Chapter 6: Federalism, Political Parties, and the Burden of National Unity

Chapter 6 notes: Federalism, Political Parties, and the Burden of National Unity

• Core premise

  • Political parties perform essential functions in liberal democracies: organizing electoral choices, representing interests, channeling political participation, and recruiting decision-makers (King, 1969; Covell, 1991).

  • In federal systems, parties also take on a “knitting” or nation-building task—unifying the nation and linking regional interests with the center. In Canada, brokerage parties historically served as the “sinews of a healthy federalism” (David Smith, 1985).

  • Recent Canadian developments raised questions about whether parties can again serve as national integrators given regional fragmentation and changes in the party system.

• Framing questions (early 21st century context)

  • Is there a renewed prospect that parties will carry the burden of national unity with two national parties and less fragmentation?

  • What can be reasonably expected of the two main parties as national integrators?

  • Is the classic knitting function of parties, as seen in the 1960s–70s, still relevant?

• Structure of the chapter

  • Part I: mechanisms by which parties knit regions to the center and where they fall short.

  • Parts II–III: retrospective on party-system performance from decline in late 20th century to potential revival more recently.

  • Three offsetting factors analyzed: intrastate federalism (regional caucuses and ministers), minority governments shaping the federal–provincial agenda, mobility of political actors between provincial and federal levels.

  • Conclusion: evaluation of performance, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the party system in relation to the Canadian federation.

A parties-based theory of federalism (Campbell Sharman, 1994)

• Three dimensions (as outlined by Sharman, building on William Riker’s ideas)
  1) Partisan symmetry–asymmetry in the federation (the federal bargain)

  • Riker argued that the degree of symmetry between national and subnational parties shapes whether a federation is centralized or decentralized.

  • Symmetrical party systems (same parties operating nationally and subnationally) tend to produce more centralized federations if the national–subnational link is strong.

  • A strong link is indicated when a party has a strong presence at both levels, many shared members, and provincial officials moving up through the party to the national level.

  • Canadian evidence historically shows a significant degree of confederal tendencies relative to U.S. federalism, with a disjunction between federal and provincial party systems (Smiley 1987; 1989) and a weaker national–regional linkage than in some other federations.
    2) Intrastate dimension: representation of local/regional interests in national governance

  • Parties facilitate representation of regional interests in national bodies by creating channels for communication, influence, and personnel flows: regional politicians move up while maintaining ties to local governance.

  • Advantages:

    • Politicians with provincial experience bring broader perspectives and understand local challenges.

    • National leaders with regional experience understand local issues better.

    • Regional governments and parties can serve as talent pools for national offices.

  • Canadian evidence: Smiley argued that Canada is more confederal in its party-system alignment than typical federations; there is a disjunction between federal and provincial party systems but cabinet remains the most important intrastate institution capable of representing regional interests (Smiley 1987; Watts & Smiley 1985).
    3) Structure of party systems and norms governing competition between them

  • Chandler (1987) identified three party-system types:

    • Single-party majority

    • Multiparty with one party dominant

    • Coalition (no single party majority; two or more form a governing majority)

  • Implications for federalism:

    • Single-party majority systems tend to be highly adversarial and may undermine collaborative norms needed for federal–provincial cooperation.

    • Coalition systems are the least adversarial and potentially more conducive to cooperative governance.

  • Carty & Wolinetz (2004) note Canadian parties historically avoided formal inter-party coalitions at the federal level, though leaders often engage in coalition-style bargaining in the federal–provincial arena.

• Practical observation: Canadian party systems link regions to the center and promote collaboration, but not always in line with standard theories. The authors highlight the underappreciated role of party professionals (staff) in linking federal and provincial agendas.

• Bottom line from the theory

  • The knitting function should be viewed alongside other roles of parties (recruitment, representation, policy formation).

  • In Canada, the knitting function is not the sole determinant of federal–provincial cooperation; staff networks and regional bargaining play crucial roles.

Canada’s party system, 1867–1993: the triumph of regionalism

• Early era: a two-party system with strong regional bases

  • From Confederation until the Diefenbaker landslide (1958), two main national parties (Liberal and Conservative) cobbled together broad coalitions spanning Ontario and Quebec, delivering regional balance that helped manage unity.

  • Ontario and Quebec together accounted for 60–75% of seats; a party needed Quebec support to win national office.

  • Prolonged stability until the 1917 Unionist shift; then Diefenbaker’s 1958 landslide broke the pattern by forming a majority without Quebec support.

• The brokerage era (King and St. Laurent)

  • Brokerage politics: leaders cobbled together diverse regional coalitions to govern.

  • Ministers from key regions helped integrate broader interests (e.g., J.G. Gardiner in Saskatchewan, C.D. Howe in NW Ontario, Ernest Lapointe in Quebec).

  • The patronage system declined after the Civil Service Reform Act (1918) but was replaced by pork-barrel funding (large regional projects) as a means to maintain regional ties.

  • This system gradually weakened as pan-Canadianism became dominant post-1950s, reducing reliance on regional brokers.

• The pan-Canadian era and its centralizing thrust (1957–1984)

  • TV and leadership-focused campaigns reduced the influence of regional power brokers in elections.

  • Diefenbaker’s “One Canada” and the Bill of Rights drew attention to formal equality; Pearson’s medicare, the Canada Pension Plan, and Trudeau’s policies (Official Languages Act, NEP, Constitution reforms) centralized more power in Ottawa.

  • Trudeau’s reforms alienated some regions (notably Western Canada; bilingualism and NEP were divisive).

  • The centralizing drive coincided with increasing regional fragmentation: the Liberal and Conservative parties drew support from limited regional strongholds rather than cross-country appeal.

• Consequences of pan-Canadianism for regional representation

  • Regional strongholds: Liberals dominated Quebec in many elections; the West became a site of reformist protest parties (CCF/NDP, then Reform/Western reformers).

  • The 1960s–1980s period saw the rise of regional protest parties (Progressives in 1920s–1930s; CCF/NDP in the mid-20th century) challenging the two-party monopoly.

  • The 1980s and 1990s: regional fragmentation intensified as Reform ascended in the West and Bloc Québécois emerged in Quebec; Liberal dominance eroded in Western provinces and Bloc challenged Liberal hegemony in Quebec.

• Key features of the decline and reformulation

  • The 1958 and 1984 landslides exposed the fragility of all-encompassing national coalitions.

