Exhaustive Guide to NIL, Revenue Sharing, and Athlete Branding in College Football

Introductions and Opening Remarks

• Event Overview: The session serves as a continuation of previous discussions on college football, focusing on in-depth topics including NIL (Name, Image, and Likeness), the transfer portal, collectives, the House settlement, and revenue sharing.

• Prominent Current Case Study: The lecture references the monumental development of Brennan Sorsby being ruled eligible and the subsequent backlash and aftermath of that decision in college football.

• Teaching Assistants (TAs): Eugene introduces two teaching assistants, Adam Hartog and Addie Crawford, who flew in to assist with the week's proceedings.

Profile: Dave Shumate (Guest Speaker)

• Professional Background: Dave Shumate is an NIL football partner at Three Strand Sports. He has a decorated background in college football personnel and graduated from the University of Alabama.

• Personnel Experience: Shumate has worked in personnel departments at several "Blue Blood" SEC programs including Alabama, Auburn, Georgia, and Texas A&M. He has also held Director of Player Personnel/General Manager type roles at Kansas and Central Florida (UCF).

• Unique Expertise: Unlike many agents with purely business backgrounds, Shumate specializes in player evaluation and roster building, providing a unique advantage in negotiations with collegiate General Managers (GMs).

Historical Evolution of Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL)

• The O’Bannon Case (2014): The legal roots of NIL began with Ed O’Bannon, a former UCLA basketball player, who sought compensation for his likeness used in college basketball video games.

• Official Implementation (July 1, 2021): This date marked the beginning of the NIL era. Initially, the focus was simplistic, involving players hosting summer camps, selling t-shirts, or building personal websites (e.g., Dylan Gabriel at UCF).

• Traditional NCAA Model (Pre-NIL):

  • Operated under an amateur framework where athletes could not receive outside compensation.

  • Scholarships were viewed as educational benefits rather than wages.

  • Examples of prior violations included selling textbooks or receiving payment for uncompleted summer jobs (often for as little as $50$).

The Post-House Settlement Era: Revenue Sharing (July 1, 2025)

• Revenue Share Cap: Starting in July 2025, schools are subject to an annual revenue cap of approximately $20.5\, \text{million}$ per school for the entire athletic department.

• Projected Growth: The revenue share cap is expected to rise gradually, potentially reaching $32.9\, \text{million}$ by the 2034-2035 academic year.

• Distribution Strategy:

  • Most schools allocate roughly $14\, \text{million}$ to $16\, \text{million}$ of the revenue share cap specifically to football.

  • Men’s basketball typically receives between $4.5\, \text{million}$ and $6\, \text{million}$.

  • The remainder is distributed among other varsity sports, influenced by Title IX requirements and the success of specific programs like women's basketball or softball.

Financial Mechanics: Revenue Share vs. Third-Party Funds

• Guaranteed Revenue Share: This money comes from school-level revenue (TV distributions). Payments are strictly calendared (e.g., July 1, August 1, September 1) and are the only true guarantee for the player.

• Third-Party/Collective Money:

  • This is supplemental income raised from donors and alumni, often requiring "activation" such as social media posts or attending camps.

  • Deals must be reported to and approved by the College Sports Commission (CSC) or Deloitte to ensure compliance.

  • Agencies must frequently follow up with collectives to ensure these non-guaranteed payments are made on time.

• Commission Circumvention: Some programs (e.g., LSU, Florida, Michigan) pay agent commissions directly. Every dollar paid directly to the agent does not count against the school's revenue share cap, allowing them to maximize their roster budget.

Positional Market Value in NIL

• High-Value Positions: Compensation is driven by how a player affects or protects the quarterback.

  • Quarterbacks: Often command between $1.2\, \text{million}$ and $2.0\, \text{million}$ in Power 4 conferences.

  • Edge Rushers, Interior Defensive Linemen, and Offensive Tackles: These are the next highest earners because they either pressure or protect the passer.

• Marketing Challenges for Linemen: Offensive and defensive linemen are often less marketable to third-party brands because they wear helmets and are not "skill" players. Consequently, their compensation is weighted more heavily toward guaranteed revenue share contracts rather than brand deals.

• Undervalued Positions: Inside linebackers and running backs often face budgetary pressure and may be compensated less (sometimes in the $150,000$ to $200,000$ range for non-starters) as teams prioritize other positions.

The Transfer Portal and Tampering Realities

• Portal Database: An online system where athletes declare their intent to transfer. The current model features one primary window (historically January 1–16).

