The Constitutional Framework: Pragmatism, Politics, and Federalist No. 10
Traditional Historiography vs. Political Realism in Constitutional Framing
Re-evaluating the Framers of the United States Constitution:
Traditional textbook treatments cast the Framers reverentially as political philosophers delivering timeless civic laws to future generations, tracing their intellectual lineage to John Locke, Baron de Montesquieu, David Hume, and Niccolò Machiavelli.
In political reality, the Framers were practical, professional democratic politicians charged with proposing a reform package that had to win endorsement from at least of the states before becoming valid law.
While highly conversant with the leading political thought of their era, they utilized theoretical concepts versatilely to justify pragmatic political positions.
The Constitution was ultimately a "patch-work sewn together under the pressure of both time and events."
Historical Metamorphoses of the Framers' Image:
Over a century and a half, the reputation of the Framers shifted from bold liberals and social engineers to sound Burkean conservatives.
Modern revisionism humorously imagines James Madison as President of the Ford Foundation and Alexander Hamilton as Chairman of the Committee for Economic Development.
Historians transformed the revolutionary ferocity of the period—which included confiscating Tory property and exiling opponents to New Brunswick—into a benign dedication to consensus and prescriptive rights.
Robert R. Palmer's The Age of the Democratic Revolution demonstrated the Framers' radical revolutionary nature; they were democratic politicians operating within a universe of public approval.
In a modern political setting, James Madison would likely serve as Speaker of the House of Representatives, while Alexander Hamilton would act as the éminence grise dominating the Executive Office of the President.
Refutation of Charles A. Beard and filiopietist scholars: The Philadelphia Convention was not a "College of Cardinals" or a council of Platonic guardians operating in a manipulative, pre-democratic environment. It was a nationalist reform caucus navigating a hostile political landscape to secure popular approval.
The Principle of Political Pragmatism:
Walton Hamilton emphasized raising the Framers from "immortality to mortality" to recognize their mastery of democratic politics within consensus limits.
John Dickinson articulated the pragmatic philosophy of the delegates on August 13, 1787: "Experience must be our guide. Reason may mislead us."
Rejection of the "coup d'état" or "counter-revolutionary junta" thesis: Although the nationalist elite's goals were subversive to the Articles of Confederation, success depended on popular endorsement through regularized democratic procedures.
The movement for a stronger central government was no more a conspiracy than John F. Kennedy's political plotting between 1956 and 1960 to win the presidency.
Political Mechanics and Coalition Building in the Confederation Era
Legal and Procedural Hurdles in the States:
The Constitutionalists utilized mechanisms of political legitimacy, mobilizing superior expertise against bumbling opponents.
The reform strategy required state legislatures to consent to their own institutional emasculation through democratic techniques of coercion.
Example of New York's procedural hurdles:
Agreeing to send delegates to the Philadelphia Convention.
Providing maintenance funds for delegates (New Hampshire named delegates early but delayed maintenance funding until July 1787).
Creating an ad hoc state convention to vote on ratification.
Conceding to the decision of the ad hoc convention to join the Union, despite New York's economic interest in maintaining the status quo to exploit New Jersey and Connecticut.
Heterogeneous Coalition of Parochial and National Interests:
Georgia supported a strong central authority to gain military protection for its sparsely populated territory against the Creek Confederacy.
New Jersey and Connecticut sought protection from economic exploitation and trade duties imposed by New York.
Virginia sought a system reflecting its prominent size and status in republic councils.
Personal rivalries influenced alignment: Patrick Henry opposed the movement largely due to his feud with Thomas Jefferson, while others supported reform simply because their local political rivals opposed it.
No political movement arises from "immaculate conception"; private self-interest naturally aligns with perceived public interest (as seen in Plato's placing of philosophers at the top of the social hierarchy).
The "Continental" Perspective and Institutional Socialization:
of the delegates at the Federal Convention had served in the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation.
