Statutory Preclusion and Equal Protection Principles in TPS Terminations

Statutory Preclusion of Judicial Review

  • 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A) precludes district courts from reviewing determinations and terminations of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations.

  • Congress barred all judicial review of TPS termination decisions, including constitutional claims, obliging courts to give effect to the ordinary meaning of 8 U. S. C. §1254a (Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221 (2020)).

Constitutional Limits of Equal Protection Claims Against the Federal Government

  • The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies exclusively to the States, not the Federal Government (U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1).

  • The Fifth Amendment textually and historically lacks an equal protection clause or component (Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954); United States v. Vaello Madero, 596 U. S. 159 (2022)).

  • The Due Process Clause restricts deprivation of core private rights ("life, liberty, or property") that do not depend on government will, rather than government-created privileges (Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U. S. 148 (2018); Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U. S. 229 (2026)).

  • A Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation is a discretionary, government-created privilege rather than a private right (United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537 (1950); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 (1952); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279 (1904)).

Application of Equal Protection Principles to Immigration Law

  • Non-citizens have no guaranteed constitutional right to immigration status or citizenship rooted in equal protection principles (Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178 (1922)).

  • Federal immigration statutes routinely distinguish non-citizens based on national origin (e.g., Act of July 6, 1798, §1, 1 Stat. 577; 8 U. S. C. §1152(a)(2)).

  • Applying Fourteenth Amendment equal protection scrutiny to federal immigration choices conflicts with existing statutory frameworks and national-origin classifications inherent in immigration policy (Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948)).