Notes on The Clash of Civilizations? (Huntington, 1993)

Key Thesis

• With the end of the Cold War, international politics shifts from a Western-centric frame to interactions among civilizations, especially between the West and non-Western civilizations. The future world is likely to be shaped by conflicts along civilizational fault lines rather than along ideological or purely state-based lines.
• The central proposition: the clash of civilizations will be the major source of conflict in the post-Cold War era, with violence and political contestation increasingly reflecting civilizational differences rather than purely economic or ideological ones.
• The West-versus-the-Rest frame emphasizes a pivot from ideological wars to culture-based rivalries, with civilizations acting as the principal actors and referents for identity and legitimacy.

The Nature of Civilizations

• Civilization defined: a cultural entity comprising a broad, high-level cultural identity; the strongest marker of human difference short of species membership.
• Civilizations are identified by both objective elements (language, history, religion, customs, institutions) and subjective self-identification (Roman, Italian, Catholic, Christian, European, Westerner, etc.). People can redefine identities; civilizations are dynamic and boundaries fluid.
• Civilizations may involve many people or only a few (e.g., China as a civilization, Anglophone Caribbean as a small one).
• Civilizations may consist of multiple nation-states (Western, Latin American, Arab) or a single state (Japanese civilization).
• Civilizations blend and overlap; subcivilizations exist within larger civilizations.
• Major variants within Western civilization: European and North American. Islam subdivides into Arab, Turkic, and Malay strands.
• Civilizations are meaningful because they rise, fall, divide, and merge; they can disappear, leaving historical traces. They are not purely monolithic political units.
• Western civilization historically dominated as the template for global actors for several centuries; broader civilizations have their own dynamics and trajectories.
• Toynbee’s framework identified many civilizations; modern times reduce them to a subset (e.g., 6 major civilizations exist today).

Why Civilizations Will Clash

• Civilization identity will become increasingly important; 7–8 major civilizations are likely to shape future interactions: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African.
• The most significant conflicts will occur along the fault lines separating these civilizations.
• Six core reasons for why clashes will occur:
  1) Differences among civilizations are real and basic, rooted in history, language, culture, tradition, and religion. These differences influence views on God and man, individual vs. group, state and citizen, rights vs. responsibilities, liberty vs. authority, equality vs. hierarchy. They are deeper than political or ideological differences and have historically produced prolonged and violent conflict.
  2) The world is becoming smaller; interactions across civilizations increase, heightening civilization-consciousness and highlighting differences and intra-civilizational commonalities. Examples include how immigration and diaspora dynamics affect perceptions and attitudes (e.g., North African immigration to France, Ibo identities shifting across Lagos, London, and New York).
  3) Economic modernization and social change are eroding traditional local identities and weakening the nation-state as the primary source of identity. Religious movements (often labeled fundamentalist) fill the resulting identity vacuum, spanning Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. The late-twentieth-century trend toward “unsecularization” supports transnational religious commitments that cross borders (la revanche de Dieu).
  4) The West’s dual role: while Western power is at its peak, non-Western civilizations respond with inward turns and “ Asianization,” Hinduization, re-Islamization, and a reorientation of Russia toward Asia. Western dominance prompts non-Western societies to reassert identity and pursue paths that resist Western homogenization.
  5) Cultural traits are less mutable than political or economic ones; identity-granting features (religion, language, ritual, moral codes) are deeply ingrained and resistant to rapid change. Conflicts can be between groups who must answer the question "What are you?" rather than choosing sides in a political struggle.
  6) Economic regionalism is increasing, encouraging blocs that align with civilizational identities. Intra-regional trade rose from $51\% \to 59\%$ in Europe, $33\% \to 37\%$ in East Asia, and $32\% \to 36\%$ in North America between 1980 and 1989. Regional economic integration is more likely to succeed when rooted in a shared civilization; Europe’s integration rests on Western culture and Christianity, while NAFTA’s success depends on convergence among Mexican, Canadian, and American cultures. Japan’s difficulty in creating a comparable East Asian bloc highlights how civilization shapes integration prospects.
• The West and non-Westerns also confront different trajectories of modernization and interaction that fuel civilizational cleavage rather than unify.

