Adjudicative Guidelines for Classified Information Access

Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information

Source: 32 CFR Part 147 (Executive Order 12968 framework); Part 147 establishes adjudicative guidelines, investigative standards, and temporary access provisions for all U.S. Government personnel and individuals requiring access to classified information. Authority and source notes are included (EO 12968; 60 FR 40245; 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p. 391).
Scope and applicability:
- Applies to civilian and military personnel, contractors, consultants, licensees, certificate holders, grantees, and their employees who require access to classified information, including Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and Special Access Programs (SAP).
- Used by government departments and agencies for final clearance determinations (initial or continued eligibility).
Whole person concept:
- Final determinations are based on the examination of a sufficient period of a person’s life; consideration of both favorable and unfavorable information; weighing multiple variables to reach a determination about eligibility.
- The adjudicator must rely on available, reliable information about the person’s past and present conduct.

§ 147.1 Introduction

Adjudicative guidelines are established for all individuals requiring access to classified information.
They apply to initial and continued eligibility determinations, including SAPs and SCI access.
Emphasizes use by agencies in final clearance determinations.

§ 147.2 Adjudicative process

The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person’s life to determine eligibility for a security clearance.
Eligibility is predicated upon meeting personnel security guidelines; final determinations rely on weighing a number of variables (the whole person concept).
Key evaluative factors include:
- (1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct
- (2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, including knowledgeable participation
- (3) The frequency and recency of the conduct
- (4) The individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct
- (5) The voluntariness of participation
- (6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes
- (7) The motivation for the conduct
- (8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress
- (9) The likelihood of continuation of recurrence
Each case must be judged on its own merits; final determination remains the responsibility of the specific agency.
Any doubt about national security clearness should be resolved in favor of national security.
The ultimate determination should consider the Guidelines A–M in the context of the whole person.

§ 147.3 Guideline A—Allegiance to the United States

(a) The concern: An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States; willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if allegiance is suspect.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
- (1) Involvement in acts of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, sedition, or attempts to overthrow the U.S. government by unconstitutional means; association or sympathy with such actors; advocacy for overthrow by force or unconstitutional means; or unlawfully advocating or practicing acts of force or violence to prevent constitutional rights.
- (2) Association or sympathy with persons attempting or committing the above acts.
- (3) Association or sympathy with persons or organizations advocating the overthrow of the U.S. government by force or violence.
- (4) Involvement in activities that unlawfully advocate or practice force to prevent constitutional rights.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
- (1) Unaware of unlawful aims and severed ties upon learning of them;
- (2) Involvement limited to lawful/humanitarian aspects of such an organization.
- (3) Other mitigating scenarios as applicable (e.g., official sanction, therapy, or remediation actions).
(d) The text indicates that adverse information about a single criterion may not, by itself, be fatal to eligibility, but could contribute to a disqualifying pattern depending on the whole-person evaluation.
(e) When information of security concern becomes known about an already eligible individual, adjudicators should consider:
- (1) Whether it was voluntarily reported
- (2) Truthfulness and completeness in responses
- (3) Whether the individual sought assistance and followed guidance
- (4) Whether the issue is likely to be favorably resolved
- (5) Positive changes in behavior and employment
- (6) Whether access should be suspended pending final adjudication
(f) If information is not serious enough to warrant disapproval or revocation, an approval with a warning can be considered for future risk mitigation.

§ 147.4 Guideline B—Foreign influence

(a) The concern: Security risk exists when immediate family, cohabitants, or others with affection, influence, or obligation are non-U.S. citizens or could be subject to duress; contacts with foreign nationals or financial interests abroad are relevant if they increase vulnerability to coercion or pressure.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
- (1) Immediate family member or close associate who is a citizen or resident of a foreign country
- (2) Sharing living quarters with foreign nationals where coercion risk exists
- (3) Relatives, cohabitants, or associates connected with a foreign government
- (4) Failure to report associations with foreign nationals
- (5) Unauthorized associations with suspected foreign intelligence collaborators
- (6) Conduct making an individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government
- (7) Indications that foreign nationals are increasing vulnerability to coercion
- (8) Substantial financial interests in a foreign country or foreign-owned/operated businesses that could affect security responsibilities
(c) Mitigating conditions include:
- (1) Immediate family members are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to coerce
- (2) Foreign contacts are the result of official U.S. Government business
- (3) Casual and infrequent foreign contacts
- (4) Prompt compliance with agency reporting requirements
- (5) Foreign financial interests are minimal and do not affect security responsibilities

