China’s Disinformation Strategy: Notes

Executive Summary

• China seeks to strengthen its discourse power to shape global norms and raise its global profile
• Approach is step-by-step, leveraging state media and social media to promote a Chinese vision guided by the CCP
• Core targets: protect sovereignty (including Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan) and win over overseas Chinese and global audiences
• China aims to contrast its stability and growth with perceived Western weaknesses, leveraging events like the COVID-19 pandemic to bolster its image
• Disinformation is framed as a tool to advance China’s soft power and global leadership, not merely propaganda
• Recognizes shortcomings inChina’s strategy, notably lower follower engagement on some platforms and limited direct influence on major elections to date
• Looking forward, China is investing in more sophisticated methods, including AI tailored messaging and a broader, more global reach
• Policy implications for democracies: guard against manipulation, bolster resilience of institutions, and promote transparency in information ecosystems

The Backdrop to Today’s Disinformation Push

• Under Deng Xiaoping, China pursued a strategy of keeping a low profile and biding time to gain strength; relied on collective leadership and gradual reform
• Goals included lifting living standards and growing GDP; targets included: doubling GDP and disposable per-capita income between 2010 and 2020, and ending absolute poverty by 2021
• These economic successes enabled China to project power abroad while still prioritizing development at home
• The 2004 Beijing Consensus emerged as an alternative to the Washington Consensus, signaling China’s growing confidence in a different development model
• The 2008 Beijing Olympics represented a “coming out party” for China; the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis catalyzed rethinking of global economic norms and the appeal of a China-centered model
• A standard practice under earlier leadership was collective decision-making within the Politburo Standing Committee to avoid single-person policy risk

The Environment Under Xi: Concentration of Power and a New Era

• Xi Jinping’s leadership marked an unprecedented concentration of power and a shift from Deng-era caution toward assertiveness on the world stage
• The state promotes the China Dream as a national rejuvenation narrative and a model for development that could rival Western democracy
• Xi’s era has seen codification of his ideology into the constitution (Xi Jinping Thought for a New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics) and the removal of presidential term limits
• Foreign policy tools expanded through the Belt and Road Initiative, creation of China-centered financial institutions like the AIIB, and increased maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea
• Sovereignty and unification with Taiwan remain central; Hong Kong’s governance and civil liberties have become flashpoints, underscoring sovereignty concerns as a core driver of policy
• China’s soft-power challenge: while hard power (military, economic) grew, soft power and global narrative control lagged, intensifying disinformation efforts to close the gap
• Economic challenges persist: aging population, shrinking workforce productivity, rising debt (roughly $\frac{ ext{Debt}}{ ext{GDP}} \approx 3$), and reforms needed to transition to a more domestic-market-driven economy
  • Rural hukou and dual land system reinforce inequality and barriers to broad middle-class expansion
  • These domestic constraints motivate a push for nationalist sentiment and a narrative of external threat to sustain CCP legitimacy

The Disinformation Imperative and the China Model

• Central aim: create and promote a China-centered model as an alternative to Western democracy and the US-led order
• Core concerns shaping disinformation: preserving territorial integrity (Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan) and preventing division
• The party seeks to showcase China as stable, capable, and morally legitimate in contrast to Western disarray highlighted by political polarization and governance failures
• Disinformation is viewed as a tool to support the China model, undermine Western liberal democracies, and attract overseas Chinese to return or invest in China
• The dual circulation strategy signals a shift toward self-reliance and export resilience while engaging global markets on Beijing’s terms
• Despite early successes in messaging, the China model’s ability to persuade broad global audiences remains mixed and is an ongoing test for Beijing’s communicative capabilities

The Actors and Tools of China’s Disinformation Strategy

• Key state actors leading disinformation efforts:
  • People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its information operations components
  • State Council and its Taiwan Affairs Office
  • Cyberspace Administration of China
  • CCP United Front Work Department (UFWD)
• Roles include seeding social media with favorable narratives about Hong Kong protesters, Taiwan’s DPP government, and Western politics; cultivating Chinese celebrities to advocate for Beijing’s positions
• Domestic media and propaganda organs drive content with positive messaging and patriotic themes
  • State media: People’s Daily, CCTV, Global Times
  • Domestic platforms: Sina Weibo, WeChat; censorship apparatus to scrub sensitive content and promote positive energy (zheng neng liang)
• Overseas Chinese networks and platforms play a critical role:
  • State actors and diplomats use foreign platforms; “wolf warrior” diplomacy; doctored imagery and misinformation
  • Nonstate actors include sockpuppets, content farms, and propaganda units embedded in diaspora communities
• Non-state actors and diaspora dynamics:
  • 50 Cent Army and other online actors paid to post supportive content
  • Overseas Chinese students, pop stars, fangirls, and nationalist online communities
  • Diaspora figures (e.g., Guo Wengui) and media outlets (Epoch Times, New Tang Dynasty Television) have been more effective in some cases at spreading anti-CCP sentiment in the diaspora
• Key information channels and practices:
  • Domestic internal censorship and promotion of positive energy via search algorithms and content curation
  • International platforms (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) used by Chinese officials and state media to reach global audiences and shape narratives
  • Use of memes, music videos, and culturally resonant content to go viral among younger audiences in Hong Kong and Taiwan

