EU, NATO, and Central/Eastern Europe Notes
Guiding Questions
What role did regional institutions play in the aftermath of the transition?
What role did NATO and the EU play in the aftermath of the transition?
How did Central/Eastern European states enter the EU?
How did the EU change Central/Eastern European states?
How did Central/Eastern European states change the EU?
Introduction
Prior to the Interwar era, discussing the foreign policy of East-Central Europe (ECE) is difficult because:
The region was controlled by empires such as the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman Empires, which dictated foreign policy.
Even during the Interwar era, not all states were sovereign; some were protectorates or had limited autonomy.
Those with sovereignty struggled to maintain it due to economic weaknesses and external pressures.
During the communist era, ECE states were tied together through institutions dominated by the USSR:
Cominform: Ideological coordination ensuring adherence to Soviet doctrines.
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: Economic coordination that favored Soviet interests.
Warsaw Pact: Military coordination that solidified Soviet military control.
These institutions were neither consultative nor cooperative, serving primarily as instruments of Soviet influence.
The end of the Cold War created a new context where states possess full sovereignty.
This required formulating independent foreign policies and evaluating international institutions.
Reorientation of foreign policy was facilitated by regional cooperative institutions:
Central European Initiative: Focused on practical cooperation in areas like infrastructure and environment.
Visegrad Group: Aims to promote cooperation and integration among its members.
Central European Free Trade Area: Designed to foster trade and economic growth within the region.
These boosted interstate interaction on key issues like technology, transportation, and minority rights, addressing historical tensions.
They also increased leverage for negotiation with other international institutional entities like the EU and NATO.
The Central vs. Eastern Europe distinction is also viewed as intermediary steps towards bigger goals like NATO and EU membership.
Central/Eastern Europe and NATO
German unification and Soviet dissolution removed two historical threats.
However, the region still feared:
Russian resurgence, particularly given Russia's historical expansionism.
Western apathy, reflecting concerns that Western powers might not remain engaged in the region's security.
Regional integration alone would not address these concerns, but NATO could.
NATO's key goal was initially to defend against a known adversary (i.e., USSR).
The end of the Cold War prompted a re-assessment of goals, adding "crisis management" and "cooperative security" to "collective defense."
This boosted institutionalization of the alliance by coordinating defense planning and incentivizing political solidarity.
Debates arose about expansion:
Would new members make decision-making more difficult given the need for consensus?
Would new members extend NATO commitments beyond manageable levels, straining resources?
Would expanding to include Russia be possible, given Russia's ambiguous relationship with the West?
Would expansion provoke Russia, leading to increased tensions?
Should NATO include members outside of Europe and North America, altering its fundamental character?
Once decisions were made about Russia (no membership prospects) and geography (no expansion outside of North America/Europe), members had to decide on ECE expansion.
Desire by ECE:
Creates "stamp of approval" at the international level, enhancing legitimacy.
Allows "Western" states (i.e., liberal democracies and market economies) to join NATO, solidifying democratic credentials.
Provides additional protection against regional instability, especially given historical conflicts.
Deters Russia, signaling a united front against potential aggression.
Concerns by NATO:
New members are unlikely to make significant military resource commitments, adding to burden-sharing problems.
Internal strife within new members could destabilize the alliance, requiring intervention.
Ongoing concerns about burden sharing, as many members fail to meet spending targets.
May weaken influence of dominant members (i.e., US), as new voices enter the decision-making process.
NATO expands to avoid being seen as ignoring prospective applicants.
It uses membership (and the nuclear umbrella) as inducement for reforms.
It requires members to resolve all internal disputes peacefully, reducing regional tensions.
Impact of NATO Membership
Expansion did NOT reduce US influence in the alliance, undermine the ability of NATO to respond to new challenges, or promote deadlock.
The US is still the most influential member due to its military and economic power.
Greece, Turkey, and France are still the states most likely to object, often due to national interests.
