Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining; Shultz Notes

Abstract

  • focus on problems that arise when state seeks to use military force to compel changes in another state’s policies

  • cost associated with military action means generally compromises that both sides prefer to conflict, but bargaining may fail if deals are not enforceable in face of tempetations to renege on policy concessions

  • what this study does?

    • developed model that shows inefficient conflict can occur when states bargain over policies that one of them can change unilaterally and covertly

  • theory useful for understanding conflicts where one state supports rebel groups engaged in civil war in another state

  • episodes of rebel support associated with substantial increase in risk of militarized disputes

  • rationalist explaination of war: war is costly, so actors will try not to go to war.

Assumptions

  • state a assumes to control some policy from which it derives beenfit but harms state b

  • starts with abrgaining phase where states come to agreement on some level of policy

  • enforcement phase, state a decides in every perood what level of policy to enact. two things: if enforceable agrement exists, can be reached in bargaining phase. if it does not exist then bargaining is irrelevant

  • state b has no control over state a policy, can threaten or use military to enforce restraint

    • in each period of state b chooses whether not to attack

Possible solutions to enforcement problem

  • costly monitoring

    • to prevent imperfect monitoring

  • reducing incentive to cheat through concessions

Why do some agreements at policy restraint work while others do not?

  • key challenge to reaching enforceale deal is the possibility that a state could renege without detection, then a deal is more likely to work if it improves monitoring technology

  • second implication of theory is that agreements to limit revel support more likely to work when linked through concessions by targeted state

Interest Differences not key to settle conflicts

  • why? have to explain information difference or commitment problem that prevents an agreement

  • focus on the incentives that an actor has

Conclusion

  • efforts to coerce policy restraint face enforcement problem

  • when monitoring imperfect, inefficient conflict can occur even though exists dela both sides prefer to fighting

  • ex: usa and iraq reflect iraq’s inability to commit credible and verifiabily to terms of the ceasefire