  • Mackenzie King era emphasized a cohesive federation via regional ministers and regional brokers; this era also showed limits of integration and the fragility of “one omnibus” coalitions (Carty, 2002).

  • Mulroney era (1984) partly revived regional cabinet representation, with ministers from Newfoundland, Alberta, and Quebec playing central regional roles, but even this was not a full return to earlier brokerage.

• Notable shifts in later decades

  • The 1993 election was a watershed: collapse of the PC party, rise of Reform in the West, Bloc Québécois in Quebec; Liberals dominated Ontario but were weak in the West and Quebec’s Bloc gained strength.

  • The 1994–1995 period saw Quebec sample political options (BQ, PQ) and a close referendum in 1995.

  • Chrétien era (late 1990s–2000s): Liberal dominance resurfaced, with Ontario becoming a central stronghold; Quebec and the West were now represented by distinct regional forces (Reform in the West, Bloc in Quebec) rather than a single national party bridging regions.

  • The Harper era (2006–2015) featured a minority government relying on regional balance in cabinet and notable Quebec representation, followed by a 2011 majority obtained without Quebec’s decisive role. The 2011 results highlighted a shift: NDP surged in Quebec, Liberals declined in Ontario, and the Conservatives achieved a majority with non-Quebec seats.

  • The 2015 and 2019 cycles: Liberals regained a central position with a majority (2015) and then a minority (2019), with the NDP fading in Quebec and the Bloc Québecois resurging in 2019; the Liberals faced new regional dynamics and the West regained some leverage via cabinet appointments and regional strategy.

• The regional-ministry and cabinet dynamics

  • Regional ministers and regional caucuses have long linked provincial and federal agendas, often acting as conduits for provincial priorities and intergovernmental bargaining.

  • The advent of television and centralized leadership reduced the leverage of regional brokers, but cabinet representation remained a key intrastate link.

  • The Trudeau era (2015–2019) saw attenuated regional ministerial roles and a governance style centered in the federal capital, with cross-regional policy struggles (e.g., Indigenous rights, climate change).

Regional caucuses and regional ministers in practice

• Regional caucuses

  • All parties with more than one MP in a region have regional caucuses; these are often dominated by regional ministers.

  • Activities typically occur with cloak of caucus secrecy, limiting public visibility for regional concerns, despite expectations of representation.

  • Notable insider example: John Crosbie as Atlantic regional minister publicly rebuked the Prime Minister over a fishery treaty; resulted in a public apology from the deputy PM (Crosbie, 1997).

  • 2010s example: Saskatchewan MPs publicly expressed concerns regarding a takeover bid for Potash Corporation (Chase & McCarthy, 2010).

• Regional ministers in recent governments

  • Harper government (2011–15) included a noticeable share of ministers from Ontario and Quebec; several from Quebec held senior portfolios; this reflected a deliberate attempt to anchor the cabinet regionally.

  • Trudeau government (2015–19) moved toward governing from the center; cabinet composition and regional representation reflected centralized governance priorities, with less emphasis on traditional regional ministers.

• Regional representation and accountability

  • Appendix data (historical) show variability in regional representation in Parliament and Cabinet; when Parliament regional representation is uneven, cabinet composition tends to compensate to ensure the central government remains responsive to all regions.

  • 2011 example: Quebec accounted for ~3% of Conservative seats in Parliament (5 of 166); however, just over 10% of Harper’s ministers came from Quebec, illustrating compensatory cabinet representation.

  • 2015 Liberal government: Ontario dominance in caucus; Atlantic MPs tended to hold junior status in cabinet portfolios; West representation limited in some contexts.

  • 2019 Liberal government: Liberal attempts to compensate for West representation by appointing a Prairie-focused political representative outside cabinet; regional balance continued to be a concern.

Minority government, regional voices, and open federal–provincial bargaining

• Minority government dynamics

  • Minority governments elevate the potential for federal–provincial collaboration or bargaining, as parties seek to secure support in Parliament for policy agendas.

  • Such governments create opportunities for regional voices to influence policy more directly in Parliament and in committees, rather than through elite accommodation alone.

  • Historical exemplars:

  • Pearson (1963–1968) minority government laid the basis for social programs like the Canada-Quebec Pension Plan (C/QPP) and medicare, aided by NDP support in Parliament (Russell, 2008).

  • Harper (2006–11) minority relied less on federal–provincial bargaining and more on political strategy (e.g., attack ads) and steering stimulus during the 2009 crisis.

  • The 2019 election produced another minority government (Liberal) with NDP and Bloc holding balance of power; this configuration raised expectations of renewed federal–provincial social policy momentum, similar to the 1963–68 era in terms of potential policy scope.

• Implications for regional parties and bargaining

  • Minority contexts can empower regionally based parties to push agendas directly in Parliament rather than wait for cross-party accommodation at the federal–provincial arena.

  • The effectiveness of minority governments in delivering regionally balanced social policy depends on inter-party cooperation in Parliament and committees, as well as the willingness of provinces to collaborate with the federal government.

Mobility and partisan alignment

• Core idea (Riker model): partisan alignment between national and local levels and upward mobility of officials promote integration

  • In Canada, alignment and mobility have been limited historically; moving from provincial to federal office is the exception rather than the rule, and mobility has declined over time (Smiley 1987; Barrie & Gibbins 1989).

  • The 2006 Harper government saw former provincial ministers join the federal cabinet (e.g., a number of Harris-era PCs moved to Ottawa), indicating selective mobility and integration.

  • In some cases, mobility goes in the opposite direction (e.g., Jason Kenney moving from federal to provincial leadership; Jean Charest’s path from federal to provincial leadership in Quebec).

• Inter-party mobility and cross-level collaboration

  • There are notable examples of cross-level collaboration even without identical party control: ministers and staff moving between federal and provincial governments can facilitate cooperation and information sharing (e.g., Ontario Liberals’ staff moving to Ottawa in 2015; Harper staff moving to Ontario Ford government in 2018).

  • Shared party affiliation does not guarantee bridging divisions; even within same-party governments there can be strong intergovernmental disagreements (e.g., Trans Mountain pipeline dispute between NDP governments in BC and Alberta, and federal NDP leadership positions).

• Unelected officials and staff mobility

  • A long history of movement of non-elected officials (public servants and political staff) across levels—and particularly during regime changes—shapes policy formation (e.g., Saskatchewan exodus in the 1960s feeding medicare at the federal level; recent Ontario staff moves during Trudeau era contributing to C/QPP expansion negotiations).