The Fault Lines Between Civilizations

• The fault lines replace the Cold War’s political/ideological walls as primary loci of crisis and bloodshed.
• The Western-Orthodox-Islamic dynamic in Europe marks a central fault line, with a long history of interaction (dark periods of conquest and empire, religious and cultural divides).
• The “Velvet Curtain” of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as Europe’s dominant dividing line (northwest vs. east and south of the curtain).
• The gulf between Western Christianity and Islam, along with Orthodox Christianity, creates deep civilizational divides in Europe and beyond.
• Historical chronic conflicts along these fault lines include centuries of clashes between Islam and the West, including Tours (732), Crusades, Ottoman expansion, and colonial-era interventions.
• The post-World War II era saw another layer of conflict (Arab-Israeli wars, Gulf conflicts, and Western interventions) that is often framed through civilizational narratives rather than purely ideological terms.
• The gulf line in Europe roughly follows the old Habsburg–Ottoman boundary in the Balkans; it correlates with differences in economic development and political development across regions.
• Across Eurasia, violent ethnic conflicts frequently align with civilizational borders, while within many civilizations, conflicts are less likely to erupt into full civilizational wars.

The West versus the Rest

• The West reaches an extraordinary peak of power; the post–Cold War era lacks a single rival state in the West’s league (except possibly Japan’s unique position).
• Western control over security institutions (UN Security Council) and major economic institutions (IMF, etc.) creates a framework for Western-led international order. The West often frames actions as representing the “world community,” a rhetoric perceived by non-Westerners as Western domination.
• Western dominance includes military, economic, and institutional power that can shape outcomes and legitimacy globally, sometimes at odds with broader non-Western perspectives.
• Differences in power (military/economic/institutional) and differences in basic cultural values (liberal democracy, human rights, rule of law, free markets) are the two primary sources of conflict with non-Western civilizations. Western universalism—especially the export of liberal-democratic values—meets resistance as non-Western societies seek to preserve indigenous values.
• The notion of a universal civilization is contested; most scholars emphasize a world of distinct civilizations with their own religious, philosophical, and cultural logics. The West’s claim to universalism often clashes with non-Western skepticism about what Western values mean in practice.
• Kishore Mahbubani’s framing: the central axis is the conflict between “the West and the Rest.” Non-Western responses to Western power typically take one of three forms: isolation, bandwagoning with Western norms, or balancing against the West while preserving indigenous values.
• The West’s long-term challenge is to maintain influence while adapting to a world in which non-Western civilizations grow economically and militarily and seek to shape global norms.

The Confucian-Islamic Connection

• A strategic association has emerged to counter Western influence: a Confucian-Islamic linkage among powerful non-Western states (China, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, etc.) to compete with Western interests.
• This connection accelerates arms development and exchange of weapons technology, creating a three-way dynamic: Western non-proliferation norms versus non-Western ambitions to acquire weapons for security and deterrence.
• The weapons flow often travels from East Asia toward the Middle East, with China exporting nuclear and missile-related tech to Iran, Pakistan, and others; Iran and Syria import and share weapons and capabilities; North Korea proliferates to several states.
• China’s modernization and military expansion, including long-range missiles, potential carrier acquisition, and nuclear tests, contribute to a regional arms race in East Asia and a wider strategic balance.
• A new form of arms competition emerges: one side builds up, while the other side seeks to limit and constrain that buildup through international norms, inspections, and sanctions.
• This Confucian-Islamic bloc challenges Western primacy and its security architecture, complicating arms control, nonproliferation, and regional stability efforts.

The Torn Countries

• Some nations are culturally divided, having large populations from multiple civilizations—these are torn countries. Leaders often wish to align with the West, but historical and cultural forces pull them toward non-Western identities.
• Prototypical torn country: Turkey. Turkish elites align with the West’s NATO framework and seek European integration, yet segments of Turkish society emphasize a Muslim, Middle Eastern orientation. The West often refuses full Western membership, citing religious/cultural differences.
• Mexico shares a similar tension: an inclination to imitate the United States and participate in North American integration, while maintaining a distinct Latin American identity.
• Russia is globally the most significant torn country: its elites oscillate between Western alignment (Atlanticism, integration with Europe and the US) and Eurasian/Slavic-Orthodox identity (focus on Asia, Turkic and Muslim connections, and regional power politics).
• Three requirements for turning a torn country into a full adopting civilization: (1) political/economic elites must broadly support the move, (2) the public must acquiesce, (3) dominant groups within the prospective civilization must embrace the convert.
• In practice, Mexico and Turkey show some support for Western alignment, whereas Russia faces substantial internal debates about Westernization versus Russification, with some elites advocating Asia-oriented policies rather than Western integration.