Case Studies: Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Diaspora

• Hong Kong
  • State media and CCP-sponsored campaigns create patriotic messaging that appeals to youth, including memes and music videos
  • Content such as hashtags and music campaigns are used to frame protests and mainland governance in favorable terms
  • Domestic security concerns amplify messaging against perceived foreign interference
• Taiwan
  • Taiwan is a primary testing ground for disinformation tactics intended to influence elections and public opinion
  • Local tech ecosystems and online forums (PTT, Dcard) are battlegrounds for disinformation and pro-unification content
  • Pro-unification media ties (Want Want China) illustrate the influence of mainland money on Taiwanese media; regulatory actions have targeted questionable outlets
  • The CCP’s United Front strategy funds trips for local elites to foster pro-unification sentiment
• The Diaspora (Global Chinese Communities)
  • The approach has faced limitations in exploiting existing societal fractures in target countries, unlike Russia’s operations
  • Diaspora actors like Epoch Times and New Tang Dynasty Television have been more effective in resonating with certain audiences than state-led campaigns within some contexts
  • Chinese authorities increasingly rely on heavy-handed, state-controlled messaging rather than covertly engineered online interference to shape global perceptions
• Global social media platforms
  • Chinese officials have opened accounts on platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to promote China’s rise and criticize opposing narratives
  • The rise of assertive diplomacy, or wolf warrior diplomacy, has complicated international relations and raised concerns about manipulation of foreign publics

The Strategic Environment: AI, Economics, and Influence Operations

• Beijing’s disinformation strategy increasingly incorporates advanced technologies:
  • Military and civilian integration to tailor content for diverse audiences, including Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States
  • Plans to leverage AI to improve audience targeting and influence effectiveness on global platforms
• Economic leverage and coercion:
  • China uses its vast market to pressure foreign companies and individuals to align with the CCP line or face economic consequences
  • The leverage extends to cultural industries, tourism, and investments, influencing global narratives about China
• The “dual circulation” concept reinforces a strategy of expanding domestic resilience while moderating exposure to external pressures

Shortcomings and Prospects for China’s Disinformation Campaign

• Current gaps in China’s approach include limited engagement and influence relative to sophisticated campaigns by Russia or other adversaries
• China’s messaging has often been constrained by doctrinal, prescriptive talking points that may feel inauthentic to foreign audiences
• Over time, the strategy may become more sophisticated as AI, data analytics, and global business networks expand
• The leadership’s willingness to escalate, including potentially coercive or coercive-like messaging in economic or political arenas, could raise international backlash or pushback from partners
• The probability of achieving a truly global, widely accepted “China story” remains uncertain and will hinge on Beijing’s ability to adapt to diverse political cultures and information ecosystems

Policy Recommendations (Summary)

• Expand US and allied Chinese-language media reach via depoliticized, well-funded outlets such as Radio Free Asia to provide balanced Mandarin-language content
• Support Taiwan-US joint initiatives to study and counter disinformation, including independent broadcasting and online engagement strategies; bolster Taiwan’s media resilience
• Work with allies to counter China-led disinformation tactics in Asia through academic programs, think tanks, and public education
• Implement educational initiatives to teach media literacy, digital hygiene, and awareness of overseas censorship and propaganda effects
• Increase Mandarin-language education and study of China’s political economy in schools and universities
• Reopen and expand people-to-people exchanges (Peace Corps, Fulbright) to foster mutual understanding and reduce susceptibility to propaganda
• Avoid broad visa restrictions on students; instead, carefully target senior state media executives for visa controls while maintaining broader academic exchange
• Encourage social media platforms to label disinformation clearly and adjust algorithms to limit spread; establish an agency to coordinate with platforms on counter-disinformation efforts
• Engage with business associations to resist self-censorship pressures from China; encourage firms to resist changes that degrade Taiwan’s status or cede to Beijing’s demands in ways that would penalize noncompliant partners
• Create independent monitoring mechanisms to publicize cases of self-censorship and to inform foreign policy and corporate decision-making
• Maintain a principled stance against tit-for-tat expulsions of journalists; rather, use targeted visa policies against senior state-media personnel while preserving broader journalistic exchange
• Establish research initiatives to study both PLA and UFWD roles in disinformation, building partnerships with US and Taiwan-based academic and industry actors to better understand and counter these efforts

Conclusion: The Road Ahead

• China’s disinformation efforts are unlikely to remain stagnant; as its power grows, so will its investment in shaping the global narrative
• The COVID-19 pandemic has provided a recent proving ground for China’s messaging about its handling of the crisis, which could influence global perceptions if leveraged effectively
• The long-term objective is to shape hearts and minds beyond Hong Kong and Taiwan, spreading influence into the diaspora and broader global audiences
• While China’s current toolkit lags behind Russia in some respects, rapid improvements in AI, media production, and international reach indicate a more capable disinformation ecosystem in the future
• For the United States and other democracies, collaboration, resilience-building, transparency, and well-funded counter-narratives will be essential to slow China’s advance in the information domain and protect democratic norms

Key References and Context Points (Integrated from the Text)

• China’s sovereignty concerns drive disinformation priorities and justification for harsher governance in Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan
• The China Dream and China model narrative underpin public diplomacy and domestic propaganda efforts
• The dual circulation strategy signals a push toward self-reliance and external engagement with conditions favorable to Beijing’s interests
• The United Front Work Department plays a central coordinating role in shaping narratives among nonparty groups and individuals
• Taiwan’s political environment, minority groups, and diaspora communities are focal points for testing and deploying disinformation tactics
• The disinformation ecosystem includes state media, state actors on foreign platforms, and nonstate diaspora actors, with varying degrees of influence and credibility
• The evolution of China’s disinformation tactics is expected to continue, incorporating AI and bigger market leverage, potentially expanding to new regions and audiences