§ 147.5 Guideline C—Foreign preference

(a) The concern: A preference for a foreign country over the United States may lead to actions that harm U.S. interests
(b) Disqualifying conditions include:
- (1) Dual citizenship
- (2) Possession or use of a foreign passport
- (3) Military service or willingness to bear arms for a foreign country
- (4) Acceptance of benefits from a foreign country (education, medical, retirement, welfare)
- (5) Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements
- (6) Using foreign citizenship to protect financial interests in another country
- (7) Seeking or holding political office in a foreign country
- (8) Voting in foreign elections
- (9) Acting to serve another government over the United States
(c) Mitigating conditions include:
- (1) Dual citizenship is solely based on parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign country
- (2) Foreign preference indicators occurred before U.S. citizenship
- (3) Activities sanctioned by the United States
- (4) Willingness to renounce dual citizenship

§ 147.6 Guideline D—Sexual behavior

(a) The concern: Sexual behavior can be a security concern if criminal, indicates emotional disorder, creates risk of coercion, exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment; sexual orientation/preference cannot be used as a disqualifying factor.
(b) Disqualifying conditions include:
- (1) Sexual behavior of a criminal nature (whether prosecuted or not)
- (2) Compulsive or addictive sexual behavior that shows loss of judgment or high-risk behavior or relates to a personality disorder
- Note: The adjudicator should consider related guidelines (Criminal Conduct, I) in resolving concerns.
(c) Mitigating conditions include:
- (1) Dual citizenship indicators or activities occurred before U.S. citizenship
- (2) Activity sanctioned by the United States
- (3) Willingness to renounce foreign citizenship (when applicable)

§ 147.7 Guideline E—Personal conduct

(a) The concern: Questionable judgment, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules could indicate failure to safeguard classified information
(b) Disqualifying conditions include:
- (1) Refusal to undergo required security processing (medical/psychological testing, forms, releases, truthful answers)
- (2) Omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from security questionnaires or investigations
- (3) Deliberate false or misleading information to investigators or authorities
- (4) Personal conduct or concealment increasing vulnerability to coercion or blackmail
- (5) Pattern of dishonesty or rule violations
- (6) Association with persons involved in criminal activity
(c) Mitigating conditions include:
- (1) Information not recent or no evidence of related misconduct
- (2) Absence of other evidence of questionable judgment
- (3) Behavior no longer serves as basis for coercion or duress

§ 147.8 Guideline F—Financial considerations

(a) The concern: Financial overextension creates risk of coercion or exploitation; unexplained affluence may be linked to criminal activity.
(b) Disqualifying conditions include:
- (1) History of not meeting financial obligations
- (2) Deceptive or illegal financial practices (embezzlement, tax evasion, etc.)
- (3) Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts
- (4) Unexplained affluence
- (5) Financial problems linked to gambling, drug use, alcoholism, or other security concerns
(c) Mitigating conditions include:
- (1) Behavior not recent
- (2) Isolated incident
- (3) Causes largely beyond the person’s control
- (4) Counseling with evidence of resolution
- (5) Affluence from legal sources
- (6) Good faith effort to repay debts

§ 147.9 Guideline G—Alcohol consumption

(a) The concern: Excessive alcohol use can lead to questionable judgment, unreliability, and increased risk of unauthorized disclosure due to carelessness
(b) Disqualifying conditions include:
- (1) Alcohol-related incidents away from work (DUI, abuse, etc.)
- (2) Alcohol-related incidents at work (impaired performance, on-the-job drinking)
- (3) Medical diagnosis of alcohol abuse/dependence
- (4) Evaluation by licensed professionals indicating abuse/dependence
- (5) Habitual or binge drinking causing impaired judgment
- (6) Post-diagnosis ongoing alcohol dependence with continued use
(c) Mitigating conditions include:
- (1) Incidents do not indicate pattern
- (2) Problems occurred years ago with no recent issues
- (3) Positive changes supporting sobriety
- (4) Rehabilitation progress and sustained abstinence with favorable prognosis

