Acting East and the Indo-Pacific – Comprehensive Study Notes

Historical Roots of India–Southeast Asia Relations

The Indo-Pacific debate rests on civilisational links that stretch back to the first century CE. Proximity across the Bay of Bengal enabled merchants, monks and artisans to cross from the Tamil and Gangetic coasts to what early Indian texts called
Suvannabhumi – the “Land of Gold.” Evidence of this interaction survives in Sanskrit, Tamil and Pali inscriptions, the spread of the
Ramayana and
Mahabharata (which became foundational epics shaping Southeast Asian literature and performing arts), and legal-political treatises such as the
Dharmashastras and
Arthashastra. Religious flows were equally decisive: the adoption of Hindu deities (Vishnu, Siva) and later Buddhism legitimised indigenous rulers and inspired the
mandala model of state formation. Monumental mandala symbolism appears in Borobudur, Prambanan, Angkor Wat and Bayon. Although largely peaceful, these ties were punctuated by Rajendra Chola’s 1025 CE naval strike on Srivijaya – a reminder that commerce and conflict have always intertwined.

Colonial Interlude and Strategic Geography

Under the British, India became both source of raw materials and spring-board for controlling the maritime approaches to Southeast Asia. Lord Curzon’s Indo-centric view of the Indian Ocean argued that safeguarding India required holding chokepoints from Aden to Malacca – a logic later echoed by Indian planners. World-War II validated this linkage: Allied defeats in Southeast Asia forced Britain to rely on Indian manpower and diplomacy (Cripps Mission), imprinting a strategic continuum that still influences New Delhi’s security calculus for its North-Eastern Region and adjoining seas.

Early Post-Independence Enthusiasm and Subsequent Drift

Inspired by
Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (“the world is one family”), newly-independent India championed Asian solidarity at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference, Bandung (1955) and Belgrade (1961). Yet cooperation stalled. Economically, India’s inward-looking socialism produced the so-called “ $3\%$ Hindu rate of growth” (a term coined to describe the slow economic growth rates from the 1950s to the 1980s), unattractive to export-oriented “East-Asian-Miracle” states. Strategically, the 1962 Sino-Indian war undermined pan-Asianism, and India’s 1971 treaty with the USSR alienated U.S.-aligned ASEAN members (who viewed it as a Cold War alignment with the Soviet bloc against their Western partners). By the late 1980s some ASEAN voices even accused India of seeking “blue-water” power projection.

Systemic Shocks and the Birth of the Look East Policy (LEP)

Two crises converged in 1991: (i) the Soviet collapse removed India’s strategic anchor, while China’s rise unsettled both Delhi and ASEAN; (ii) India’s balance-of-payments emergency – forex reserves fell to $\text{US\$ }5.8\text{ billion}$ – forced IMF-backed liberalisation (LPG reforms, focused on Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Globalisation, opening India's economy). Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao responded with the LEP. India became ASEAN Sectoral Dialogue Partner in 1992, Full Dialogue Partner in 1995, and joined the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996. Rao’s 1994 Singapore Lecture sketched twin objectives: market access and strategic partnership.

LEP Phase II: Security Deepening and Trade Architecture

After 9/11 the logic of counter-terrorism widened cooperation towards a more comprehensive security partnership, including maritime security and intelligence sharing. Summit-level ASEAN-India meetings began in 2002. The
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (2003) provided legal scaffolding for the
ASEAN-India Free Trade Area (AIFTA). Key milestones:
• Goods FTA (2009)
• Services & Investment accords (2014)
• Admission to the East Asia Summit (2005) heralded India’s security role beyond the Indian Ocean, expanding discussions to include regional security challenges like maritime safety and disaster management. Trade trends: overall ASEAN-India goods turnover rose from $5.836\text{ bn}$ (1996-97) to $45.342\text{ bn}$ (2008-09), but fluctuated thereafter. Post-pandemic rebounds hit $110.4\text{ bn}$ (2021-22) and $131.57\text{ bn}$ (2022-23), finally crossing the $100\text{ bn}$ mark. India usually runs a deficit (- $43.57\text{ bn}$ in 2022-23) because tariff cuts favoured ASEAN imports. Cumulative 2000-21 FDI from ASEAN to India reached $117.88\text{ bn}$ – $115\text{ bn}$ of it via Singapore. Bilateral pacts include the India–Singapore CECA (2005), India–Malaysia CECA and India–Thailand EHS.

From Look East to Act East (2014-)

Prompted by Barack Obama’s 2010 call to “Engage East,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi re-branded the policy at the 9th EAS (Nay Pyi Taw, 2014). Act East promised agility through the three C’s: Culture (promoting stronger people-to-people connections and shared heritage), Commerce (boosting trade and investment ties), Connectivity (enhancing physical and digital linkages across the region). It simultaneously stretched India’s horizon to the
Indo-Pacific, defined by Modi at Shangri-La (2018) as “from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas,” anchored in “inclusiveness, openness and ASEAN centrality.”