• Overall takeaway on mobility

  • Mobility and alignment help but are not sufficient alone for robust integration; party labels can be unreliable measures of linkages across levels, and policy networks and policy experts/staff play a crucial role in facilitating cooperation.

Performance, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the party system

• Key assessment criteria

  • Integrative capacity: to what extent do parties knit regions to the center and facilitate coordination across levels?

  • Flexibility and responsiveness: can the party system adapt to changing regional demands and national priorities?

  • Legitimacy: do electoral outcomes and the presence of regionally distinct parties contribute to a legitimate federal system that accommodates divergent regional aspirations?

• Historical patterns and cautions

  • The past suggests that full regional representation within one governing party is not necessarily desirable and can lead to crises when too many interests are bundled into a single omnibus coalition (Carty, 2002).

  • The Canadian cabinet tends to act as the crucial intrastate institution capable of representing regional interests when regional representation in Parliament is uneven; cabinet composition often compensates for regional imbalances in the legislature.

  • The idea of a golden age of party-driven integration is misleading; the federation survived in part due to a system that allowed regional representation and competition, and not solely due to party cohesion.

• Considerations about the party-system in a federal context

  • The past may overstate the role of parties in linkage; the federation endured even when parties were regionally segmented and not fully integrated.

  • The value of dissimilar federal and provincial party allegiances can be productive for checks and balances within a Westminster system, providing diversity of regional priorities in governance.

• Reframing the analytic model

  • The Riker framework (two-party, mobility-based integration) is incomplete for Canada due to regional variation and the role of staff networks and cross-level movements.

  • A broader framework should recognize the importance of:

  • Party staff networks and policy advisors as linking devices

  • Intergovernmental bargaining and committee dynamics

  • The impact of regional representation on policy outcomes (e.g., medicare, CPP expansion)

  • Electoral dynamics (regional splits between federal and provincial parties) as a mechanism for signaling preferences and maintaining checks and balances

• Overall conclusion on realism and impact

  • The party system’s integrative capacity has been limited and remains debated as to whether it can or should carry the heavy burden of national unity.

  • The federation may function well with diverse regional representation in Parliament and cabinet; strong regional representation in cabinet and targeted minority-government bargaining can enhance responsiveness and legitimacy.

  • In light of evolving regional dynamics and the rise of regional parties (e.g., Bloc Québécois, Reform/Conservative realignments), the party system should be viewed as one important, but not exclusive, instrument for federal stability and coherence.

Conclusion and synthesis

• Is the party system capable of doing the heavy lifting for national unity?

  • Not historically or functionally guaranteed; integrative capacity has always been limited by regional fragmentation and the structure of the Westminster system.

  • The federation survived and adapted through regional representation, cabinet-based intrastate governance, and strategic mobility of political actors, not simply through uniform national-party dominance.

• What constitutes effective governance in a federal system?

  • Flexibility and responsiveness to regional concerns

  • A balance of power between centre and periphery, allowing for diverse regional agendas to coexist and to influence national policy

  • Countervailing powers produced by divergent provincial and federal electoral outcomes (e.g., Ontario vs. Quebec vs. Western provinces), as well as the presence of minority governments that can open space for intergovernmental bargaining

• Final assessment (as framed by Bakvis & Tanguay)

  • The present party system has acquitted itself reasonably well under a broader framework of federalism that values balance, regional representation, and intergovernmental deliberation.

  • The knitting function remains relevant but should be complemented by attention to staff networks, mobility, and institutional arrangements that foster cooperation across levels of government.

Appendix 1: Regional representation in government caucus and federal cabinet (highlights)

• Purpose of Appendix 1

  • Originally compiled by Shannon Wells (2004) and updated by the authors (2011, 2019) to show regional distribution in Parliament and in the Cabinet across Canadian history.

  • Includes regional breakdowns for West, Ontario (Ont.), Quebec (Que.), Atlantic (Atl.), plus the total and cabinet shares.

• Key takeaways from the data discussions

  • Regions historically experience uneven representation in Parliament; cabinets tend to compensate for Parliament’s regional gaps to ensure central government accountability to all regions.

  • 2011 example: Quebec accounted for only about 3% of Conservative seats in Parliament (5 of 166), yet more than 10% of Harper’s ministers came from Quebec, illustrating cabinet-level compensation for regional underrepresentation in Parliament.

  • 2015 Liberal cabinet patterns reflected Ontario’s electoral weight, with Atlantic provinces receiving relatively junior cabinet posts, signaling regional prioritization within the governing party.

  • 2019 Liberal strategy included appointing a Prairie-focused representative outside of cabinet to better engage Western Canada after losing representation in Alberta and Saskatchewan, indicating ongoing concern with Western regional representation.

• Note on data interpretation

  • The table includes numbers by region for general elections, governing party status, and cabinet positions; a region labeled as “West” encompasses the Northwest Territories, Yukon, and Nunavut.

  • The data show the ongoing balancing act: when Parliament’s regional balance is skewed, cabinet portfolios provide a mechanism to maintain federal responsiveness to regional interests.

Glossary and key terms

• Brokerage party: A party that seeks broad-based electoral coalitions across social classes, regions, and groups, emphasizing leadership, patronage, and flexible ideology.

• First-past-the-post (FPTP): The electoral system used in Canada where the candidate with the most votes in a riding wins, even without a majority.

• Government party: A term used to describe a party that governs, sometimes used to denote a party that has effectively merged with the government apparatus (Whitaker, 1977) and is also referred to as the “natural governing party.”

• Intrastate vs. interstate federalism: Distinctions made by Cairns (1979) and Smiley & Watts (1985) between mechanisms that enable regional interests to be accommodated within the central government (intrastate: cabinet, Senate) versus those that involve intergovernmental face-to-face meetings (interstate: premiers’ conferences).

• Reform Party of Canada / Canadian Alliance: Western-based party formations that emerged in the late 1980s–1990s as expressions of western concerns; eventually merged into the Conservative Party (1990s–2000s).

• Two-and-a-half party system: A period in the Canadian party landscape (notably 2011) when the Conservative Party held a majority outside Quebec, with the NDP and Liberals sharing the opposition landscape, altering traditional dichotomies.

• Medicare, CPP, NEP, Official Languages Act: Key centralizing federal programs/policies discussed as examples of pan-Canadian policymaking that affected regional relations.