Service in Congress established a shared continental frame of reference and common conceptual language distinct from local state legislatures.
Foreign policy challenges forced Congressmen to adopt a broad national view, informed by reports from Secretary John Jay and dispatches from envoys in Britain, France, and Spain.
A Hobbesian view of international relations dictated that national survival amidst foreign powers required a reordering and strengthening of national sovereignty, a view personified by George Washington.
Key Political Assets of the Constitutionalist Caucus:
Presence of George Washington as the authentic American father figure.
Energetic leadership and superior communication networks, supported abroad by figures like John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.
Preemptive political skill that framed their objective as The Issue, forcing locally oriented opponents into a permanent defensive posture.
The unifying credo of American nationalism emerging from the Revolution.
Exploitation of the "fair play" argument: "How can you condemn reform before you know precisely what is involved?"
Opponents were caught in a political trap: opposing a meeting to discuss reforms made them look like defenders of a flawed status quo. The failure of the 1786 Annapolis Convention (where only states sent commissioners and were legally represented) lulled opponents into false security.
The Philadelphia Convention Agenda and the Strategy of Secrecy
Delegate Selection and the Articles of Confederation Context:
All states appointed delegates except Rhode Island.
Opponents realized the danger too late; in non-polarized environments, special committee appointments go to those who initiated the movement.
New York Governor George Clinton appointed Alexander Hamilton but sent two allies, Robert Yates and John Lansing, to control the state's delegation.
Selection of delegates by state legislatures (rather than direct popular vote) reflected standard Articles of Confederation protocol (except Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire), ensuring state legislatures maintained control over national representatives.
James Madison's Agenda-Setting Strategy:
Arriving before a quorum assembled, Madison drafted the Virginia (Randolph) Plan, locking the convention into discussing his specific framework.
The plan shifted the objective from piecemeal amendments to drafting an entirely new constitutional structure.
The proposal that the new Constitution take effect upon approval by states was thoroughly subversive, as the Articles of Confederation required unanimous consent ( states) for amendments.
Homogeneity and the Function of Secrecy:
The convention was ideologically homogeneous; basic divisions were structural rather than ideological.
Uncompromising opponents left early: Yates and Lansing departed on July 10, 1787, while Luther Martin ("Maryland's bibulous narcissist") left in a huff on September 4, 1787.
Delegates adopted strict secrecy rules to retain flexibility and avoid public posturing in early negotiation stages (George Mason noted secrecy prevented misrepresentation of unformed ideas).
Madison refrained from sending details of deliberations even to Thomas Jefferson in Paris.
The New York Daily Advertiser (August 14, 1787) remarked that the secrecy was a "happy omen" indicating an absence of extreme party division.
Re-evaluating "Federalism":
The Federalist essays represent retrospective justification and propaganda rather than original theoretical design.
Applying David Hume's warning in Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences: Historical analysis must avoid assigning causes that never existed or turning contingent events into stable, universal principles.
Federalism was an improvisation later elevated into political theory.
Ideological Homogeneity and the Rejection of High Centralization Plans
Madison's Unitary Model in the Virginia Plan:
James Madison sought a centralized national government dominant over the states, reducing states to corporate administrative units (similar to municipal corporations under the British Crown).
Lower house of the legislature elected directly by the people proportional to population; upper house elected by the lower house.
Executive and Judiciary chosen by the national legislature.
National legislature granted plenary authority wherever individual state legislation threatened national harmony or where states were "incompetent."
National legislature given power to disallow (veto) state laws contravening the Articles of Union (passed May 31, 1787, without debate or dissent).
Central government authorized to use military force against non-compliant states.
The Breaking Point between Utopia and Reality:
On June 14, 1787, small-state delegates realized that Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania would dominate the national government under proportional representation.
John Dickinson warned Madison: "You see the consequences of pushing things too far… we would sooner submit to a foreign power than… be deprived of an equality of suffrage in both branches."
