Principles of Microeconomics - Public Goods and Tax Policies

Public Goods and Tax Policies (Chapter 14)

The Government, Public Goods, and Tax Policies

  • The government can increase efficiency by:
    • Regulating industries to overcome market failures (e.g., curbing negative externalities, monopolies).
    • Providing critical public goods and services (e.g., delineating and enforcing property rights, national defense).

Public Goods

  • A public good is nonrival and nonexcludable.
    • Nonrival good: Consumption by one person does not diminish its availability to others.
    • Non-excludable good: Difficult or costly to exclude non-payers from consuming.
      • Examples: Fresh air, fireworks displays, street lighting, national defense.
    • A pure public good is, to a high degree, both nonrival and nonexcludable.

Goods Classification

  • Classification of goods based on excludability and rivalry:
    • Rival and Excludable: Private Goods (e.g., ice cream).
    • Rival and Non-Excludable: Common Resources (e.g., tuna in the ocean).
    • Non-Rival and Excludable: Collective Goods (e.g., cable TV, Wi-Fi).
    • Non-Rival and Non-Excludable: Public Goods (e.g., national defense, asteroid deflection).

Market for Public Goods

  • Public goods are not provided in sufficient quantities by the market due to:
    • The free-rider problem: Non-payers cannot easily be excluded from consuming.
      • Difficult for private firms to cover costs and make a profit.
  • How much of a public good should be provided?
    • Cost-Benefit Principle: Provide it up to the point where Marginal Benefit (MB) equals Marginal Cost (MC) (difficult to implement).
      • Costs are calculated as for private goods.
      • Benefits are hard to estimate in practice.
    • Demand for Public Good differs from Demand for Private Good.

The Optimal Quantity of a Public Good

  • The optimal quantity is where the demand curve (marginal benefit) intersects the marginal cost curve.

Private Good Demand

  • Horizontal Summation of Individual Demand Curves
    • All buyers face the same price and each choose the quantity they want.
  • Example:
    • Individual 1's demand (D1):
    • Individual 2's demand (D2):
    • Total Market Demand (D) = D1 + D2

Public Good Demand

  • Vertical Summation of Individual Demand Curves
    • All buyers are provided with the same quantity, although they might value it differently.
  • Example:
    • Individual 1's demand (D1):
    • Individual 2's demand (D2):
    • Total Market Demand (D) = D1 + D2

Who Provides Public Goods?

  • Two alternative means:
    • Government Provision
    • Private Provision

Private Provision of Public Goods

  • Examples of private provision (which doesn’t rely on markets):
    • Funding by donation: Volunteer action and funding. Non-profit NGOs, e.g., National Public Radio (NPR), Public Broadcasting Services (PBS), American Alliance for Museums, the Getty Foundation, the Central Park Conservancy (NY–land preservation) etc.
    • Sale of by-products: e.g., Air broadcasting T.V., financed by the sale of advertisement; National parks selling branded merchandise, etc.
    • Private contracting: Gated communities and homeowners’ associations.

Government Provision of Public Goods

  • The government provides public goods through various means, funded by taxes.

Who Should Pay for Government Provision of Public Goods?

  • Benefit principle: Those who benefit from public spending should bear the cost.
    • e.g., those who benefit from a road should pay for that road’s upkeep.
    • Practical considerations make it impossible to rely on this approach exclusively.
      • Main issue: ability to pay.
      • Potential option: Progressive Tax System, we all pay but according to our ability to pay.