• C/QPP: Canada–Quebec Pension Plan; a landmark social policy negotiated in minority-government contexts that illustrates how federal–provincial cooperation can shape long-term social programs.

References to foundational ideas and authors (selected)

• Riker, William H. 1964. Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance.

• Smiley, Donald V. 1987; Smiley & Watts, 1985. Intrastate vs. interstate federalism.

• Chandler, William M. 1987. Federalism and the Political Parties (in the chapter collection).

• Carty, R. Kenneth; Wolinetz, Stephen. 2004. Political Parties and the Canadian Federation’s Coalition Politics.

• Bakvis, Herman; Tanguay, A. Brian. 1994–2019. Various chapters and empirical data on Canadian party system dynamics, regional representation, and mobility.

• Smith, David E. 1985. Party Government, Representation and National Integration in Canada.

• Crosbie (1997) and other sources cited for regional minister anecdotes.

Chapter 6 notes: Federalism, Political Parties, and the Burden of National Unity

Core premise

Political parties perform essential functions in liberal democracies: organizing electoral choices, representing diverse interests, channeling political participation, and recruiting decision-makers with varying levels of experience (King, 1969; Covell, 1991).

In federal systems, parties take on an additional, crucial "knitting" or nation-building task. This involves unifying the nation by bridging regional divides and effectively linking diverse regional interests with the federal center. In Canada, traditional brokerage parties historically served as the “sinews of a healthy federalism” (David Smith, 1985), ensuring national cohesion.

Recent Canadian developments, particularly increased regional fragmentation and shifts in the party system since the late 20th century, have raised significant questions about whether contemporary parties can still effectively serve as national integrators and fulfil this historical function.

Framing questions (early 21st century context)

Is there a renewed prospect that parties will effectively carry the burden of national unity, especially with the re-emergence of two dominant national parties and seemingly less fragmentation observed in the early 2000s?

What can be reasonably expected of the two main parties in their role as national integrators, given the persistent regional cleavages and distinct regional political cultures?

Is the classic knitting function of parties, as observed and theorized in the 1960s–70s, still relevant or even possible in Canada's evolving political landscape, or have other mechanisms superseded it?

Structure of the chapter

Part I: Examines the theoretical mechanisms by which parties are supposed to knit regions to the center and delves into where these mechanisms have historically fallen short or been insufficient.

Parts II–III: Provides a detailed retrospective analysis of party-system performance, tracing its decline in national integration capacity in the late 20th century and evaluating its potential revival in more recent times.

Three offsetting factors analyzed: The role of intrastate federalism (specifically focusing on regional caucuses and the influence of regional ministers within cabinet), how minority governments shape and often open up the federal–provincial agenda, and the mobility of political actors (both elected and unelected) between provincial and federal levels of government.

Conclusion: Offers a comprehensive evaluation of the performance, effectiveness, and overall legitimacy of the Canadian party system specifically in relation to its impact on the health and functioning of the Canadian federation.

A parties-based theory of federalism (Campbell Sharman, 1994)

Three dimensions (as outlined by Sharman, building on William Riker’s foundational ideas)

1) Partisan symmetry–asymmetry in the federation (the federal bargain)

Riker theorized that the degree of symmetry (similarity) between national and subnational party systems significantly shapes whether a federation leans towards centralization or decentralization.

Symmetrical party systems, where the same major parties operate effectively at both national and subnational levels, tend to produce more centralized federations, especially if the national–subnational party link is robust and cohesive.

A strong link is typically indicated by a party having a dominant presence at both federal and provincial levels, significant shared membership between federal and provincial party wings, and a clear career path where provincial officials frequently move up through the party ranks to the national level.

Canadian evidence historically demonstrates a significant degree of confederal tendencies relative to the more centralized U.S. federalism. This is marked by a notable disjunction between federal and provincial party systems (Smiley 1987; 1989) and a considerably weaker national–regional party linkage compared to some other federations, implying a less centralized federal dynamic.

2) Intrastate dimension: representation of local/regional interests in national governance

Parties are expected to facilitate the effective representation of specific regional interests within national governing bodies. They do this by creating formal and informal channels for communication, influence, and the flow of personnel (e.g., regional politicians moving up through the party while maintaining strong ties to their local constituencies and provincial governance).

Advantages:

Politicians with prior provincial experience bring broader insights and a deeper understanding of localized challenges and policy impacts to the national level.

National leaders who have direct regional experience are better equipped to comprehend and address specific local issues, fostering more responsive governance.

Regional governments and their respective provincial party structures often serve as crucial talent pools, grooming individuals who can then be recruited to national offices, enriching federal policymaking with diverse regional perspectives.

Canadian evidence: While Smiley argued Canada exhibits more confederal party-system alignment than typical federations due to the disjunction between federal and provincial party systems, he also emphasized that the federal cabinet remains the most important intrastate institution capable of accurately representing and responding to regional interests (Smiley 1987; Watts & Smiley 1985). This highlights the cabinet's compensatory role.

3) Structure of party systems and norms governing competition between them

Chandler (1987) identified three primary party-system types based on the distribution of power:

Single-party majority: Characterized by one party consistently holding a dominant majority of seats and forming government.

Multiparty with one party dominant: Multiple parties exist, but one consistently leads or controls the policy agenda.

Coalition (no single party majority; two or more form a governing majority): Requires formal or informal agreements between parties to reach a governing threshold.

Implications for federalism:

Single-party majority systems often tend to be highly adversarial, which can potentially undermine the collaborative norms and consensus-building efforts essential for effective federal–provincial cooperation.

Coalition systems, by their nature, are generally the least adversarial and potentially more conducive to cooperative governance, as they necessitate inter-party negotiation and compromise to function.

Carty & Wolinetz (2004) observe that despite these theoretical implications, Canadian federal parties have historically avoided formal inter-party coalitions at the federal level. However, federal leaders frequently engage in extensive, albeit informal, coalition-style bargaining and negotiation within the federal–provincial arena, adapting to Canada's multi-level governance.

Practical observation: Canadian party systems do, to some extent, link regions to the center and promote collaboration, but often not in a straightforward manner consistent with standard theories. The authors particularly highlight the often underappreciated yet critical role of party professionals (such as political staff, policy advisors, and strategists) in effectively linking federal and provincial agendas and facilitating cross-governmental communication.

