Bureaucracy notes
Executive Control
As the size and scope of the American national government, in general, and of the executive branch and the bureaucracy, in particular, have grown, presidents have delegated more and more power to bureaucrats. Bur, most presidents have continued to try to exer cise some control over the bureaucracy. They have often found that task more difficult than they first envisioned. President John F. Kennedy, for example, once lamented that to give anyone at the Department of State an instruction was comparable to putting your request in a dead-letter box.* No response would ever be forthooming.
Recognizing these potential problems, presidents try to appoint the best possible people to carry out their wishes and policy preferences. Presidents make hundreds of appointments to the executive branch; in doing so, they have the opportunity to appoint individuals who share their views on a range of policies. Although presidential appointments make up a very small proportion of all federal jobs, presidents or the Cabinet secretaries usually fill most top policy-making positions.
Presidents, with the approval of Congress, can reorganize the bureaucracy. They also can make changes in an agency's annual budget requests and ignore legislative initiatives originating within the bureaucracy: Several presidents have made it a priority to try to tame the bureaucracy to make it more accountable. Thomas Jefferson was the first president to address the issue of accountability. He attempted to cut waste and bring about a "wise and frugal goverment." But, it wasn't until the Progressive era that calls for reform began to be taken seriously. Later, President Calvin Coolidge urged spending cuts and other reforms. His Correspondence Club was designed to reduce bureaucratic letter writing by 30 percent.?1
As discussed in chapter 8, presidents also can shape policy and provide direction to bureaucrats by issuing executive orders." Executive orders are rules or regulations issued by the president that have the effect of law; all executive orders must be published in the Federal Register. For example, even before Congress acted to protect women from discrimination by the federal government, the National Organization for Women convinced President Lyndon B. Johnson to sign a 1967 executive order that added the category of "gender" to an earlier order prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in the awarding of federal contracts.
Although the president signed the order, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, part of the Department of Labor's Employment Standards Administration, failed to draft appropriate guidelines for implementation of the order until several years later.?3 A president can direct an agency to act, but it may take some time for the order to be carried out. Given the many jobs of any president, few can ensure that all their orders will be carried out or that they will like all the rules that are made.
Congressional Control
Congress, can confirm (or reject) nominees to top bureaucratic positions and has also played an important role in checking the power of the bureaucracy. Constitutionally, it possesses the authority to create or abolish departments and agencies. It may also transfer agency functions, and expand or contract bureaucratic discretion, as was the case in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.
Congress can also use its investigatory powers to conduct program evaluations or hold oversight hearings. It is not at all unusual for a congressional committee or subcommittee to hold hearings on a particular problem and then direct the relevant agency to study the problem or find ways to remedy it. Representatives of the agencies also appear before these committees on a regular basis to inform members about agency activities, ongoing investigations, and budget requests.
Political scientists distinguish between two different forms of congressional oversight: police patrol and fire alarm over-sight.4 As the names imply, police patrol oversight is proactive and allows Congress to set its own agenda for programs or agencies to review. In contrast, fire alarm oversight is reactive and generally involves a congressional response to a complaint filed by a constituent or politically significant actor. Given the prevalence of iron triangles, issue networks, and policy coordinating committees, it is not surprising that the most frequently used form of oversight is fire alarm oversight and the most effective communication is between House staffers and agency personnel.
In the aftermath of an oil rig explosion and ensuing oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 for example, a host of congressional committees held hearings to investigate the cause of what has been called the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history. Members of Congress from both houses grilled executives from British Petroleum (BP), the oil drilling company Transocean, the service contractor Halliburton, and others to determine not only who was responsible for the accident but also what efforts were being made to contain it.25
Congress also has the power of the purse. To control the bureaucracy, Congress uses its abilities to authorize spending and appropriate funds for an agency's activities much like the proverbial carrot and sticks. Money can be a powerful tool to coerce bureaucrats to make particular policies.
The first step in the funding process is authoriza-tion. Authorization legislation originates in the various legislative committees that oversee particular agencies (such as Agriculture, Veterans Affairs, Education, and Labor) and sets the maximum amounts that agencies can spend on particular programs. While some authori-zations, such as those for Social Security, are permanent, others, including Departments of State and Defense procurements, are watched closely and are subject to annual authorizations.
Once programs are authorized, funds for them must be appropriated before they can be spent. Appropriations originate with the House Appropriations Committee, not the specialized legislative committees.
Thus, the House Appropriations Committee routinely holds hearings to allow agency heads to justify their budget requests.
To help Congress's oversight of the bureaucracy's financial affairs, in 1921 Congress created the General Accounting Office, now called the Government Accountability Office (GAO), at the same time that the Office of the Budget, now the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), was created in the executive branch. With the establishment of the GAO, the Congressional Research Service (CRS), and later, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congress essentially created its own bureaucracy to keep an eye on what the executive branch and bureaucracy were doing. Today, the GAO not only tracks how money is spent in the bureaucracy but also monitors how policies are implemented. The CBO also conducts oversight studies. If it or the GAO uncovers problems with an agency's work, Congress is notified immediately.
Legislators also augment their formal oversight of the executive branch by allowing citizens to appeal adverse bureaucratic decisions to agencies, Congress, and even the courts. Congressional review, a procedure adopted by the 104th Congress, by which agency regulations can be nullified by joint resolutions of legislative disap-prova, is another method of exercising congressional oversight. This form of oversight. is discussed in greater detail in chapter 7.
