American Indians, Economic Development, and Self-Determination in the 1960s

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Bibliographic Information

• Article: “American Indians, Economic Development, and Self-Determination in the 1960s.”

• Author: Christopher K. Riggs.

• Journal: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. $69$, No. $3$ (Aug $2000$), pp. $431–463$.

• Publisher: University of California Press; stable JSTOR URL provided.

• Rights: JSTOR & University of California Press manage digital access; terms-of-use link supplied.

Contextual Remarks

• JSTOR framed as a not-for-profit digital archive supporting scholarly work.

• Acknowledgment that some references require JSTOR log-in.

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Opening & Author Credentials

• Riggs teaches in the History Department, University of Colorado at Boulder.

• Initial vignette: On $16$ May $1967$, Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall submitted the Indian Resources Development “Omnibus” Bill to Congress.

Acknowledgments (Methodological Transparency)

• Riggs credits librarians, Robert L. Bennett (Oneida; BIA Commissioner), Vine Deloria Jr. (Standing Rock Sioux), Forrest J. Gerard (Blackfeet), Joe S. Sando (Jemez Pueblo), Thomas Clark (scholar), Andrew DeRoche, Timothy Krainz, and anonymous reviewers.

Historiographical Note

• Footnote 1 lists secondary literature on the Omnibus Bill: Castile (1998), Cobb (1998), Deloria (1985), Josephy/Nagel/Johnson (1999), McClellan (1988), Prucha (1984), Steiner (1968), Washburn (1994), plus Clarkin’s doctoral study (1998) as the fullest account.

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Core Provisions of the Draft Bill

• Would create a $\$500\text{ million}$ revolving loan fund for Indian economic projects.

• Empowered tribes (with Interior permission) to:
  • Form corporations.
  • Sell or mortgage trust lands.
  • Condemn reservation land.
  • Adopt zoning/building codes.

• Udall’s stated objectives: improve economic conditions and enhance tribal self-determination.

Immediate Paradox

• Despite rhetoric of self-determination, widespread Indian opposition killed the legislation.

• Central Question: Why did Native leaders—long vocal about autonomy—reject a bill promising control? → Competing definitions of “self-determination.”
  • Backers equated it with market-driven economic modernization.
  • Opponents feared land loss & expanded Interior power; argued drafting process ignored tribal input.

• Significance: Defeat forced public debate on what self-determination means and showcased Native political power during Johnson’s Great Society.

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Section Heading: “The Shadow of Termination”

• 1960s = pivot from 1950s “termination” policy to “self-determination.”

• Termination aimed to abolish trust status, dismantle BIA, place Indians under state jurisdiction, and assimilate tribes (“de-tribalize”).

• Trust land removal → state taxes, nullification of tribal laws, liquidation of federal services.

• Termination chronology traced back to Senate Report $310$ (1943); gains traction with Dillon S. Myer (appointed $1950$).

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Early Termination Mechanics

• Myer: argued trusteeship = paternalism causing segregation/poverty.

• Strategy: deliver short-term aid then withdraw trust status.

• By Jan $1952$ bureau had drafted bills terminating groups in OR & CA; Myer willing to impose without consent.

• Eisenhower era: Commissioner Glenn L. Emmons continued trajectory; Congress endorsed via:
  • H.Con.Res. $108$ (Aug $1953$) – formal statement favouring rapid termination.
  • Public Law $280$ – transferred criminal jurisdiction to CA, MN, NE, OR, WI (+ opt-in clause for others).

Specific Terminations

• Major targets: Menominee (WI) & Klamath (OR); also Southern Paiute, mixed-blood Ute, Alabama-Coushatta, many CA rancherias, Siletz & Grand Ronde.

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Impacts of Termination

• Menominee: loss of federal lumber contracts; land sales to cover state taxes; hospital closure owing to licensing; resultant spikes in unemployment, health crises, cultural erosion.

• Klamath: tribal disintegration; high incarceration & institutionalization rates.

Conceptual Stakes

• Termination endangered legal status and cultural identity; sovereignty rooted in collective land & treaty rights.

• Consequently, termination became broadly unpopular in Indian Country and catalyzed pan-tribal activism.

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National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) & Anti-Termination Organizing

• NCAI (founded $1944$) led resistance:
  • Passed resolutions against HCR $108$ & PL $280$; insisted on tribal consent.
  • Organized “Emergency Conference” $1954$ in Washington D.C.; $183$ representatives from $21$ states & Alaska lobbied Congress/Interior.