Bottom line from the theory

The knitting function of parties should be understood and viewed alongside their other crucial roles, including candidate recruitment, interest representation, policy formation, and electoral organization.

In Canada, the knitting function is not the sole determinant of the success or failure of federal–provincial cooperation; informal staff networks, robust intergovernmental policy networks, and direct regional bargaining sessions also play critical and often underestimated roles.

Canada’s party system, 1867–1993: the triumph of regionalism

Early era: a two-party system with strong regional bases

From Confederation in 1867 until the Diefenbaker landslide in 1958, Canada was largely dominated by two main national parties – the Liberal and Conservative parties. These parties successfully cobbled together broad, cross-national electoral coalitions, particularly spanning the demographic and political heartlands of Ontario and Quebec, which were crucial for delivering regional balance and effectively managing national unity issues.

Historically, Ontario and Quebec together consistently accounted for a significant proportion (between $60\%$ to $75\%$) of all parliamentary seats. Consequently, a party virtually needed substantial Quebec support to win national office and form a stable majority government.

This system enjoyed prolonged political stability until the 1917 Unionist shift during WWI. The pattern was definitively broken by John Diefenbaker’s massive 1958 landslide, which famously formed a majority government without securing decisive support from Quebec, signaling a weakening of the traditional power dynamic.

The brokerage era (King and St. Laurent)

Brokerage politics describes a political style where party leaders skillfully cobbled together diverse regional, ethnic, and socio-economic coalitions to gain and maintain power and govern the nation.

Key ministers from strategically important regions played a vital role in integrating broader regional interests into federal policy. Notable examples include J.G. Gardiner in Saskatchewan, C.D. Howe in Northwest Ontario, and Ernest Lapointe in Quebec, who served as crucial regional conduits within the cabinet.

The traditional widespread patronage system began to decline significantly after the Civil Service Reform Act of 1918. However, it was largely replaced by the strategic allocation of pork-barrel funding (large, often visible regional projects) as a new, more institutionalized means to maintain and solidify regional political ties and support.

Despite its initial effectiveness, this brokerage system gradually weakened as a more pan-Canadian national identity and set of shared values became increasingly dominant after the 1950s, leading to a reduced reliance on individual regional brokers for national unity.

The pan-Canadian era and its centralizing thrust (1957–1984)

The advent of television and the increasing emphasis on leadership-focused election campaigns significantly reduced the traditional influence and local leverage of regional power brokers in national elections.

John Diefenbaker’s rallying cry of “One Canada” and the introduction of the Bill of Rights in 1960 shifted national attention towards formal equality and common citizenship. Subsequently, policies under Lester B. Pearson (like medicare and the Canada Pension Plan) and Pierre Trudeau (Official Languages Act, National Energy Program (NEP), and extensive Constitution reforms) progressively centralized more legislative and policymaking power in Ottawa.

Trudeau’s ambitious reforms, while national in scope, inadvertently alienated some crucial regions, most notably Western Canada, where policies like official bilingualism and the NEP were perceived as highly divisive and harmful to regional economies and identities.

This significant centralizing drive regrettably coincided with an increasing overall trend of regional fragmentation within the Canadian political landscape. Both the Liberal and Conservative parties found their support increasingly confined to limited regional strongholds rather than maintaining their traditional cross-country appeal.

Consequences of pan-Canadianism for regional representation

The era led to distinct regional strongholds: Liberals often dominated Quebec in numerous elections, while the West increasingly became a fertile ground for reformist protest parties, initially the CCF/NDP, and later the Reform Party and other Western reformers.

The period from the 1960s to the 1980s witnessed the prominent rise of these regionally-based protest parties (following earlier Progressive movements in the 1920s–1930s and the CCF/NDP in the mid-20th century), which effectively challenged the long-standing two-party monopoly at the federal level.

The 1980s and especially the 1990s saw an intensification of regional fragmentation. The Reform Party ascended dramatically in the West, while the Bloc Québécois emerged as a significant force in Quebec. This period saw a marked erosion of Liberal dominance in Western provinces and a strong challenge to Liberal hegemony in Quebec by the Bloc.

Key features of the decline and reformulation

The 1958 Diefenbaker landslide and the 1984 Mulroney landslide both powerfully exposed the inherent fragility of maintaining all-encompassing national coalitions that sought to represent everyone.

The Mackenzie King era, while emphasizing a cohesive federation via regional ministers and brokers, also demonstrated clear limits to this integration model and highlighted the inherent fragility of relying on “one omnibus” coalitions to hold disparate interests together (Carty, 2002).

The Mulroney era (1984–1993) represented a partial attempt to revive strong regional cabinet representation, with ministers from Newfoundland, Alberta, and Quebec playing central regional roles. However, even this was not a full return to the earlier, more dominant brokerage model.

Notable shifts in later decades

The 1993 federal election was a watershed moment: it saw the near-collapse of the Progressive Conservative party, the dramatic rise of the Reform Party in the West, and the emergence of the Bloc Québécois as a major player in Quebec. While Liberals dominated Ontario, they remained weak in the West, and the Bloc significantly challenged them in Quebec.

The 1994–1995 period was marked by Quebec intensely sampling its political options with strong support for the Bloc Québécois federally and the Parti Québécois provincially, culminating in the extremely close 1995 Quebec referendum on sovereignty.

The Chrétien era (late 1990s–2000s): Liberal dominance resurfaced, with Ontario becoming their central stronghold. However, Quebec and the West were now largely represented by distinct regional forces (Reform/Canadian Alliance in the West, Bloc Québécois in Quebec) rather than through a single national party attempting to bridge all regions.

The Harper era (2006–2015) notably featured several minority governments relying heavily on carefully cultivated regional balance in cabinet and significant Quebec representation. This was followed by a 2011 majority obtained without Quebec’s traditional decisive role, marking a significant shift. The 2011 results were pivotal: the NDP surged dramatically in Quebec, Liberals experienced a decline in Ontario, and the Conservatives achieved a majority largely driven by seats outside Quebec.

The 2015 and 2019 election cycles: Liberals regained a central position with a majority in 2015 and then a minority in 2019. The NDP significantly faded in Quebec, while the Bloc Québécois enjoyed a strong resurgence in 2019. Throughout these periods, the Liberals faced new and complex regional dynamics, with the West regaining some leverage, particularly through key cabinet appointments and targeted regional strategies.

