Peacekeeping and International Intervention in Civil Conflicts

Course Announcements and Midterm Logistics

• Midterm 2 Schedule: The exam is scheduled for one week from today. It will be cumulative, covering the material introduced since the beginning of the quarter.
• Exam Format: The structure will mirror the first midterm, consisting primarily of true/false and multiple-choice questions. It will be slightly longer than the first exam.
• Delivery and Requirements: The midterm will be held in class using the Lockdown Browser.
• Upcoming Assignments: A quiz based on last week's concepts is due this coming Wednesday (two days from today). No new quiz will be posted for next week to allow focus on midterm preparation.
• Course Progression: Following the midterm, the class will transition into the third and final block of the quarter.

Recap of Block Two: Civilian Harm and International Intervention

• Primary Inquiry: Block two focuses on why atrocities occur in violent conflicts and what the international community can do to prevent them.
• Bottom-Up Approach (Humphreys and Weinstein):     * Focuses on the internal structure of rebel factions or organizations.     * Argues that violence against civilians is driven by failures in unit discipline, monitoring, and punishment.     * Rebel forces unable to monitor bad behavior among members are more likely to commit atrocities.
• Top-Down Approach:     * Views targeting civilians as a calculated counterinsurgency strategy, particularly against guerrilla insurgencies.     * Governments face an "informational problem" in identifying guerrillas who rely on civilian support (food, intelligence, shelter, recruits).     * Targeting becomes more likely if regime survival is at stake or if the guerrilla group has massive civilian support.
• International Levers for Mitigation:     * Sanctions (BAPT and Morgan): Highlighting the use of international sanctions to shape incentives for government and rebel leaders. High costs associated with violence may reduce its occurrence.     * International Institutions: The UN serves as a unifying force, preventing sanctioned actors from forming "side deals" by binding member countries to a single set of clear demands (e.g., justice, humanitarian access).     * Physical Intervention: The focus of today's lecture—putting "boots on the ground" through peacekeeping forces.

The Framework of Peacekeeping and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

• Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Articulated by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and endorsed at the $2005$ UN World Summit.
• Scope of R2P: Applies specifically to four crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.
• The Three Pillars of R2P:     1. States bear the primary responsibility for protecting their own populations.     2. The international community has a duty to assist states in fulfilling this role.     3. If states "manifestly fail," the international community must respond decisively through diplomatic, humanitarian, or coercive measures authorized by the UN Security Council.
• Example of Application: In $2011$, the UN Security Council authorized force in Libya to protect civilians. This NATO-led operation drew criticism for potentially exceeding its protective mandate.
• Core UN Peacekeeping Principles:     1. Consent: Missions deploy at the invitation of the host government.     2. Impartiality: Missions implement mandates without favoring one belligerent over another.     3. Restricted Use of Force: Force is limited to self-defense and defense of the mandate.

Theoretical Mechanisms of Peacekeeping: Hultman et al. Analysis

• Objective: To determine how the composition of UN peacekeeping forces (military, police, and observers) affects the reduction of civilian harm.
• Mechanism 1: Military Troops and the Battlefield:     * By physically separating combatants, troops reduce the strategic value of targeting civilians.     * Separation encourages disarmament and prevents the escalatory cycle where one side arms in response to the other.     * Troops help enforce ceasefires, reducing the need for groups to retrench through predatory civilian targeting for supplies or intelligence.
• Mechanism 2: Police and the Rear Areas:     * Police patrol population centers, secure humanitarian corridors, and protect Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps.     * This targets "undisciplined" or "rogue" soldiers committing atrocities outside official command structures.     * Police act as a "multiplier" by training local forces to create durable institutions.
• Mechanism 3: Unarmed Observers:     * Theoretically Ambiguous: Observers report on violations but lack physical power.     * Weak Resolve Signal: Sending only observers may signal to combatants that the UN lacks the commitment to use force, granting them "free rein."     * Moral Hazard: Their presence might embolden civilians to take risks or incentivize combatants to consolidate control violently before more robust forces arrive.

Empirical Findings on Peacekeeping Effectiveness

• Study Parameters: Analyzed civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa between $1991$ and $2008$. The dataset included $36$ conflicts, $12$ of which received UN peacekeeping operations.
• Dependent Variable: Civilian deaths from intentional targeting (excluding collateral damage).
• Results for Military Troops:     * Increased troops correlate with fewer deaths.     * Model prediction: Civilian deaths fall from roughly $106$ per month (with no troops) to approximately $2$ per month with $8,000$ troops.     * Effect is observed for both rebel and government-perpetrated violence.
• Results for Police:     * Increased police correlate with lower civilian deaths.     * Model prediction: Civilian deaths fall from roughly $96$ per month (no police) to approximately $14$ per month with $200$ police.
• Results for Observers:     * Counterintuitively, more UN observers are associated with higher civilian deaths.
• Cost Analysis: The authors estimate that $8,000$ troops cost approximately $8,000,000$ per month at the UN’s flat reimbursement rate. This is considered inexpensive relative to comparable military interventions.

Case Study: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and MONUSCO

• Current Context (Late 2022/2023): Escalating violence in the Eastern DRC involving the M23 rebels (with reported Rwanda support), Burundi forces, Congolese armed forces, and local militias. Approximately $2,000,000$ people are displaced.
• MONUSCO Overview:     * One of the largest UN missions with approximately $12,000$ personnel.     * Headquarters in Kinshasa; field operations centered in Goma.     * Operating with Chapter VII authority.
• Host Government Friction: The DRC central government has requested a drawdown (reduction) of the mission’s footprint.
• Policy Decision Exercise: Students acted as Senior Political Affairs Officers recommending a change to MONUSCO. Options included:     * Option A: Mandate amendment for a troop surge to separate combatants (requires UN Security Council and DRC consent).     * Option B: Rebalance toward police units for IDP camps and humanitarian corridors (no new mandate required; higher local consent likelihood).     * Option C: Hand off operations to regional bodies like the African Union (AU) or East African Community (EAC).

Questions & Discussion

• Student Question: What happens if the government is the one perpetrating the violence? How does consent work then?
• Response: This makes the situation extremely complicated. Negotiations around the mandate's scope occur before the UN can enter. Because of the principle of consent, if the UN is constrained by the host government, it might limit the mission's effectiveness. This is why peacekeeping is just one tool alongside sanctions and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
• Student Discussion on Policy Options: A poll of the class showed $60\%$ favored Option B (policing), $27\%$ favored Option A (troop surge), and $13\%$ favored Option C (regional handoff).
• Analysis of Option B: Choosing policing assumes the primary issue is predatory behavior behind the lines rather than large-scale troop combat. If the core problem is $10$ armed groups fighting for territory, shifting away from military troops could be a risky assumption.
• Scenario-Based Complications: If the DRC government agrees to a surge only on the condition that troops operate in government-held territory and endorse a counter-offensive:     * Impact on Findings: This would limit the troops' ability to physically separate sides, turning a military mandate into a policing function within government territory.     * Neutrality Risk: Publicly endorsing a government counter-offensive against M23 would violate the core UN principle of impartiality/neutrality.