• Continued grassroots lobbying; by $1958$ Secretary Fred A. Seaton publicly rejected “coercive termination.”

Persistence of “Termination Mentality”

• Despite policy retreat, many Interior staff & legislators still eyed assimilation:
  • Senators Gordon Allott (R-CO) & Ernest Gruening (D-AK) sought curbs on new trust lands.
  • Interior committees proposed termination for Pawnee, Shawnee, Kalispel; Sen. Henry M. Jackson pushed to terminate Colville tribes ($1964, 1966$).

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Continuing Anti-Termination Mobilization

• American Indian Chicago Conference (AICC) June $1961$ – $460$ delegates from $90$ nations drafted Declaration of Indian Purpose, demanding end to termination.

• Kennedy Task Force found “overwhelming” opposition to termination.

• Tribal examples: Colorado River Indian Tribe, Cheyenne River Sioux, etc. communicated resistance.

• NCAI Exec. Dir. Robert Burnette warned LBJ (Dec $1964$) that participation in federal programmes could be weaponized to force termination.

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Competing Visions of Self-Determination (I): NCAI Perspective

Three Core Components

1. Preservation of treaty rights & trust lands (bedrock of inherent sovereignty).

2. Consultation/consent in any policy change (stemming from Congress’s plenary power; ensures tribes—not federal fiat—direct change).

3. Economic self-sufficiency (needed to perform governmental functions and stem out-migration).

Evidence

• NCAI’s constitution ($1944, 1948$) and continual resolutions emphasized treaties.

• AICC Declaration repeated call to defend treaty/trust status.

• Workshop papers (Bennett, 1959) link land security to sovereignty.

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Component 2 Expanded: Consultation

• Historical context: IRA (1934) had been drafted before tribal input—sets negative precedent.

• Supreme Court (Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, $1903$) grants Congress plenary power; thus voluntary consultation is tribes’ only safeguard.

• NCAI communications $1944–1964$ consistently demanded policy co-making (“do things WITH us, not FOR us” – Burnette).

Component 3 Expanded: Economic Self-Sufficiency

• Post-WWII poverty: high unemployment, low wages, poor health.

• Resolutions $1948$ onward call for “rehabilitation” funding.

• Deloria (1966) writes LBJ re: need for credit access without jeopardizing land.

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Competing Visions of Self-Determination (II): Pro-Termination or Alternate Tribal Views

• Some tribes without treaties/trust lands (e.g., Lumbee, certain Oklahoma tribes) saw termination/bureau removal as liberation from BIA control.

• American Indian Federation, League of North American Indians, individual leaders (e.g., Joseph Bruner; Madeline Colliflower) equated trusteeship with “enslavement.”

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Federal Officials’ Divergent Conceptions

Civil-rights Liberal Angle

• Senators Chavez, Bosone, Gruening, and BIA heads Myer/Emmons used desegregation rhetoric: eliminating differential status = racial equality.

• However, economic & political self-interest often overshadowed humanitarianism.

War on Poverty Angle

• OEO (R. Sargent Shriver, Sanford Kravitz, Forrest Gerard) framed self-determination as direct tribal control of funds.

• Indians could apply to national OEO (bypassing state offices & BIA) → unprecedented autonomy; OEO singled out as only agency practicing systematic consultation.

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Interior Department Reformists

• Udall, Commissioner Philleo Nash, Deputy John O. Crow, Assoc. Comm. James Officer all viewed economic development as route to autonomy.

• Logic: If jobs/services exist on reservations, relocation pressures decrease → cultural survival.

• Yet: Bureaucratic proposals focused on economic tools, neglecting legal sovereignty & process of consultation → clash with NCAI.

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April $1966$ Santa Fe Conference

• Interior announced intent for “new foundation legislation” akin to IRA.

• Udall pledged two things:
  • Lift trust-related economic constraints (e.g., easing land transactions, expanding capital).
  • “Work very closely” with tribes in drafting.

Immediate Missteps

• NCAI representatives initially barred; protest (threatened march) forced inclusion of only 2 observers.

• Deloria hailed the incident as a turning point (first forced consultation), yet distrust intensified.

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Commissioner Robert L. Bennett Takes Office (27 April $1966$)

• First Native Commissioner since Ely Parker (19th c.).

• Publicly endorsed self-determination contingent on economic development; promised regional hearings for tribal input.

False Start on Hearings

• NCAI learned via BIA insider that a draft bill already existed before hearings.

