Zombie Argument Questions

What is a possible world?

A way of talking about how things could be. Saying that something is possible is saying that it is true in some possible world. Saying that something is impossible is saying that it is false in all possible worlds. For example, I might have been born in London in this world, but in a possible world I might have been born in Paris. 3/3

What is metaphysical necessity?

Metaphysical necessity refers to something that must be true in all possible worlds as it could not have been otherwise. It is what is necessary given the identity of things e.g. it is metaphysically necessary that water is H2O because of the identity relation between the concepts. 3/3

Define Qualia

Qualia are phenomenal properties which are understood to be intrinsic, non-Intentional and introspectively accessible. For example, smelling a cup of coffee has the quale of what it is like to smell coffee (the intrinsic phenomenal property). Coffee-scented perfume would also have this same quale. 3/3

Explain the zombie argument for property dualism

The argument for property dualism that if consciousness were identical to some physical properties, it would not be metaphysically possible for something to have that physical property without consciousness. However,

1) philosophical zombies (physical and functional duplicates of us which lack phenomenal consciousness) are conceivable, and so
2) philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible. Therefore,
3) consciousness is non-physical and physicalism is false.

Philosophical zombies are an exact physical and functional duplicate of a person, existing in another possible world, but without any phenomenal consciousness. The zombie therefore has identical physical properties to a person (and identical functional properties) but different mental properties. This is an argument for property dualism as it aims to demonstrate that we can have an exact physical and functional duplicate but with different mental properties. Physicalism claims that everything that exists is either physical or depends entirely on something physical (what is physical is ontologically fundamental). Therefore, if there is a possible world which is physically and functionally identical, but mental properties are different, then property dualists have shown that physicalism is false.

Outline the knowledge/Mary argument for property dualism

The Mary argument suggests a hypothetical situation: Mary is a neuroscientist specialising in colour vision, who knows all the physical and functional facts that a completed physics would tell us. She knows exactly how we see colour

P1. If physicalism is true, then all the facts are physical facts
P2. In her black and white room, Mary knows all the physical facts
P3. When Mary sees the tomato, she learns a new fact: “seeing red has this phenomenal property in humans”
P4. Some facts are not physical facts
C. Therefore physicalism is false

What is property dualism

Property dualism is the theory that there is only one kind of substance, physical substance, but two ontologically fundamental kinds of property - mental and physical. Mental properties are neither reducible to or supervene on physical properties. Property dualism develops on from substance dualism, which argues that there are both mental and physical substances, whereas property dualism recognises that there is only one kind of substance but claims there are two kinds of property. Property dualism still thinks that we have irreducible mental properties, such as consciousness. Property dualism rejects physicalism, and argues that mental properties are not ontologically reducible.

[12] Explain the philosophical zombies argument and the response that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible. Exemplar answer

1) philosophical zombies (physical and functional duplicates of us which lack phenomenal consciousness) are conceivable, and so
2) philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible. Therefore,
3) consciousness is non-physical and physicalism is false.

The physicalist can respond by arguing that even if zombies are conceivable, this does not entail that they are metaphysically possible, thereby attacking premise two of the zombie argument. If Physicalism is true, then zombies are in fact metaphysically impossible. This is because if phenomenal properties just are certain physical and/or functional properties, then you cannot have these physical and/or functional properties without phenomenal consciousness. This is due to the nature of metaphysical necessity – if phenomenal properties of consciousness are identical to physical and/or functional properties, then this would be true in all possible worlds, meaning that philosophical zombies would be metaphysically impossible. This objection from the physicalist therefore undermines the second premise of the zombie argument.

Do not mention the masked man fallacy/water not being H20 → this is what the physicalist has to say

Explain the philosophical zombies argument and the response that philosophical zombies are not conceivable

1) philosophical zombies (physical and functional duplicates of us which lack phenomenal consciousness) are conceivable, and so
2) philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible. Therefore,
3) consciousness is non-physical and physicalism is false.

The physicalist can respond to this argument by attacking premise one and arguing that zombies are not in fact conceivable. This objection claims that the only reason we may think zombies are conceivable is because we are not thinking clearly or we lack relevant information. If we had a complete analysis of consciousness, we would see that consciousness can be completely explained in physical and functional terms. The objection argues that:

P1. If physicalism is true, then phenomenal properties are physical properties realising particular functional roles.
C1. So, a physical and functional duplicate of a person with consciousness has phenomenal consciousness.
P2. A physical and functional duplicate of a person with consciousness cannot both have and lack phenomenal consciousness.
C2. Therefore, if physicalism is true, zombies are inconceivable.

By showing that zombies are inconceivable, this objection from the physicalist attacks the first premise of the zombie argument for property dualism.

Explain the philosophical zombies argument and the response that what is metaphysically possible may not actually be the case.

The zombie argument is a conceivability argument for property dualism which argues that if consciousness were identical to some physical properties, it would not be metaphysically possible for something to have that physical property without consciousness. However, 1) philosophical zombies (physical and functional duplicates of us which lack phenomenal consciousness) are conceivable, and so 2) philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible. Therefore, 3) consciousness is non-physical and physicalism is false.

The physicalist can respond to this argument by attacking the inference from P3 to the conclusion (zombies are metaphysically possible and therefore actually the case). The physicalist argues that, at best, the zombie argument shows that in another possible world, physical properties and phenomenal properties are distinct. This does not necessarily entail that these properties are distinct in the actual world. It could be the case that physicalism is true in the actual world but property dualism is true in a different possible world. In other words, the zombie argument only shows that property dualism is possible, not that it is true. It does not show that the key claim of property dualism – that physical properties and phenomenal properties are distinct and both ontologically fundamental – is true.