Principles of Microeconomics - Public Goods and Tax Policies
Public Goods and Tax Policies (Chapter 14)
The Government, Public Goods, and Tax Policies
- The government can increase efficiency by:
- Regulating industries to overcome market failures (e.g., curbing negative externalities, monopolies).
- Providing critical public goods and services (e.g., delineating and enforcing property rights, national defense).
Public Goods
- A public good is nonrival and nonexcludable.
- Nonrival good: Consumption by one person does not diminish its availability to others.
- Non-excludable good: Difficult or costly to exclude non-payers from consuming.
- Examples: Fresh air, fireworks displays, street lighting, national defense.
- A pure public good is, to a high degree, both nonrival and nonexcludable.
Goods Classification
- Classification of goods based on excludability and rivalry:
- Rival and Excludable: Private Goods (e.g., ice cream).
- Rival and Non-Excludable: Common Resources (e.g., tuna in the ocean).
- Non-Rival and Excludable: Collective Goods (e.g., cable TV, Wi-Fi).
- Non-Rival and Non-Excludable: Public Goods (e.g., national defense, asteroid deflection).
Market for Public Goods
- Public goods are not provided in sufficient quantities by the market due to:
- The free-rider problem: Non-payers cannot easily be excluded from consuming.
- Difficult for private firms to cover costs and make a profit.
- How much of a public good should be provided?
- Cost-Benefit Principle: Provide it up to the point where Marginal Benefit (MB) equals Marginal Cost (MC) (difficult to implement).
- Costs are calculated as for private goods.
- Benefits are hard to estimate in practice.
- Demand for Public Good differs from Demand for Private Good.
The Optimal Quantity of a Public Good
- The optimal quantity is where the demand curve (marginal benefit) intersects the marginal cost curve.
Private Good Demand
- Horizontal Summation of Individual Demand Curves
- All buyers face the same price and each choose the quantity they want.
- Example:
- Individual 1's demand (D1):
- Individual 2's demand (D2):
- Total Market Demand (D) = D1 + D2
Public Good Demand
- Vertical Summation of Individual Demand Curves
- All buyers are provided with the same quantity, although they might value it differently.
- Example:
- Individual 1's demand (D1):
- Individual 2's demand (D2):
- Total Market Demand (D) = D1 + D2
Who Provides Public Goods?
- Two alternative means:
- Government Provision
- Private Provision
Private Provision of Public Goods
- Examples of private provision (which doesn’t rely on markets):
- Funding by donation: Volunteer action and funding. Non-profit NGOs, e.g., National Public Radio (NPR), Public Broadcasting Services (PBS), American Alliance for Museums, the Getty Foundation, the Central Park Conservancy (NY–land preservation) etc.
- Sale of by-products: e.g., Air broadcasting T.V., financed by the sale of advertisement; National parks selling branded merchandise, etc.
- Private contracting: Gated communities and homeowners’ associations.
Government Provision of Public Goods
- The government provides public goods through various means, funded by taxes.
Who Should Pay for Government Provision of Public Goods?
- Benefit principle: Those who benefit from public spending should bear the cost.
- e.g., those who benefit from a road should pay for that road’s upkeep.
- Practical considerations make it impossible to rely on this approach exclusively.
- Main issue: ability to pay.
- Potential option: Progressive Tax System, we all pay but according to our ability to pay.
Sharing a Water Well - An Example
- Imagine sharing a water well with a neighbor. A new device costs 1,000. You both value it, but you earn twice as much.
- You're willing to pay 800, neighbor's reservation price is 400.
- Individually, neither will buy it (not willing to pay 1,000).