• Deloria & Belindo distributed leaked draft at Minneapolis, Billings, Portland meetings → audience fury; bill equated with land-loss threat.

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Core Objections in Leaked Draft

• Mortgage clause: tribes’ trust lands could be collateral for BIA-run projects; defaults = land loss.

• No tribal veto; decision rested with Secretary of Interior.

• Heightened suspicion of termination agenda.

Interior Attempts Damage Control

• Udall circulated draft (Dec $1966$) giving leaders $\approx1$ month to review before D.C. policy conference.

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Organized Grass-Roots Resistance

• Pyramid Lake Paiute Chair Wilfred Shaw: trusteeship = payment for ceded lands; calls for new agency focused on assistance not dictation.

• Deloria hosted Denver strategy session with “noisiest” chairmen; mailed questionnaires → evidentiary leverage.

• Cato Vallandra helped Northwest tribes pass anti-bill resolution; subsequent condemnations from Crow Creek Sioux, Lower Brule Sioux, All-Indian Pueblo Council.

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National Indian Conference on Policy & Legislation (Jan–Feb $1967$, D.C.)

• Chaired by Norman Hollow; co-chairs Earl Old Person & Roger Jourdain.

• Unified message to LBJ: economic aid yes, but not at expense of trust status; termination rejected; invoke sacred land-for-trust bargain.

Tactical Senate Testimony

• NCAI Pres. Wendell Chino (Mescalero Apache) offered anonymized critique at War on Poverty hearing → foregrounds land as “soul” and demands formal repudiation of termination.

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Strategic “Poison-Pill” Amendment

• Deloria & ex-Comm. Nash influenced friendly BIA staff to hike loan fund from $\$100 million$ → $\$500 million$ in final draft; expectation: Appropriations Committee would balk.

Submission Optics (16 May $1967$)

• Senator Jackson introduced bill “by request” → signals neutrality.

• Califano advised LBJ to let Interior, not White House, transmit; promised friendlier package later.

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Pockets of Support & Internal Divisions

• Eleven Oklahoma tribes (Five Civilized + others) “unanimously” endorsed: they had minimal trust lands & federally appointed leaders—less to lose.

• Wichita Nation (Frank Miller) initially intrigued but repudiated due to increased bureaucratic control.

• Udall’s House testimony: conceded reservations might ultimately disappear → confirmation of fears.

Fallout

• Osage Chief Paul Pitts sought exemption for valuable mineral estate.

• Ute Mountain Utes (Chair Scott Jacket) asked Sen. Allott to kill bill.

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NCAI Convention, Oct $1967$

• Resolution reiterates necessity of tribal–federal co-drafting and absolute maintenance of trust protection.

• Bennett reported some softening but still conceded the bill’s prospects dim.

• Gerard called draft a “monstrosity”; measure never left committee.

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Analytical Aftermath

Why Indians Opposed

1. Substance – mortgage powers & unilateral Secretary authority  threat to land/treaties.

2. Process – consultation promises broken; mirrored 1930s paternalism.

3. One-size-fits-all – ignored diversity; conflicting local interests (e.g., OK vs. Pyramid Lake).

4. Historical Context – active Colville termination pushes; no formal anti-termination statement yet from President or Congress.

Why Udall Persisted

• Personal legacy aspirations (IRA-scale reform).

• Belief in Rostow-style “take-off” economics: short-term risk, long-term independence.

• White House pressure for rapid achievements.

Bureaucratic Dynamics

• Older BIA officials skeptical of extensive tribal consultation; cultural inertia.

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Development-Economics Lens

• Rostow’s “stages of growth” applied domestically: federal funds = catalytic; private capital then sustains growth.

• Udall’s speeches link foreign-aid philosophy to Indian reservations; readiness to accept “some risk” (i.e., land collateral).

Clash of Paradigms

• Udall/BIA: Self-determination = economic self-support even if trust restraints loosen.

• NCAI & majority tribes: Self-determination begins with sovereignty/land; economic tools must reinforce, not undermine, that base.

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Role Conundrum of Native Bureaucrats

• Bennett & Gerard were Indians inside system; attempted to salvage bill via amendments & consultation.

• Bennett later claimed he tacitly allowed NCAI to sink bill once draft diverged from his intent (preferring tribe-specific acts).

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Outcome & Legacy

• Omnibus Bill’s failure = watershed.
  • Demonstrated effective national Indian lobbying.
  • Clarified non-negotiable elements of sovereignty for policymakers.