• Pre-2018 Rules: Coaches previously held significant control and could block athletes from transferring to certain schools or conferences. Graduates with their degrees had more flexibility (e.g., Jalen Hurts or Everett Golson).

• The Tampering Process: In the current era, most portal moves are decided before a player officially enters the database. Agents often send "portal lists" of potential transfers to GMs weeks or months in advance.

• Negotiation Strategy: Schools like Florida State and Michigan use sophisticated negotiation tactics. For instance, an SEC GM admitted to usually offering $100,000$ below their actual budget limit to leave room for negotiation.

Medical Advocacy and Agent Resources

• Second Opinions: In the NIL era, schools with high financial stakes may push players to play through injuries (e.g., diagnosing a tear as a mere sprain). Agencies like Three Strand Sports provide access to professional-level doctors for second opinions.

• Case Study: Cam James (Florida): Initially diagnosed with a shoulder sprain; a second opinion from the New York Mets' team doctor revealed a torn rotator cuff, leading to necessary surgery.

• Case Study: Josh Dallas (Georgia Southern): Initially diagnosed with a hip pointer; an Eagles' core specialist identified a torn oblique. This saved his eligibility and a potential $750,000$ to $800,000$ transfer offer from Texas Tech.

Professional Roster Evaluation and Grading

• The Saban/Belichick Influence: Modern college personnel departments use NFL-style evaluation sheets to grade size, length, and frame.

• Combine Standards (10-Year Average for QBs):

  • Height: $6\, \text{ft} \, 2\, \text{and} \, 7/8\, \text{in}$

  • Weight: $222\, \text{lbs}$

  • Hand Size: 9\, \text{and}  5/8\, \text{in}

  • Arm Length: $32\, \text{and} \, 1/8\, \text{in}$

  • $40$-Yard Dash: $4.83\, \text{s}$

• Grading Scale: Programs like Georgia use qualitative tiers:

  • Rare/All-League: Elite, NFL-ready talent.

  • Winnable: Strong starters who help the team win.

  • Winnable Minus: Competent players who may be limited athletically (the "Midwest Mike" linebacker or "dancing bear" lineman) but are cerebral and reliable.

Athlete Branding: Nick Luzinski

• Branding Overview: While revenue share dominates NIL income ($93\%$), branding and marketing account for roughly $7\%$ of the total earnings.

• Types of Brand Deals:

  • Monetary: Direct payments for appearances, autographs, and social media posts. Trading card deals (Panini, Topps, Leaf) are the most lucrative, often ranging from $30,000$ to $35,000$.

  • Product: Athletes receive free merchandise (e.g., TravisMathew golf gear or Red Bull) in exchange for "organic" social media mentions. These do not necessarily involve cash payments.

  • Trade (Service-based): Exchanges for services like luxury car leases, country club memberships (e.g., South Bend Country Club), or recovery therapies (infra-red/cold tubs).

• Marketability Factors: Brands prioritize "Performance" and a player's established "Brand Identity" (e.g., Jeremiah Love's "J-Love" comic books) over raw stats or even follower counts.

Social Media Analytics in Branding

• Followers vs. Engagement: High follower counts do not always translate to high marketability.

• Engagement Rate Comparison:

  • Maverick Baranowski (Minnesota): Low follower count ($3,700$) but exceptionally high engagement rate ($22\%$).

  • Jaden Bonsu (Pitt): Higher follower count ($12,100$) but lower engagement rate ($1.31\%$).

• Decision Metrics: Fashion brands (e.g., True Religion) may require a minimum threshold of $20,000$ followers to even consider a player, whereas performance brands value the interaction and loyalty seen in higher engagement rates.

Questions & Discussion

• Question (Student): How do you protect players from their parents taking advantage of their contracts?

• Response (Eugene/Dave): We employ financial literacy programs and try to maintain a fine line. There are horror stories, such as Anthony Lucas at USC, whose parents allegedly scraped his account dry, leading to a loss of over $1.5\, \text{million}$ in potential bankable income and falling in the draft.

• Question (Student): What happens to a player's contract if they become ineligible mid-season?

• Response: Contracts usually have clauses protecting the school from paying out if there is a felony charge or chronic academic failure, though mid-season GPA-based ineligibility is rare.

• Question (Student): Do gambling companies do brand deals with college players?

• Response: No. Gambling, alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana (NCAA/League banned substances) are strictly prohibited for both collegiate and NFL athlete branding.