- Efficient to share: Total Value = 800 + 400 = $1,200. Cooperative Surplus = 200 = (1,200 - $1,000).</li><li>Willefficientsolutionbeobtained?Dependsontransactioncosts.Unlikelyforlargegroups.</li></ul></li></ul><h4id="governmentinvolvementinthewaterwellexample">GovernmentInvolvementintheWaterWellExample</h4><ul><li>Wouldyouacceptgovernmentprovidingthedevicebasedon:<ul><li><strong>EqualTaxRule(HeadTax)</strong>:Taxof500 each. Neighbor's reservation price is too low (400).No.</li><li><strong>ProportionalIncomeTax</strong>:Taxunderwhichalltaxpayerspaythesameproportionoftheirincomesintaxes.Yes.<ul><li>Youearntwiceasmuch,sopaytwiceasmuch.</li><li>Youearn66,700 a year, neighbor earns 33,350ayear.Aproportionaltaxtocoverthedevicewillchargeyouboth1<li>Youpay667, neighbor 333.Youbotharebetteroff!</li></ul></li></ul></li></ul><h4id="takeaway">Takeaway</h4><ul><li>Wealthyindividualstendtoassignhigherreservationpricesforpublicgoodsthanlow−incomepeople.</li><li>Aheadtaxwouldresultinsocietygettingsmalleramountsofpublicgoodsthanitwants.</li><li>Aproportionaltaxationoraprogressivetaxation[ataxunderwhichtheproportionofincomepaidintaxesrisesasincomerises]aremoreeffectiveatachievingefficientoutcomes!</li></ul><h4id="thegovernmentandincentives">TheGovernmentandIncentives</h4><ul><li>Thegovernmentcanhelpincreaseefficiency…</li><li>Butgovernmentinterventionisnota"freelunch."</li></ul><h4id="governmentinterventionisnotafreelunch">GovernmentInterventionisNotaFreeLunch</h4><ul><li>Itiscostlytomaintainabureaucracy.</li><li>Taxesnecessarytofinancepublicgoodscancreatedeadweightlosses.</li><li>Majorincentiveproblemsgetinthewayofefficiencyenhancingpolicies:Peoplewhoactintheirownself−interestinmarketsituationsdonotstopdoingsooncetheystepintopublicoffice!</li></ul><h4id="structuralincentiveproblemsharingarestaurantbill">StructuralIncentiveProblem:SharingaRestaurantBill</h4><ul><li>Nateand9friendssharearestaurantbill.</li><li>Desserttime:Nateonlyordersdessertwhenhesharesthebill,duetothereducedcostto103 surplus from pudding (4 - $1)and2.40 from mousse (3 - $0.6).Hechoosespudding.</li><li>Nate′sfriendsfollowsamelogicthetotalrestaurantbillhigherthanitwouldotherwisebe…Nateendsuppayingthefull10 and losing 6 = ($10 - $4).</li><li>PumpkinBreadPudding<ul><li>MenuPrice10
*Reservation Price 4</li></ul></li><li>ChocolateMousse<ul><li>MenuPrice6
*Reservation Price 3</li></ul></li></ul><h4id="incentiveproblematthegovernmentlevelporkbarrelspending">IncentiveProblemattheGovernmentLevel:PorkBarrelSpending</h4><ul><li><strong>Porkbarrelspending</strong>:Inefficientprojectssupportedbyalegislatorbecausethebenefitstotheirdistrictexceedthecoststotheirdistrict.<ul><li>Ex.Projectcreates100 million in benefits to a specific district with total costs of 150million.</li><li>Inefficienttogoforthisproject.</li><li>But,ifthedistricthasonly11.5 million; 98.5$$ million surplus for the district. Its representative will propose this bill. - Legislators from other districts support this bill because of logrolling (exchanging favors).
Rent-Seeking
- Rent-seeking: Groups or individuals spending resources to use the government to redistribute wealth in their favor.
- Example: Lobbying government to get tariff exemptions.
- Rent-seeking produces inefficient outcomes because:
- It diverts resources from productive activities to redistributive ones.
- Rent-seeking is costly to curb because:
- Public officials enjoy donations from rent-seekers (for political or personal gain).
- Groups hurt by such outcomes (e.g., consumers) often fail to organize due to high transaction costs.