• Direct line to LBJ’s Special Message (6 Mar $1968$) embracing NCAI’s triad (trust, partnership, programme access).

Page 26 – Page 31 (Endnotes Synopsis)

Citational Richness & Further Reading

• Detailed footnotes reference dissertations, congressional hearings, oral histories, and secondary works by Fixico, Deloria & Lytle, Philp, etc.

• Numerical data appear mainly as dates, Public Law numbers, and funding figures; key sums: $\$500\text{ million}$ loan fund; $183$ conference delegates; $460$ AICC participants.

Cross-Page Synthesis & Concept Map

1. Historical Backdrop
   • Termination (≈$1943–1961$) → severe socio-economic & cultural trauma.
   • Great Society/WOP (mid-$1960s$) opens pathways for new policy.

2. Actors
   • Federal: Udall, Nash, Bennett, Gerard, Shriver.
   • Native: NCAI leadership (Deloria, Chino, Hollow), tribal chairs (Old Person, Jourdain, Shaw), dissident pro-termination figures (Bruner).

3. Policy Fault-Lines
   • Economic Development vs. Land Security.
   • Top-down efficiency vs. participatory drafting.

4. Events Timeline
   $1943$ Senate Report $310$ → $1953$ HCR $108$/PL $280$ → $1961$ AICC Declaration → $Apr 1966$ Santa Fe conference → $Dec 1966$ draft circulated → $16$ May $1967$ bill submitted → $Oct 1967$ NCAI convention rejects → bill dies in committee.

5. Philosophical Implications
   • Self-determination is multidimensional; economic independence alone insufficient.
   • Legal sovereignty (treaty/trust) and procedural justice (consultation) are prerequisites, not bargaining chips.

Practical & Ethical Takeaways

• Policymakers must honor both material needs and legal-cultural rights; economic aid should fortify, not threaten, sovereignty.

• Tribal consultation must be genuine, early, and iterative—otherwise programmes accrue legitimacy deficits.

• History warns against “one-size-fits-all” statutes; locally tailored, tribe-specific legislation (later embodied in $1975$ Indian Self-Determination & Education Assistance Act) better aligns with diverse conditions.

Key Terms & Acronyms Glossary

• BIA – Bureau of Indian Affairs.

• IRA – Indian Reorganization Act ($1934$).

• HCR 108 – House Concurrent Resolution promoting termination ($1953$).

• PL 280 – Public Law transferring criminal jurisdiction to states.

• OEO – Office of Economic Opportunity.

• NCAI – National Congress of American Indians.

• AICC – American Indian Chicago Conference.

• Self-Determination (NCAI model) – Treaty/trust preservation + consultation + economic self-sufficiency.

• Termination – Policy abolishing federal trust relation & special services, aiming for assimilation.

Sample Exam-Style Prompts (for Revision)

1. Compare and contrast the definitions of “self-determination” held by (a) Stewart Udall and (b) Vine Deloria Jr. in $1966–67$.

2. Explain how the Omnibus Bill controversy illustrates the continuing legacy of $1950$s termination.

3. Using specific examples, analyse why some Oklahoma tribes supported the bill while others (e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute) opposed it.

4. Assess the significance of the Johnson administration’s War on Poverty framework in reshaping federal-tribal relations.

5. Evaluate the claim that economic modernisation inherently enhances indigenous sovereignty.

Formulae & Figures

• Loan fund proposed: $L = \$500\,000\,000$.

• Conference attendance: $N<em>{AICC} \approx 460$; $N</em>{Emergency Conf} = 183$.

• Timeline interval termination → self-determination pivot $\Delta t \approx 10\text{ years}$ (mid-$1950$s → mid-$1960$s).

The main argument of Christopher K. Riggs' article is to explain why American Indian leaders, despite advocating for greater autonomy, overwhelmingly rejected the Indian Resources Development “Omnibus” Bill of $1967$. The article argues that this rejection stemmed from competing definitions of "self-de

termination": while the bill's backers equated it with market-driven economic modernization, Native opponents feared potential land loss and expanded Interior Department power, primarily because the bill's drafting process largely ignored tribal input. The defeat of the bill highlighted the nuanced and multifaceted meaning of Native self-determination, emphasizing that genuine self-determination must safeguard treaty rights and trust lands, ensure consultation and consent in policy-making, and lead to economic self-sufficiency without undermining sovereignty, rather than merely offering economic tools that could threaten the foundational aspects of tribal existence.