The regional-ministry and cabinet dynamics

Regional ministers and regional caucuses have historically served as critical links between provincial and federal agendas. They often act as conduits for provincial priorities, facilitating intergovernmental bargaining and compromise.

The advent of television and the centralization of campaign efforts around strong leadership figures reduced the traditional political leverage of individual regional brokers. However, strong cabinet representation from diverse regions remained, and continues to be, a crucial intrastate link within the federal structure.

The Trudeau government (2015–2019) saw a shift towards attenuated regional ministerial roles and a more centralized governance style, with decision-making often concentrated in the federal capital. This sometimes led to visible cross-regional policy struggles and disagreements (e.g., over Indigenous rights, climate change policies, and resource development).

Regional caucuses and regional ministers in practice

Regional caucuses

All parties that have more than one Member of Parliament (MP) elected in a particular region typically form regional caucuses. These caucuses are very often dominated by the regional ministers who themselves serve in the federal cabinet.

The activities and deliberations of these caucuses usually occur under a strict cloak of caucus secrecy, which paradoxically limits the public visibility and perceived effectiveness of regional concerns being addressed, despite the fundamental expectation of regional representation.

A notable insider example of regional influence: In 1997, John Crosbie, serving as the Atlantic regional minister, publicly rebuked the Prime Minister over a fishery treaty that was perceived as detrimental to Atlantic interests. This rare public disagreement resulted in a public apology from the deputy Prime Minister (Crosbie, 1997), illustrating the potential, albeit rare, for regional ministers to assert regional concerns vigorously.

In the 2010s: Saskatchewan MPs from the governing party publicly expressed significant concerns regarding a proposed takeover bid for Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan, demonstrating how regional caucuses can mobilize to protect provincial economic interests (Chase & McCarthy, 2010).

Regional ministers in recent governments

The Harper government (2011–2015 majority) included a noticeably large share of ministers from both Ontario and Quebec, with several ministers from Quebec holding significant senior portfolios. This composition reflected a deliberate and strategic attempt to anchor the cabinet regionally and ensure broader representation after earlier electoral struggles in these regions.

In contrast, the Trudeau government (2015–2019 majority) distinctly moved towards governing from a more centralized perspective. The composition of its cabinet and the emphasis on regional representation reflected these centralized governance priorities, with less overt public emphasis placed on the traditional, highly visible roles of designated regional ministers.

Regional representation and accountability

Historical appendix data conclusively shows a significant variability in both regional representation within Parliament and proportional representation within the federal Cabinet. Crucially, when parliamentary regional representation is uneven or skewed, cabinet composition frequently tends to compensate for these imbalances to ensure that the central government remains responsive and accountable to the interests of all regions.

A salient 2011 example: Quebec accounted for a mere $3%$ of the Conservative seats in Parliament (5 out of 166). However, just over $10%$ of Harper’s ministers originated from Quebec, vividly illustrating the compensatory role of cabinet representation to offset regional underrepresentation in the broader parliamentary caucus.

In the 2015 Liberal government, there was a pronounced Ontario dominance within the governing caucus. Consequently, MPs from the Atlantic provinces tended to hold more junior status in cabinet portfolios, signaling a clear regional prioritization within the governing party's distribution of power.

For the 2019 Liberal government, facing significant losses in the West, a strategic attempt was made to compensate for the reduced Western representation by appointing a Prairie-focused political representative outside cabinet. This indicated an ongoing and persistent concern with addressing and maintaining Western regional representation despite electoral setbacks.

Minority government, regional voices, and open federal–provincial bargaining

Minority government dynamics

Minority governments fundamentally elevate the potential for significant federal–provincial collaboration and more intensive, open bargaining. This is because the governing party must constantly seek the support of opposition parties in Parliament to pass legislation and advance its policy agendas.

Such parliamentary configurations inherently create enhanced opportunities for distinct regional voices (often amplified by regionally-based opposition parties or influential government backbenchers) to influence policy-making more directly within Parliament and its committees, rather than relying solely on traditional elite accommodation processes behind closed doors.

Historical exemplars:

The Pearson (1963–1968) minority government is a key historical example. It successfully laid the foundational basis for transformative social programs such as the Canada-Quebec Pension Plan (C/QPP) and Canada's universal medicare system, largely aided by the crucial parliamentary support from the NDP (Russell, 2008).

The Harper (2006–2011) minority governments, in contrast, relied less on extensive federal–provincial bargaining and more on calculated political strategy (e.g., targeted attack ads) and decisive steering of economic stimulus measures during the 2009 global financial crisis.

The 2019 federal election resulted in another Liberal minority government, with both the NDP and Bloc Québécois holding the balance of power. This configuration immediately raised expectations of renewed federal–provincial social policy momentum, with potential policy scope reminiscent of the productive 1963–1968 Pearson era.

Implications for regional parties and bargaining

Minority contexts can significantly empower regionally based parties, allowing them to directly push their specific agendas and priorities in Parliament rather than being forced to wait for broader, cross-party accommodation in the traditional federal–provincial arena.

The overall effectiveness of minority governments in successfully delivering regionally balanced social policy outcomes fundamentally depends on two critical factors: the extent of inter-party cooperation within Parliament and its committees, and the explicit willingness of provincial governments to actively collaborate with the federal government on shared policy objectives.

Mobility and partisan alignment

Core idea (Riker model): partisan alignment between national and local levels and upward mobility of officials promote integration

According to the Riker model, a high degree of partisan alignment between national and subnational levels, combined with significant upward mobility of political officials (e.g., from provincial to federal office), actively promotes closer integration within a federal system.

In Canada, however, both partisan alignment and the mobility of elected officials have historically been quite limited. Moving directly from provincial to federal office has largely been the exception rather than the rule, and this mobility has, in fact, declined over time (Smiley 1987; Barrie & Gibbins 1989).

The 2006 Harper government did see a selective, notable reversal of this trend, with several former provincial ministers joining the federal cabinet (e.g., a number of former Harris-era Progressive Conservatives moved to Ottawa), indicating periods of selective mobility and integration.

In some prominent cases, mobility has occurred in the opposite direction (e.g., Jason Kenney moving from federal cabinet to provincial leadership in Alberta; Jean Charest’s significant path from federal to provincial leadership in Quebec), further complicating the linear integration model.