Delegates were practical politicians who had to defend the final agreement to their constituents at home.
The New Jersey Plan as Practical Nationalism
Re-evaluating William Paterson's Proposals:
The New Jersey Plan was not a states'-rights rejection of national power, but a practical proposal designed for political acceptability in smaller states.
William Paterson stated on June 16, 1787: "I came here not to speak my own sentiments, but the sentiments of those who sent me. Our object is not such a Government as may be best in itself, but such a one as our Constituents have authorized us to prepare, and as they will approve."
Paterson emphasized that national power depends on the scope of authority lodged in executive, legislative, and judicial branches, not merely on representation form.
Nationalist Elements in the New Jersey Plan:
Originated the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Paterson's 6th Resolution).
Authorized military force to enforce national laws against state resistance.
Direct operation of federal authority on individual citizens rather than through state governments (violating traditional states'-rights doctrine).
Draft proposals by Paterson and David Brearley (June 9, 1787) suggested erasing state boundaries and redistricting the entire territory into equal geographical districts.
Charles Pinckney observed: "Give N. Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Natl. system."
Alexander Hamilton's Monarchical Speech (June 18, 1787):
Delivered a 6-hour oration proposing an elected executive and senate serving for life, modeled on the Cromwellian Instrument of Government (1653).
Argued that an insulated executive was necessary to prevent mob rule and govern in the interest of the whole community.
William Samuel Johnson noted on June 21 that Hamilton was praised by everybody but supported by none.
Hamilton left the convention 10 days later in disgust, playing little role in subsequent drafting.
The Representation Crisis and the Connecticut Compromise
Rejection of the New Jersey Plan and Procedural Progress:
On June 19, 1787, Madison analyzed the New Jersey Plan, identifying legislative representation as the primary obstacle.
Delegates voted to (with state divided) to keep the Virginia Plan as the working model (New York, New Jersey, and Delaware voted No; Maryland divided).
Oliver Ellsworth moved to remove the word "national" from the 3rd Virginia Resolution; Edmund Randolph accepted the change, passing unanimously.
The July 2 Tie Vote and Committee Formation:
Debates over Senate representation reached an impasse; Benjamin Franklin suggested daily morning prayers.
On July 2, 1787, a tie vote occurred on equal state representation in the Senate when Abraham Baldwin of Georgia shifted his vote (Georgia divided with Few absent and Pierce in NY fighting a duel; Luther Martin was sole MD delegate on floor).
Convention voted to create a Grand Committee (1 delegate per state) to resolve representation.
Committee composition excluded uncompromising figures like Madison and Wilson, selecting conciliatory, second-tier political figures (including Benjamin Franklin over James Wilson or Gouverneur Morris).
Adoption of the Compromise:
On July 17, 1787, the Connecticut Compromise was adopted by a vote of states to (with divided), granting proportional representation in the House and equal state representation in the Senate.
Madison, Wilson, and Morris opposed the compromise to the end, but accepted the result once passed and worked to expand national substantive powers.
Lack of Theoretical Guidance in Debates:
Delegates focused on pragmatic politics rather than abstract theoretical debates.
Theoretical references (Locke, Montesquieu, Harrington) were used as rhetorical tools, largely sourced from John Adams' 1786 compilation A Defense of the Constitutions of Government.
Montesquieu was cited only times during the convention, and only once regarding the separation of powers (by Madison).
Pragmatic Bargaining on the Executive Branch and the Electoral College
Debate on Executive Selection:
Original Virginia Plan specified an executive chosen by the national legislature for a single 7-year term.
Objections arose against legislative choice; proposals included direct popular election, election by state governors, election by electors chosen by state legislatures, and an electoral college chosen by lot from the legislature.
Discussions were manageable because delegates assumed George Washington would serve as the first President; rules were designed for the post-Washington era.