Kin-Country Syndrome (Civilization Rallying)

• As conflicts unfold, groups from the same civilization rally to the cause of kin-country allies, replacing traditional ideology or balance-of-power calculations as the primary basis for coalition-building.
• Gulf War (1990–1991): Arab states’ elites publicly backed Iraq, while some Arab publics supported Saddam Hussein; Islamic fundamentalist movements supported Iraq despite official positions. The coalition against Iraq was thus mixed in civilizational terms.
  • Safar Al-Hawali framed the war as a clash between the West and Islam.
  • Ayatollah Khamenei framed ongoing resistance as jihad against Western aggression.
• In the former Soviet space, Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan against Armenia illustrates kin-country dynamics (as Armenian atrocities escalated, Turkey showed support; economic and political calculations followed).
• In Yugoslavia, Western publics supported Bosnian Muslims; Croat and Slovenian destinies aligned with Western Europe; Russia’s stance varied between Orthodox solidarity with Serbs and strategic interests with Europe/West. Iran and برخی Islamic states supported Bosnians, while Saudi Arabia and other Muslim governments faced pressure from domestic Islamist groups to provide more aid.
• Kin-country rallying predicts intensified civilizational coalitions that accompany, and at times substitute for, traditional alliance blocks.
• The spread of kin-country dynamics increases the likelihood that conflicts among civilizations will escalate and broaden into multi-state, multi-faith coalitions.

Implications for the West

• The article lays out short-term and long-term implications for Western policy:
  • Short term: strengthen internal Western unity (European and North American cooperation), integrate compatible societies from Eastern Europe and Latin America, maintain relations with Russia and Japan, and sustain Western leadership in international institutions to reflect Western interests. Work to prevent local conflicts from becoming inter-civilizational wars; mitigate rising tensions with Confucian-Islamic states.
  • Long term: there is unlikely to be a universal civilization; Western states must understand underlying religious and philosophical assumptions of other civilizations and identify commonalities to coexist. Western policy should avoid coercive campaigns to Westernize non-Western societies; instead, pursue balanced engagement that acknowledges diverse modernities.
• The West must balance power with accommodation: maintain military and economic primacy while engaging with non-Western modernities; avoid overreach by coercive universalist agendas; cultivate deeper cultural and religious understanding to identify shared interests.
• Strategies for future engagement include:
  • Promoting intra-Western cooperation and unity; expanding common ground with compatible non-Western regions; managing relations with Russia and Japan; maintaining influential Western-led institutions.
  • Recognizing the three possible non-Western responses to Western power: isolation, bandwagoning with Western values, or balancing to guard indigenous identities (and combining approaches where feasible).
  • Preparing for elevated risk of conflict along civilizational fault lines by building resilient, legitimate international institutions that incorporate non-Western perspectives while protecting Western interests.

Summary and Reflections

• The central claim is descriptive, not normative: civilizations exist as powerful sources of identity and conflict; future wars may be more likely to occur along civilizational borders than within them.

• The West’s historical predominance is shifting, necessitating a nuanced understanding of non-Western civilizations, their values, and their security concerns.

• While clashes along civilizational fault lines are plausible, coexistence is possible through recognition of differences, mutual interests, and the development of shared, legitimate international norms.

• Key takeaways for exam prep:

  • Understand the definition and dynamics of civilizations as cultural entities.
  • Be able to explain why Huntington argues civilizations will clash, including the six contributing factors and the role of economic regionalism.
  • Identify the major civilizations and the concept of fault lines.
  • Describe the kin-country syndrome and its implications for coalitions and conflict escalation.
  • Articulate the West-vs-Rest framework and its strategic implications, including the debates over universalism vs. cultural particularism.
  • Explain the Torn Countries concept and the criteria for civilization identity transformation.
  • Recognize the Confucian-Islamic connection as a driver of new forms of arms competition and strategic alignment.

• Notable numerical references to remember (formatted in LaTeX):

  • Major civilizations: $7-8$ as the expected number of major civilizations in future dynamics.
  • Toynbee’s civilizations: $21$ major civilizations historically identified; only $6$ exist today.
  • Intra-regional trade shifts (1980–1989): 51 o59 ext{ ext{%}} in Europe; 33 o37 ext{ ext{%}} in East Asia; 32 o36 ext{ ext{%}} in North America.
  • Timeframe on Islam-West conflicts: roughly $1300$ years of warfare history between Islamic and Western civilizations.