Judicial Control
Whereas the president's and Congress's ongoing control over the actions of the bureaucracy are direct, the judiciarys oversight function is less apparent. Still, federal judges, for example, can issue injunctions or orders to an executive agency even befo a rule is publicized, giving the federal judiciary a potent check on the bureaucracy. The courts also have ruled that agencies must give all affected individuals their dûe process rights guaranteed by the U.S. Consti-rution. A Social Security recipient's checks cannot be stopped, for example, unless that individual is provided with reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing. On a more informal, indirect level, litigation, or even the threat of litigation, often exerts a strong influence on bureaucrats. Injured parties can bring suit against agencies for their failure to enforce a law and can challenge agency interpretations of any law. In general, how-ever, the courts give great weight to the opinions of bureaucrats and usually defer to their expertise, 26
The development of specialized courts, however, has altered the relationship of some agencies with the federal courts, apparently resulting in less judicial deference to agenc rulings.
Research by political scientists reveals that specialized courts such as the Court of International Trade, because of its jurists' expertise, defer less to agency decisions than do more generalized federal courts. Conversely, decisions from executive agencies are more likely to be reversed than those from more specialized independent regulatory commissions.?
Executive Control
Presidential Delegation and Control Challenges
As the national government and bureaucracy expand, presidents delegate broad authority to agencies, making direct control increasingly difficult.
Example: President John F. Kennedy remarked that instructing the Department of State was like placing a request in a "dead-letter box" because no response would be forthcoming.
Appointment Power
Presidents appoint hundreds of top policy-making officials and Cabinet secretaries who share their policy preferences and ideological views.
Although presidential appointments constitute a very small percentage of federal employees, they control top leadership and direction.
Reorganization and Budgetary Influence
Presidents have the authority to reorganize agencies (with congressional approval).
Presidents can alter agency annual budget requests and ignore legislative proposals that originate within bureaucratic agencies.
Historical Examples of Administrative Reform:
Thomas Jefferson: First president to target bureaucratic accountability, attempting to curb waste to achieve a "wise and frugal government."
Calvin Coolidge: Established the "Correspondence Club" to cut bureaucratic letter writing by 30% alongside broader spending reductions.
Executive Orders
Directives issued by the president that carry the effect of law and must be published in the Federal Register.
Example: In 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued an executive order adding "gender" to an existing order prohibiting discrimination in federal contract awards, prompted by the National Organization for Women.
Implementation Limitations: Bureaucratic agencies can delay execution (e.g., the Department of Labor took several years to draft implementation guidelines for Johnson's order).
Congressional Control
Creation, Abolition, and Nominee Confirmation
The Senate holds confirmation power over top bureaucratic appointments.
Congress maintains the constitutional power to create or abolish agencies, transfer administrative duties, and expand or restrict bureaucratic discretion.
Example: Congress established the Department of Homeland Security, reorganizing and consolidating numerous existing agencies and functions.
Investigatory Powers and Oversight Hearings
Conducts program evaluations, requires routine agency testimony, and holds hearings to direct agencies to study and resolve specific problems.
Police Patrol Oversight: Proactive, ongoing monitoring where Congress sets its own review agenda.
Fire Alarm Oversight: Reactive oversight triggered by complaints from constituents or interest groups; this is the most common form due to iron triangles and issue networks.
Example: Following the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, congressional committees held oversight hearings questioning executives from BP, Transocean, and Halliburton to investigate culpability and containment efforts.
Power of the Purse
Utilizes funding mechanisms as "carrots and sticks" to influence agency policymaking.
Authorization Legislation: Originates in specialized legislative committees (e.g., Agriculture, Education, Veterans Affairs) to establish maximum spending limits (some permanent like Social Security; others annual like Defense and State procurements).
Appropriations: Originates with the House Appropriations Committee, which conducts hearings requiring agency leaders to justify their budget requests.
Legislative Support Agencies
Created specialized legislative bodies to monitor executive operations:
Government Accountability Office (GAO): Tracks bureaucratic expenditures and monitors policy implementation.
Congressional Budget Office (CBO): Prepares budget oversight studies and analyzes agency fiscal impacts.
Congressional Research Service (CRS): Provides nonpartisan research and legislative analysis.
Citizen Appeals and Congressional Review
Provides citizens with avenues to appeal unfavorable bureaucratic rulings to agencies, Congress, or the courts.
Congressional Review: A mechanism under which Congress can invalidate agency regulations through joint resolutions of legislative disapproval.
Judicial Control
Nature of Judicial Oversight
Judicial control is less direct and continuous than presidential or congressional oversight, but serves as a potent legal check.
Injunctions and Due Process Enforcement
Federal courts can issue injunctions or binding legal orders halting agency actions before a regulation is officially publicized.
Enforces constitutional due process guarantees protecting individuals from arbitrary bureaucratic actions.
Example: A Social Security recipient's benefits cannot be terminated without reasonable advance notice and an opportunity for a hearing.
Litigation and Legal Challenges
Aggrieved parties can file lawsuits against agencies for failing to enforce a law or challenging agency statutory interpretations.
The mere prospect of litigation frequently compels bureaucrats to alter or reconsider policy decisions.
Judicial Deference vs. Specialized Courts
General federal courts traditionally accord substantial deference to bureaucratic technical expertise.
Specialized Courts: Courts with targeted jurisdiction (such as the Court of International Trade) defer far less to agency interpretations due to the judges' own domain expertise.
Agency decisions from traditional executive departments face higher reversal rates than decisions made by specialized independent regulatory commissions.