§ 147.10 Guideline H—Drug involvement

(a) The concern: Improper drug involvement questions willingness or ability to protect classified information; drugs include listed controlled substances and other mood/b Pillow substances, including inhalants.
(b) Disqualifying conditions include:
- (1) Any drug abuse
- (2) Illegal possession, manufacture, distribution, or sale of drugs
- (3) Medical diagnosis of drug abuse/dependence
- (4) Evaluation by professionals indicating drug abuse/dependence
- (5) Failure to complete prescribed treatment
(c) Mitigating conditions include:
- (1) Non-recent drug involvement
- (2) Isolated or aberrant event
- (3) Demonstrated intent not to abuse drugs
- (4) Successful completion of drug treatment and rehabilitation with favorable prognosis

§ 147.11 Guideline I—Emotional, mental, and personality disorders

(a) The concern: These disorders can indicate deficits in judgment, reliability, or stability; professionals should assess with appropriate clinical input
(b) Disqualifying conditions include:
- (1) Professional opinion of a disorder or treatment indicating potential defects in judgment, reliability, or stability
- (2) Failure to follow medical advice relating to treatment
- (3) Pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, or anti-social behavior
- (4) Current behavior indicating defects in judgment or reliability
(c) Mitigating conditions include:
- (1) Non-recent involvement
- (2) Isolated or aberrant events
- (3) Demonstrated intent not to engage in abusive behavior in the future
- (4) Completion of prescribed treatment with favorable prognosis

§ 147.12 Guideline J—Criminal conduct

(a) The concern: History or pattern of criminal activity raises doubts about judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness
(b) Disqualifying conditions include:
- (1) Allegations or admissions of criminal conduct
- (2) A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses
(c) Mitigating conditions include:
- (1) Non-recent conduct
- (2) Isolated incident
- (3) Coercion or pressure no longer present
- (4) Lack of voluntariness or unlikely recurrence
- (5) Acquittal
- (6) Evidence of rehabilitation

§ 147.13 Guideline K—Security violations

(a) The concern: Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubts about trustworthiness and ability to safeguard information
(b) Disqualifying conditions include:
- (1) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information
- (2) Deliberate or negligent violations
(c) Mitigating conditions include:
- (1) Incidents were inadvertent
- (2) Isolated or infrequent incidents
- (3) Due to improper training
- (4) Positive attitude toward security responsibilities

§ 147.14 Guideline L—Outside activities

(a) The concern: Outside employment/activities that pose conflicts with security responsibilities or increase risk of unauthorized disclosure
(b) Disqualifying conditions include any service or employment with:
- (1) A foreign country
- (2) Any foreign national
- (3) A representative of any foreign interest
- (4) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis or publication related to intelligence/defense/foreign affairs or protected technology
(c) Mitigating conditions include:
- (1) Outside activities do not pose a conflict
- (2) Termination of conflicting employment/activity when notified

§ 147.15 Guideline M—Misuse of Information technology systems

(a) The concern: Noncompliance with IT system rules may raise security concerns about trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to protect classified systems
(b) Disqualifying conditions include:
- (1) Illegal or unauthorized entry into an IT system
- (2) Destruction, alteration, or denial of access to data
- (3) Removal of hardware/software/media without authorization
- (4) Introduction of unauthorized hardware/software/media into an IT system
(c) Mitigating conditions include:
- (1) Misuse not recent or significant
- (2) Unintentional or inadvertent misuse
- (3) Authorization for media actions
- (4) Isolated incident
- (5) Prompt, good-faith effort to correct the situation

Subpart B—Investigative Standards

§ 147.18 Introduction

Establishes investigative standards for all individuals requiring access, including the possibility of additional lawful procedures to resolve issues identified during background investigations or reinvestigations.

§ 147.19 The three standards

The Part enumerates three standards used to determine eligibility; attachment details summarize when to use each standard.

§ 147.20 Exception to periods of coverage

Some elements specify a period of coverage (e.g., seven years); coverage may be shortened to the period from eighteenth birthday to present or to two years, whichever is longer when appropriate.

