Abortion

Overview of Marquis' Argument

• Marquis presents his argument in "Why Abortion is Immoral" as a challenge to traditional pro-life and pro-choice debates.

Moral Status of the Fetus

• Marquis remains neutral on whether a fetus is a person with a right to life.

• He asserts the moral status of abortion should not depend solely on the personhood of the fetus.

• The standard debate often centers on this personhood question, creating a dichotomy between pro-life and pro-choice positions.

Questioning Abortion's Morality

• If the fetus is not considered a person (e.g., at 10 weeks gestation), what makes it morally wrong to abort?

• Marquis argues that the fetal future is a critical aspect of the discussion.

The Concept of a Future Like Ours

• The fetus, at any stage of pregnancy, possesses "A future like ours," implying potential experiences, activities, and joys.

• Killing the fetus deprives it of this future, which Marquis posits as the moral justification for condemning abortion.

• Generally, killing is understood as wrong because it robs the individual of a future filled with experiences, projects, and enjoyment.

Tackling the Prediction Problem

• Critics raise concerns about the prediction problem—how can we determine if the future will be better or worse for the fetus?

• Is Marquis' argument successful despite uncertainties about potential happiness or suffering?

Marquis' Response to the Prediction Problem

• The "Future Like Ours" concept is not a prediction of outcomes for the fetus's life as a person.

• Instead, it invites individuals to empathize with the fetus, imagining themselves in its position.

• This approach encourages contemplation of whether, if alive at that stage, the fetus would wish to experience life.

Applying the Golden Rule

• Marquis encourages evaluating the future desirability of life from the perspective of the fetus.

• The Golden Rule prompts reflection: Would one wish to forego potential futures, regardless of uncertainty about happiness?

• If at 12 weeks gestation, lacking mental faculties to project oneself, two variations of perspective taking are proposed:

  • #1: As one currently is.

  • #2: As the individual in the fetus' position.

Bodily Autonomy Argument

• Marquis posits a neutral stance on the personhood of the fetus. If regarded as a non-person:

  • The fetus is seen as part of the woman's body, granting her autonomy to choose abortion.

  • Thus, abortion is not morally wrong under this premise.

The Samaritan Argument (Judith Thomson)

• Thomson argues the opposite by granting personhood to the fetus from conception and introducing the famous violinist analogy.

• She presents a scenario where one must decide if it is morally necessary to sustain the life of the violinist using one's kidneys without consent.

Implications of Thomson's Argument

• If the response is 'No'—indicating it’s permissible to disconnect the violinist—then abortion could be viewed as morally acceptable.

• Thomson suggests that imposing large sacrifices to sustain another life without consent is not a moral requirement.

Evaluating Thomson's Analogy

• The analogy raises questions about its strengths, weaknesses, and potential disanalogies when applied to pregnancies.

• Some pregnancies may not resemble involuntary connections, thus complicating the overall applicability of her argument.

Standards of Responsibility

• Thomson argues that demanding a woman's Good Samaritanism as a moral standard is too high.

• Instead, she advocates for "Minimally Decent Samaritanism"—a moral expectation that requires a lower threshold of obligation.

Legal Implications of "Minimally Decent Samaritanism"

• This principle finds expression in legal frameworks, particularly Duty to Save Laws.

• These laws vary significantly and hinge on the level of personal sacrifice required.

• Thomson acknowledges circumstances where a pregnant woman has a moral duty to support her fetus, making abortion morally wrong depending on the situation.