Inter-party mobility and cross-level collaboration

There are well-documented examples of effective cross-level collaboration even in the absence of identical party control at federal and provincial levels. The movement of experienced ministers and skilled staff between federal and provincial governments can often facilitate crucial cooperation and robust information sharing (e.g., experienced Ontario Liberal staff moving to Ottawa in 2015 to join the federal Liberal government; former Harper staff moving to the Ontario Ford government in 2018).

Importantly, shared party affiliation does not automatically guarantee the bridging of intergovernmental divisions or even policy alignment. Even within same-party governments, there can be strong intergovernmental disagreements and policy clashes (e.g., the high-profile Trans Mountain pipeline dispute between the NDP governments in British Columbia and Alberta, which also created internal tensions within the federal NDP leadership).

Unelected officials and staff mobility

There is a long-standing and significant history of movement of non-elected officials (primarily public servants and political staff) across different levels of government, particularly during periods of regime change. This mobility profoundly shapes policy formation and implementation (e.g., the significant exodus of Saskatchewan public servants in the 1960s who subsequently played a crucial role in feeding expertise into the development of medicare at the federal level; more recent moves of Ontario staff during the Trudeau era directly contributing to the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) expansion negotiations).

Overall takeaway on mobility

While mobility and partisan alignment can contribute positively to integration, they are not, by themselves, sufficient conditions for robust and sustained federal integration. Simple party labels can often be unreliable measures of deeper linkages across governmental levels. Instead, extensive policy networks and the crucial role of dedicated policy experts and staff play a far more significant and often overlooked role in facilitating intergovernmental cooperation.

Performance, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the party system

Key assessment criteria

Integrative capacity: To what extent do federal political parties successfully knit regions to the center and facilitate effective coordination and compromise across different levels of government?

Flexibility and responsiveness: Can the existing party system adapt effectively and respond agilely to continually changing regional demands and evolving national priorities?

Legitimacy: Do electoral outcomes, particularly those that result in the presence of regionally distinct parties, contribute to or detract from a legitimate federal system that effectively accommodates diverse regional aspirations and identities?

Historical patterns and cautions

Historical experience strongly suggests that complete internal regional representation within one governing national party is not necessarily desirable, nor is it a simple panacea. Such attempts can, in fact, lead to significant political crises when too many divergent interests are bundled unsatisfactorily into a single, unwieldy “omnibus” coalition (Carty, 2002).

The Canadian cabinet consistently tends to act as the most crucial intrastate institution capable of representing and addressing regional interests, particularly when direct regional representation in Parliament is uneven. The composition of the cabinet often strategically compensates for these regional imbalances in the legislature, ensuring continued federal responsiveness.

The idea of a past “golden age” of seamless, party-driven integration within the Canadian federation is largely misleading. The federation has historically survived and thrived precisely in part due to a dynamic system that allowed for consistent regional representation and vibrant inter-regional competition, and not solely because of perfect national party cohesion.

Considerations about the party-system in a federal context

The historical narrative may overstate the capacity and singular role of parties in providing national linkage. The federation has demonstrably endured and adapted even when its parties were significantly regionally segmented and not fully integrated across the country.

The inherent value of dissimilar federal and provincial party allegiances can, in fact, be productive for maintaining vital checks and balances within Canada's Westminster parliamentary system, ensuring a diversity of regional priorities are voiced and considered in governance.

Reframing the analytic model

William Riker’s classic framework (predicated on a two-party system and mobility-based integration) is demonstrably incomplete when applied to Canada, primarily due to Canada's profound regional variation and the critical, often underappreciated, role of staff networks and cross-level movements of officials.

A more comprehensive analytical framework for Canadian federalism should explicitly recognize the paramount importance of:

Sophisticated party staff networks and highly specialized policy advisors as essential linking devices that bridge federal and provincial divides.

The intricate dynamics of intergovernmental bargaining and the crucial role of parliamentary committee discussions.

The direct impact of effective regional representation on the successful formulation and implementation of major policy outcomes (e.g., the initiation of medicare, the significant Canada Pension Plan expansion).

The electoral dynamics that produce regional splits between federal and provincial parties, viewing these as a constructive mechanism for signaling distinct regional preferences and for maintaining essential checks and balances within the multi-level system.

Overall conclusion on realism and impact

The party system’s integrative capacity has historically been limited and remains a subject of ongoing debate as to whether it can, or indeed should, carry the heavy and foundational burden of national unity alone.

The Canadian federation can, and often does, function effectively and legitimately with diverse regional representation in both Parliament and cabinet. Strong regional representation within cabinet and strategically targeted minority-government bargaining can demonstrably enhance both the responsiveness and perceived legitimacy of federal governance.

In light of evolving regional dynamics and the persistent rise of significant regional parties (e.g., the Bloc Québécois, and the realignments leading to the modern Conservative Party), the party system should be viewed as one important, but certainly not exclusive, instrument for ensuring federal stability and overall coherence.

Conclusion and synthesis

Is the party system capable of doing the heavy lifting for national unity?

Historically, and functionally speaking, it is not guaranteed; the integrative capacity of the Canadian party system has always been inherently limited by deep-seated regional fragmentation and the specific structural characteristics of the Westminster parliamentary system.

The federation has consistently survived and adapted through a flexible combination of robust regional representation, cabinet-based intrastate governance mechanisms, and the strategic mobility of key political actors, rather than solely through an idealized model of uniform national-party dominance.

What constitutes effective governance in a federal system?

Demonstrated flexibility and a consistent responsiveness to the diverse concerns and specific needs of the various regions.

Achieving a vital balance of power between the federal center and the provincial periphery, thereby allowing for diverse regional agendas to effectively coexist and influence national policy formation.

The presence of countervailing powers, often produced by divergent provincial and federal electoral outcomes (e.g., distinct political landscapes in Ontario, Quebec, and the Western provinces), as well as the strategic opportunities created by minority governments that can foster space for intensified intergovernmental bargaining and compromise.

Final assessment (as framed by Bakvis & Tanguay)

The present Canadian party system has reasonably acquitted itself well when viewed through a broader, more nuanced framework of federalism—one that inherently values ongoing balance, strong regional representation, and active intergovernmental deliberation.

The traditional knitting function remains relevant but should be complemented by attention to staff networks, mobility of political actors, and institutional arrangements that actively foster cooperation across all levels of government.

Appendix 1: Regional representation in government caucus and federal cabinet (highlights)

Purpose of Appendix 1

Originally compiled by Shannon Wells (2004) and updated by the authors (2011, 2019) to show regional distribution in Parliament and in the Cabinet across Canadian history.