Hungary’s position on NATO expansion is viewed as problematic due to its close ties with Russia.
Expansion DID frustrate Russia, who believed they had an agreement that NATO would not expand any further into their “near abroad.”
There was no formal agreement not to expand NATO, but Russia viewed it as a violation of the spirit of post-Cold War cooperation.
Expansion DID raise concerns over burden sharing, as members are supposed to spend 2\%% of GDP on defense spending.
Most members are spending at or above the 2\%% requirement.
All but two ECE members spend below the required levels, relying on the security umbrella provided by others.
New members play a fundamental role as the alliance is returning its focus to Europe as a result of the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Speaks to the foreign policy impact of membership, particularly in shaping responses to Russian aggression.
Membership used to incentivize democratization, but it is unclear that NATO impacted democratization institutionally.
Europeanization exerts more of an impact through EU membership requirements.
However, NATO DID enshrine civilian control over the military.
Resonated quickly in ECE and the Balkans, where military influence had been strong.
Took more time in Bulgaria and Romania, where reforms faced resistance.
Not a foregone conclusion in a region where societies were “militarized” under communism.
Eastern/Central Europe and the EU
NATO membership is important, but EU membership would:
Reinforce the “ECE is back in Europe” narrative, overcoming historical divisions.
Reconstruct Europe as a “uniquely peaceful, democratic, and diverse economic powerhouse.”
Deliver economic growth, facilitate transition, boost European identity, and reinforce foreign policy reorientation.
ECE interest was not initially reciprocated by EU members, who worried accession:
Would swamp EU institutions, making deadlock more likely due to increased complexity.
Would trigger westward migration, which would impact domestic politics, straining social services.
The EU initially offered association agreements instead of pathways to accession.
These agreements traded privileged EU-15 at the expense of ECE, limiting access to EU markets.
The EU wanted ECE to rebuild political AND economic systems before considering accession.
Who Gets In?
Soviet disintegration leaves no alternative to the EU.
However, ECE states are concerned about appearing as supplicants and needed to see a pathway to membership.
The 1993 Copenhagen European Council provided hope.
The "Copenhagen Criteria" outlined membership criteria:
Needed to be "European," culturally.
Possess democratic institutions subject to the rule of law.
Have a functioning market economy.
Possess the ability to cope with “life inside the EU."
Possess the ability to take on EU commitments.
All ECE applicants met guidelines for application, but would they be able to join?
They were much poorer than the EU average.
ECE Accession and the EU
Accession is based on the Treaty of Rome.
The Maastricht Treaty outlines a three-stage process: Association, Pre-accession, and Accession.
The Treaty of Amsterdam highlights political requirements.
Applicants must be both willing and able to adopt EU laws (i.e., the acquis communautaire).
This is tougher than the requirements for previous members, testing administrative capacity.
Adoption of EU laws and responsibilities = Europeanization.
Europeanization is facilitated via conditionality.
The EU would oversee the implementation of EU laws and responsibilities.
Perceived ability to adopt the acquis resulted in two groups:
Luxembourg Group: More capable of adopting the acquis (Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Cyprus).
Helsinki Group: Less capable of adopting the acquis (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta).
The decision was made to adopt a “big bang” approach to negotiations, which could double the size of the EU.
Negotiations were conducted in groups, but readiness would be evaluated individually.
Association Agreements: Stage I
Applicant states desire to join the EU, and a formal application is submitted later.
The stage establishes “closer relations” via an association agreement.
This agreement is "necessary but not sufficient" for membership.
It is not limited to countries wishing to join.
It provides a legal framework until accession.
It can also provide aid and assistance.
Pre-Accession: Stage II
This stage begins once the EU designates a state as a “candidate.”
It occurs alongside stage one.
It is key for states unable to immediately adopt the acquis.
Involves “twinning” of EU and candidate experts.
Reinforced by financial aid.