Sharing a Water Well - An Example

  • Imagine sharing a water well with a neighbor. A new device costs 1,0001,000. You both value it, but you earn twice as much.
    • You're willing to pay 800800, neighbor's reservation price is 400400.
    • Individually, neither will buy it (not willing to pay 1,0001,000).
    • Efficient to share: Total Value = 800 + 400 = $1,200. Cooperative Surplus = 200 = (1,200 - $1,000).</li><li>Willefficientsolutionbeobtained?Dependsontransactioncosts.Unlikelyforlargegroups.</li></ul></li></ul><h4id="governmentinvolvementinthewaterwellexample">GovernmentInvolvementintheWaterWellExample</h4><ul><li>Wouldyouacceptgovernmentprovidingthedevicebasedon:<ul><li><strong>EqualTaxRule(HeadTax)</strong>:Taxof.</li> <li>Will efficient solution be obtained? Depends on transaction costs. Unlikely for large groups.</li></ul></li> </ul> <h4 id="governmentinvolvementinthewaterwellexample">Government Involvement in the Water Well Example</h4> <ul> <li>Would you accept government providing the device based on:<ul> <li><strong>Equal Tax Rule (Head Tax)</strong>: Tax of500500 each. Neighbor's reservation price is too low (400).No.</li><li><strong>ProportionalIncomeTax</strong>:Taxunderwhichalltaxpayerspaythesameproportionoftheirincomesintaxes.Yes.<ul><li>Youearntwiceasmuch,sopaytwiceasmuch.</li><li>Youearn). No.</li> <li><strong>Proportional Income Tax</strong>: Tax under which all taxpayers pay the same proportion of their incomes in taxes. Yes.<ul> <li>You earn twice as much, so pay twice as much.</li> <li>You earn66,70066,700 a year, neighbor earns 33,350ayear.Aproportionaltaxtocoverthedevicewillchargeyouboth1<li>Youpaya year. A proportional tax to cover the device will charge you both 1% of your income…</li> <li>You pay667667, neighbor 333.Youbotharebetteroff!</li></ul></li></ul></li></ul><h4id="takeaway">Takeaway</h4><ul><li>Wealthyindividualstendtoassignhigherreservationpricesforpublicgoodsthanlowincomepeople.</li><li>Aheadtaxwouldresultinsocietygettingsmalleramountsofpublicgoodsthanitwants.</li><li>Aproportionaltaxationoraprogressivetaxation[ataxunderwhichtheproportionofincomepaidintaxesrisesasincomerises]aremoreeffectiveatachievingefficientoutcomes!</li></ul><h4id="thegovernmentandincentives">TheGovernmentandIncentives</h4><ul><li>Thegovernmentcanhelpincreaseefficiency</li><li>Butgovernmentinterventionisnota"freelunch."</li></ul><h4id="governmentinterventionisnotafreelunch">GovernmentInterventionisNotaFreeLunch</h4><ul><li>Itiscostlytomaintainabureaucracy.</li><li>Taxesnecessarytofinancepublicgoodscancreatedeadweightlosses.</li><li>Majorincentiveproblemsgetinthewayofefficiencyenhancingpolicies:Peoplewhoactintheirownselfinterestinmarketsituationsdonotstopdoingsooncetheystepintopublicoffice!</li></ul><h4id="structuralincentiveproblemsharingarestaurantbill">StructuralIncentiveProblem:SharingaRestaurantBill</h4><ul><li>Nateand9friendssharearestaurantbill.</li><li>Desserttime:Nateonlyordersdessertwhenhesharesthebill,duetothereducedcostto10. You both are better off!</li></ul></li></ul></li> </ul> <h4 id="takeaway">Takeaway</h4> <ul> <li>Wealthy individuals tend to assign higher reservation prices for public goods than low-income people.</li> <li>A head tax would result in society getting smaller amounts of public goods than it wants.</li> <li>A proportional taxation or a progressive taxation [a tax under which the proportion of income paid in taxes rises as income rises] are more effective at achieving efficient outcomes!</li> </ul> <h4 id="thegovernmentandincentives">The Government and Incentives</h4> <ul> <li>The government can help increase efficiency…</li> <li>But government intervention is not a "free lunch."</li> </ul> <h4 id="governmentinterventionisnotafreelunch">Government Intervention is Not a Free Lunch</h4> <ul> <li>It is costly to maintain a bureaucracy.</li> <li>Taxes necessary to finance public goods can create deadweight losses.</li> <li>Major incentive problems get in the way of efficiency enhancing policies: People who act in their own self-interest in market situations do not stop doing so once they step into public office!</li> </ul> <h4 id="structuralincentiveproblemsharingarestaurantbill">Structural Incentive Problem: Sharing a Restaurant Bill</h4> <ul> <li>Nate and 9 friends share a restaurant bill.</li> <li>Dessert time: Nate only orders dessert when he shares the bill, due to the reduced cost to 10% of its menu price. Consumer surplus for Nate:33 surplus from pudding (4 - $1)and) and2.402.40 from mousse (3 - $0.6).Hechoosespudding.</li><li>NatesfriendsfollowsamelogicthetotalrestaurantbillhigherthanitwouldotherwisebeNateendsuppayingthefull). He chooses pudding.</li> <li>Nate's friends follow same logic the total restaurant bill higher than it would otherwise be…Nate ends up paying the full1010 and losing 6 = ($10 - $4).</li><li>PumpkinBreadPudding<ul><li>MenuPrice.</li> <li>Pumpkin Bread Pudding<ul> <li>Menu Price1010
      *Reservation Price 4</li></ul></li><li>ChocolateMousse<ul><li>MenuPrice</li></ul></li> <li>Chocolate Mousse<ul> <li>Menu Price66
      *Reservation Price 3</li></ul></li></ul><h4id="incentiveproblematthegovernmentlevelporkbarrelspending">IncentiveProblemattheGovernmentLevel:PorkBarrelSpending</h4><ul><li><strong>Porkbarrelspending</strong>:Inefficientprojectssupportedbyalegislatorbecausethebenefitstotheirdistrictexceedthecoststotheirdistrict.<ul><li>Ex.Projectcreates</li></ul></li> </ul> <h4 id="incentiveproblematthegovernmentlevelporkbarrelspending">Incentive Problem at the Government Level: Pork Barrel Spending</h4> <ul> <li><strong>Pork barrel spending</strong>: Inefficient projects supported by a legislator because the benefits to their district exceed the costs to their district.<ul> <li>Ex. Project creates100100 million in benefits to a specific district with total costs of 150million.</li><li>Inefficienttogoforthisproject.</li><li>But,ifthedistricthasonly1million.</li> <li>Inefficient to go for this project.</li> <li>But, if the district has only 1% of the taxpayers, the district's share of the cost is1.51.5 million; 98.5$$ million surplus for the district. Its representative will propose this bill.
    • Legislators from other districts support this bill because of logrolling (exchanging favors).

Rent-Seeking

  • Rent-seeking: Groups or individuals spending resources to use the government to redistribute wealth in their favor.
    • Example: Lobbying government to get tariff exemptions.
  • Rent-seeking produces inefficient outcomes because:
    • It diverts resources from productive activities to redistributive ones.
  • Rent-seeking is costly to curb because:
    • Public officials enjoy donations from rent-seekers (for political or personal gain).
    • Groups hurt by such outcomes (e.g., consumers) often fail to organize due to high transaction costs.