§ 147.21 Expanding investigations

Investigations and reinvestigations may be expanded under Executive Order 12968 and other applicable statutes and orders.

§ 147.22 Transferability

Investigations that satisfy a standard and are current are mutually and reciprocally accepted by all agencies.

§ 147.23 Breaks in service

If an individual left government service for less than two years and is the subject of an ongoing investigation, agencies should at minimum review an updated SF-86 and relevant records; reinvestigation not required unless review indicates non-fulfillment of EO 12968 standards.

§ 147.24 The national agency check (NAC)

NAC is part of all investigations and reinvestigations:
- (a) Attachments: NACLC (A) and SSBI (B) as applicable to the investigation type
- (b) Investigative components: FBI history and fingerprint search; OPM’s Security/Suitability Investigations Index; DCII; other national agencies as needed
(a) Applicability and investigative requirements vary by level:
- Standard A applies to CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and L accesses
- Standard B applies to initial investigations for TOP SECRET and Q access
(c) For reinvestigations: timelines differ (e.g., 10 years for most reinvestigations of Confidential/Secret vs. longer intervals for higher levels); standard tables indicate specific reinvestigation timing
(d) Investigative requirements include: SF-86 with releases, NAC, financial review, DOB corroboration, local agency checks, and other records as appropriate
(a) Additional notes: If no residence/ employment lasting six months, local agency checks should be performed as deemed appropriate

§ 147.24 The national agency check – Applicability details by Standard

Standard A (NACLC) for Confidential/Secret/L access; reinvestigation timelines and required checks
Standard B (SSBI) and Standard C (SSBI-PR) apply to higher levels; additional spouse/cohabitant checks; citizenship verification; education/employment verification; references; former spouses; neighborhoods; financials; local checks; public records; subject interview; polygraph in agencies with polygraph programs
The attached tables (Attachment A, B, C, D) provide detailed mapping of when to request which investigation and the specific reinvestigation requirements.

§ 147.28–§ 147.33 Subpart C—Guidelines for Temporary Access

§ 147.28 Introduction: Establishes minimum investigative standards for temporary access under section 3.3 of EO 12968; temporary access is allowed when official functions require access prior to final adjudication.
§ 147.29 Temporary eligibility for access: Granted before investigation completion and favorable adjudication when justified by need; temporary eligibility is valid until investigation/adjudication is complete, but can be revoked if unfavorable information arises.
§ 147.30 Temporary eligibility at Confidential/Secret levels and L access: Requires completion of SF-86, favorable review by adjudicating authority, and expedited NACLC submission.
§ 147.31 Temporary eligibility at Top Secret and Q levels (subject of a favorable investigation not meeting standards): Requires SF-86 completion, favorable adjudication, and expedited SSBI submission.
§ 147.32 Temporary eligibility for Top Secret/SCI levels and Q access for subjects not currently under favorable personnel security investigation: Requires SF-86, favorable review, immediate expedited SSBI submission, and favorable review of FBI records, SII, and DCII.
§ 147.33 Additional agency requirements: Agencies may impose additional requirements based on information sensitivity; temporary eligibility remains valid only at the granting agency and other agencies that expressly accept it; subject to agency and EO 12968 limitations.

Attachments

Attachment A to Subpart B of Part 147—Standard A—National Agency Check With Local Agency Checks and Credit Check (NACLC)
Attachment B to Subpart B of Part 147—Standard B—Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI)
Attachment C to Subpart B of Part 147—Standard C—Single Scope Background Investigation Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR)
Attachment D to Subpart B of Part 147—Decision Tables
These guidelines and attachments form the authoritative (though unofficial on the transcript’s page) framework for adjudicating eligibility for access to classified information, detailing purpose, scope, and procedures for investigations, reinvestigations, and temporary access decisions.
Practical notes for study:
- Remember the whole-person concept and its role in weighing varied factors.
- Be able to distinguish between disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions for each guideline.
- Understand the difference between Standard A (NACLC) and Standard B (SSBI) investigative standards, and when each applies.
- Appreciate the conditional nature of temporary access and its dependencies on ongoing favorable adjudication and agency discretion.
- Note the emphasis on transferability across agencies and the ability to expand investigations as necessary.