The Commission evaluates candidate progress.
Initially seen as useful, but it becomes a source of irritation over time.
ECE states believed they were being held to more rigorous standards and they were right.
EU members believed ECE states were not ready for membership and they were right.
Accession: Stage III
The Commission issues an opinion about readiness.
Can the applicant apply the acquis?
Negotiations occur via the European Council.
The Council must vote unanimously to “open” or “close” negotiations.
Always follows Commission recommendations.
There are 31 acquis chapters for ECE.
The acquis is not negotiable.
Some flexibility on timetables.
Accession is initiated once all chapters are "opened” and “closed."
Requires:
Unanimous European Council vote
Majority vote of European Parliament
Unanimous approval of member states (typically via national parliaments)
Approval of applicant state
Key institutional concerns remained:
Were ECE states ready to join the EU, enhancing decision-making?
Were EU institutions ready to expand to include ECE, accommodating diverse interests?
Key political issues also remained:
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP):
Subsidizes agriculture.
EU-15 net receivers did not want to be net payers.
ECE applicants wanted full agricultural funding.
Free movement of labor:
EU citizens can live and work anywhere within the EU.
EU-15 feared the arrival of “Polish plumbers.”
ECE applicants did not want “second class” status.
Negotiations required “sweeteners” to ensure passage.
Sweeteners for EU-15:
Phase in CAP subsidies over ten years.
Placates EU-15 net receivers.
Full subsidies starting to extend to ECE.
Allowed to implement labor controls (up to seven years).
Applicants must also approve the treaty.
Not always a given (e.g., Norway).
ECE irritated at lack of full access to CAP and at the prospect of labor controls.
Sweetener for ECE:
Extended time to conform to the acquis.
No delay over minor issues.
Access to cohesion funds would provide critical development aid.
Eventual access to Schengen would provide free movement and reduce perception as “second class citizens.”
First unambiguous signal ECE actually “in.”
Accession treaties passed overwhelmingly (between 67\%% and 93\%% approval).
Consequences of Membership
Similar levels of EU support/opposition as in the West.
The same debate over:
"Democratic deficit."
Eurozone crisis.
Supranationalism vs. intergovernmentalism.
Rising Euroscepticism.
Many Central/Eastern Europeans remain supportive.
No large-scale mobilization against the EU.
For many citizens, EU membership is additional security against a resurgent Russia.
Legislatures are evolving to review EU legislation.
European Affairs Committees provide oversight.
Dependent upon resources.
Strength varies by state.
Differing levels of strength not unique to Central/Eastern Europe.
Improved diplomatic/bureaucratic core created.
Needed for effective negotiations.
The ability to create alliances within (and across) the region is key.
States are increasingly able to function within EU institutions.
Transposition (i.e., implementing EU legislation) is relatively solid.
Ability to implement is similar to EU-15.
Linked to investment in state capacity/bureaucratization during accession.
EU assistance has helped ECE economies during crises, but living standards have not fully converged.
This creates grist for populist anti-EU parties.
Some states are struggling to implement transparency and rule of law initiatives (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia).
Others engage in illiberal rhetoric (Hungary).
Conditionality is stronger before accession than after accession.
The EU is seeking to boost the latter via delaying access to Schengen, threats to invoke the “Rule of Law” mechanism and/or Article 7.
Impacts applications from other states within the region.
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Moldova, and Ukraine are all at “varying stages of readiness.”
Concerns over previous ECE accession waves impact prospects.
Conclusions
The EU is still adapting to “big bang” expansion.
Institutions still function.
ECE accession didn’t trigger deadlock.
BUT, future deepening is tougher given unanimity requirements.
Tougher to achieve with more members.
Central/Eastern Europe has broadly become “normal members.”
Most are becoming more adept at playing the “diplomatic game.”
ECE expansion is broadly viewed as a success.
However, concerns over domestic political realities in some recent additions are impacting future ECE widening.