Concise Summary of the Build-up to War in Iraq

The build-up to war in Iraq, as outlined in Ali A. Allawi's "The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace," highlights a complex interplay of U.S. foreign policy, opposition groups, and shifting dynamics within Iraq during the 1990s. Prominent figures like Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz advocated for the removal of Saddam Hussein, emphasizing that American policy toward Iraq was inadequate against perceived threats.

The Iraqi National Congress (INC) faced significant struggles during this period, particularly after the failed offensives against Saddam’s regime and infighting within the Kurdish factions. Despite initial hope for a unified opposition, rising tensions and distrust among leaders like Ahmad Chalabi and Ayad Allawi fragmented efforts. The INC's failure to secure U.S. support marked a turning point, leading to the CIA favoring Allawi’s Iraqi National Accord (INA), which aimed for regime change through internal disruption rather than open confrontation.

As the 1990s progressed, the U.S. Clinton administration articulated a ‘dual containment’ strategy, isolating both Iraq and Iran—but saw diminishing returns as sanctions inflicted severe humanitarian repercussions without toppling Saddam. This led to a growing critique of U.S. policy among conservative lawmakers and think tanks, ultimately fostering support for the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) in 1998, which shifted funding and diplomatic focus toward opposition groups.

By the late 1990s, the ideological landscape of the Iraqi opposition evolved. New political ideas emerged, reflecting tension between communitarianism, reformed Islamism, and a secular political discourse among exiled Iraqis. The Kurds secured leverage to promote their federal ambitions, while Shi’a political identity became crucial in the wake of 1991 uprisings and systematic oppressions under Saddam's regime, culminating in calls for rights and recognition through documents like the "Declaration of the Shi’a of Iraq."

Overall, the decade leading up to the 2003 invasion marked a significant transformation in both internal opposition and U.S. policy, ultimately paving the way for the later military intervention but also underscoring the complexities of nation-building in Iraq thereafter.