The Brearley Committee Invention:
The Committee on Postponed Matters (chaired by David Brearley) devised the Electoral College as a political compromise balancing multiple interests:
State legislatures determined how electors were chosen.
Small states received a minimum guarantee of electoral votes; large states received proportional representation.
Direct popular election of electors was permitted if state legislatures agreed (used by states in 1789).
If no candidate achieved an Electoral College majority, the election shifted to the House of Representatives, with each state casting vote.
Delegates expected that after Washington, the Electoral College would rarely produce a majority, with selection occurring in the House. George Mason estimated the House would select the President \n\n\frac{19}{20}\n\n ( times in ).
The Electoral College was a pragmatic political compromise rather than an application of Platonic theory or an elite "College of Cardinals." An Oklahoma elector casting an independent vote for Byrd and Goldwater in 1960 misinterpreted the institution's original purpose.
The Sectional Compromises on Commerce and Slavery
The Three-Fifths Formula:
Slavery was debated as a political and economic issue rather than on abstract moral grounds.
The Three-Fifths Compromise counted \n\n\frac{3}{5}\n\n of the slave population for legislative representation and direct taxation, adopting Madison's 1783 Confederation treasury formula.
Commerce and Slave Trade Bargain (Late August 1787):
Southern delegates feared Northern commercial majorities would pass navigation acts and tariffs damaging export economies, with George Mason demanding a \n\n\frac{2}{3}\n\n supermajority in Congress for commercial laws.
Northern delegates sought simple majority power over commerce regulations.
A special committee reported a compromise on August 25, 1787, adopted on August 29:
New England delegates agreed to permit the slave trade for years (until 1808).
Southern delegates (led by South Carolina's General C. C. Pinckney and Pierce Butler) withdrew their demand for a \n\n\frac{2}{3}\n\n supermajority on commercial and navigation laws.
General C. C. Pinckney acknowledged that while South Carolina preferred no commercial regulation, unity with Eastern states justified supporting simple majority commercial powers.
North Carolina delegates (Blount, Spaight, and Williamson) reported to Governor Caswell that commercial regulation powers were exchanged for tax and slave trade concessions.
Ambiguities, Omissions, and the Ratification Campaign Tactics
Unresolved Issues and Strategic Vagueness:
Voter qualifications were left to individual states.
Citizenship definitions were handled with studied ambiguity.
Judicial review of Congressional acts was not explicitly defined. Under the original Virginia Plan, the legislature defined its own powers; when specific powers were enumerated in Article III, delegates did not re-examine judicial review authority.
The amendment process was altered from unanimity (under the Articles) to approval by \n\n\frac{3}{4}\n\n of the states ( of ).
Ratification Tactics and Floor Management:
Opponents tried to delay ratification by calling for a second convention or demanding conditional approval with a Bill of Rights.
Madison insisted on an all-or-nothing vote, obtaining a unanimous transmittal resolution from Congress to the states.
Within months, states ratified the Constitution (Massachusetts passed to ).
Approval by Virginia and New York was necessary for a viable Union.
Virginia Ratifying Convention tactics: Patrick Henry delivered extended speeches against the Constitution; "Lighthorse Harry" Lee countered with personal military experience; Madison, Edmund Pendleton, and John Marshall provided analytical arguments.
Madison's "Battle of the Absent Authorities": Countered Henry's claim that Jefferson opposed the Constitution by noting Jefferson's absence abroad, invoking Washington's endorsement, and citing private correspondence from Jefferson favoring ratification.
Historical Outcomes and Legacy:
Anti-Constitutionalists integrated into the new government (Patrick Henry was offered the Supreme Court Chief Justiceship in 1796; Luther Martin became a Federalist prosecutor).
The Federalist had limited impact on ratification outside New York, but shaped subsequent theoretical interpretations.
The Constitution was a pragmatic compromise by skilled politicians rather than a work of theoretical perfection. Unresolved issues contributed to the American Civil War, costing over lives.