roles: Searches for common causes can be accepted as a practical methodological guide without committing to a metaphysical framework.
§6. Limits to Explanation: A Thought Experiment
- Sellars’ Critique: Postulates unobservable micro-structure as necessary to explain variations in observable phenomena.
- Counterarguments:
- Observable implications arise naturally from hypotheses should be acknowledged, reflecting no necessity of hidden structures.
- Realist Demands on Explanation: Not all phenomena require deeper explanatory levels, especially when empirical gains are absent.
§7. Demons and the Ultimate Argument
- Putnam’s Indispensability Arguments: Highlights that while theories may be indispensable for scientific advancement, this does not establish their truth fully.
- Criticism of Verificationism: Claims that verificationism unnecessarily conflates all hypotheses with identical empirical content.
- Ultimate Argument: Posits realism as explaining the success of science without it being a sheer miracle.
- Biological Perspective: Recognizes the survival of successful scientific theories, reminiscent of Darwinian competition among species in nature.