Includes regional breakdowns for West, Ontario (Ont.), Quebec (Que.), Atlantic (Atl.), plus the total and cabinet shares.

Key takeaways from the data discussions

Regions historically experience uneven representation in Parliament; cabinets tend to compensate for Parliament’s regional gaps to ensure central government accountability to all regions.

2011 example: Quebec accounted for only about $3%$ of Conservative seats in Parliament (5 of 166), yet more than $10%$ of Harper’s ministers came from Quebec, illustrating cabinet-level compensation for regional underrepresentation in Parliament.

2015 Liberal cabinet patterns reflected Ontario’s electoral weight, with Atlantic provinces receiving relatively junior cabinet posts, signaling regional prioritization within the governing party.

2019 Liberal strategy included appointing a Prairie-focused representative outside of cabinet to better engage Western Canada after losing representation in Alberta and Saskatchewan, indicating ongoing concern with Western regional representation.

Note on data interpretation

The table includes numbers by region for general elections, governing party status, and cabinet positions; a region labeled as “West” encompasses the Northwest Territories, Yukon, and Nunavut.

The data show the ongoing balancing act: when Parliament’s regional balance is skewed, cabinet portfolios provide a mechanism to maintain federal responsiveness to regional interests.

Glossary and key terms

Brokerage party: A party that seeks broad-based electoral coalitions across social classes, regions, and groups, emphasizing leadership, patronage, and flexible ideology.

First-past-the-post (FPTP): The electoral system used in Canada where the candidate with the most votes in a riding wins, even without a majority.

Government party: A term used to describe a party that governs, sometimes used to denote a party that has effectively merged with the government apparatus (Whitaker, 1977) and is also referred to as the “natural governing party.”

Intrastate vs. interstate federalism: Distinctions made by Cairns (1979) and Smiley & Watts (1985) between mechanisms that enable regional interests to be accommodated within the central government (intrastate: cabinet, Senate) versus those that involve intergovernmental face-to-face meetings (interstate: premiers’ conferences).

Reform Party of Canada / Canadian Alliance: Western-based party formations that emerged in the late 1980s–1990s as expressions of western concerns; eventually merged into the Conservative Party (1990s–2000s).

Two-and-a-half party system: A period in the Canadian party landscape (notably 2011) when the Conservative Party held a majority outside Quebec, with the NDP and Liberals sharing the opposition landscape, altering traditional dichotomies.

Medicare, CPP, NEP, Official Languages Act: Key centralizing federal programs/policies discussed as examples of pan-Canadian policymaking that affected regional relations.

C/QPP: Canada–Quebec Pension Plan; a landmark social policy negotiated in minority-government contexts that illustrates how federal–provincial cooperation can shape long-term social programs.

References to foundational ideas and authors (selected)

Riker, William H. 1964. Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance.

Smiley, Donald V. 1987; Smiley & Watts, 1985. Intrastate vs. interstate federalism.

Chandler, William M. 1987. Federalism and the Political Parties (in the chapter collection).

Carty, R. Kenneth; Wolinetz, Stephen. 2004. Political Parties and the Canadian Federation’s Coalition Politics.

Bakvis, Herman; Tanguay, A. Brian. 1994–2019. Various chapters and empirical data on Canadian party system dynamics, regional representation, and mobility.

Smith, David E. 1985. Party Government, Representation and National Integration in Canada.

Crosbie (1997) and other sources cited for regional minister anecdotes.

Key Themes and Concepts

Political Parties in Federalism:

Knitting Function: The crucial role of political parties in unifying a nation by bridging regional interests and linking them to the federal center, particularly vital in federal systems like Canada.

Brokerage Parties: Parties that historically sought broad cross-regional and cross-class coalitions, often using patronage and flexible ideologies to manage diverse interests and maintain national unity.

Partisan Symmetry/Asymmetry: The degree of similarity or difference between federal and provincial party systems, which influences the centralization or decentralization of a federation.

Party System Structure & Competition: How the dominant party types (single-party majority, multiparty, coalition) affect adversarialism and cooperation within a federal context.

Recruitment and Representation: Parties' roles in organizing electoral choices, channeling participation, and recruiting decision-makers from diverse backgrounds.

Dimensions of Federalism & Regional Dynamics:

Intrastate Federalism: Mechanisms for accommodating regional interests within the federal government itself (e.g., cabinet composition, regional caucuses, Senate).

Interstate Federalism: Intergovernmental relations involving direct interactions and meetings between federal and provincial governments (e.g., premiers' conferences).

Regionalism vs. Pan-Canadianism: The historical tension between strong regional identities and interests versus efforts to foster a unified national identity and centralized policymaking.

Regional Fragmentation: The increasing tendency for federal party support to be concentrated in specific regions, leading to less pan-Canadian appeal and the rise of regionally distinct parties.

Key Institutional Roles & Dynamics:

Regional Ministers: Cabinet members appointed from specific regions to represent and integrate those regional interests into federal policy and decision-making.

Regional Caucuses: Groups of MPs from a particular region within a party, often influenced by regional ministers, intended to voice and advocate for regional concerns.

Cabinet as Intrasting Institution: The federal cabinet's crucial role in compensating for uneven regional representation in Parliament by ensuring that regional interests are still considered at the highest level of government.

Minority Government Dynamics: Situations where no single party holds a majority, often increasing opportunities for federal–provincial bargaining and empowering regional voices/parties in Parliament.

Mobility of Political Actors: The movement of elected officials and unelected staff between provincial and federal levels, which can facilitate cross-level cooperation and information sharing, though historically limited in Canada.

Historical Shifts and Challenges:

Brokerage Era (1867-1958/mid-1950s): Characterized by two dominant national parties forming broad regional coalitions, particularly relying on Ontario and Quebec support.

Pan-Canadian Era (1957-1984): Marked by centralizing policies (e.g., medicare, Official Languages Act, NEP) and a shift towards leadership-focused campaigns, coinciding with growing regional alienation.

Decline and Reformulation (1980s-2000s): Period of intensified regional fragmentation with the rise of the Reform Party/Canadian Alliance in the West and the Bloc Québécois in Quebec, challenging traditional party dominance.

Integrative Capacity of Party System: Ongoing debate about the extent to which the party system can or should carry the burden of national unity, noting its historical limitations and the importance of other federal mechanisms.