Hard Numbers and the Connectivity Agenda

Land–sea imbalance persists: most trade moves via southern Indian ports, bypassing the land-locked North-East (NER). Flagship projects – often delayed – aim to plug that gap:
$\bullet$ India–Myanmar–Thailand (\,1{,}360\,\text{km})\,\text{Trilateral Highway} $ $ \bullet $Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport linking Mizoram to Myanmar’s Rakhine coast$
$\bullet$ Mekong–India Economic Corridor (Chennai–Dawei–Bangkok–Phnom Penh–Ho Chi Minh)
Progress is hostage to Myanmar’s post-2021 coup civil strife between the
Tatmadaw and Ethnic Armed Organisations, which severely impedes the implementation and security of crucial infrastructure projects.

Constructing the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Region

Amitav Acharya argues regions are socially constructed. The Indo-Pacific is therefore an “outside-in” project of great powers who seek to balance China’s revisionism. Historical precursors include Karl Haushofer’s vision of contest between “pirates of the sea” and “robbers of the steppe,” Nicholas Spykman’s prediction of an
“Asiatic Mediterranean” rivalry, and Ellen Churchill Semple’s geostrategic oceans. Contemporary milestones:
– East Asia Summit (2005) quietly folded South Asia and Australia into a wider arc.
– Shinzo Abe’s 2007 Indian Parliament speech, “Confluence of the Two Seas,” called for a
Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) (emphasizing a vision of a comprehensive maritime region for trade, security, and cooperation, free from coercion).
– The U.S. “Pivot/Rebalance” (Clinton, 2011) tied two oceans in American strategy.
– Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy explicitly labelled China a revisionist hegemon and geographically fixed the Indo-Pacific “from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States.”
– Biden’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy reaffirmed U.S. commitments, foregrounded ASEAN unity, and elevated the Quad.

Minilateral Geometry: Quad, AUKUS, IPEF

The
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) – Japan, U.S., Australia, India – first floated 2006, collapsed under Chinese pressure (Australia’s 2008 withdrawal), but revived on EAS sidelines in 2017. Leaders’ summits since 2021 have widened scope: vaccines, semiconductors, cyber, space, climate and a
Quad Fellowship (signaling a pivot from purely security dialogues to addressing broader global and regional challenges). Australia’s 2013 and 2016 Defence White Papers formally adopted an “Indo-Pacific strategic arc.” Meanwhile
AUKUS (2021) and the
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) enhance deterrence and standards-based economic architecture. Washington’s
B3W and
Blue Dot Network seek to offset China’s Belt & Road (BRI).

India’s Maritime Turn and SAGAR Doctrine

K. M. Panikkar long ago warned that loss of sea control invited colonial subjugation. Post-1991 liberalisation dovetailed with naval modernisation. Today \approx 90\% $of India’s trade is seaborne. The Navy hosts Milan exercises (since 1995), created the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS, 2008), and participates in Malabar (now Quad) and bilateral drills such as SIMBEX (Singapore) and VARUNA (France). SAGAR – Security and Growth for All in the Region – guides Indian HADR and capacity-building from Aden to Malacca. China’s ports at Gwadar, Hambantota, Kyaukphyu and Djibouti – the “String of Pearls” and Maritime Silk Road – have pushed Delhi to label the South China Sea a “primary area of interest” (seeing these as potential dual-use facilities that could enhance China's naval reach and strategic presence in the Indian Ocean periphery). The inaugural 2023 ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise (AIME) in those waters underscored shared commitment to freedom of navigation.<h5 collapsed="false" seolevelmigrated="true">Strategic Autonomy and ‘Evasive Balancing’</h5>India reinterpreted non-alignment as strategic autonomy: maximising options among multiple poles. Rajesh Rajagopalan terms New Delhi’s tactic “evasive balancing” – reassuring Beijing even while hedging through the Quad, FOIP, and partnerships with Europe, Russia, the U.S. and Japan. ASEAN states practise similar ambiguity, wary that hard alliances might provoke China.<h5 collapsed="false" seolevelmigrated="true">Economic Headwinds and Missed Opportunities</h5>India’s share of ASEAN trade is modest:$ \text{US\$ }108{,}420\text{ million} $in 2022 versus China’s$ 722{,}103\text{ million} $and America’s$ 420{,}445\text{ million}$$. New Delhi’s 2019 decision to quit the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) (primarily due to concerns over potential surges in imports, particularly from China, harming domestic industries and exacerbating trade deficits) undercuts its market access and raises doubts about its professed support for ASEAN centrality. Domestically, slow reforms and Myanmar-related connectivity delays weaken India’s bid to be China’s manufacturing alternative.

Internal and External Challenges to ASEAN Centrality

Within ASEAN, diverging attitudes toward Chinese finance – scepticism in some, reliance in CLMV economies – risk splintering consensus. The celebrated “ASEAN Way” (informality, unanimity) may prove too slow under crisis. Externally, AUKUS and similar pacts could sideline ASEAN if a NATO-like bloc crystallises. India itself, though a Quad member, resists a formal alliance; critics label it the Quad’s “weakest link.”

Outlook: Balancing Rivalry and Inclusivity

The Indo-Pacific contains more than half the world’s population and over a third of global GDP; how it is governed will shape the twenty-first century. India and ASEAN favour an open, rules-based, non-exclusive architecture rooted in culture, commerce and connectivity – not rigid blocs. Whether that vision