Imperial Narratives, Cultural Proximity & Divergent Nation-Building: Notes on Putin’s 2021 Essay and Russo-Ukrainian Identity

Opening thesis (first paragraph):
- Putin states he has “long said” that Russians and Ukrainians are “one and the same people.”
- Essay intended as his “historical proof.”
- Compiled with assistance from advisers, historians, clerics.
Intellectual genealogy:
- Idea first voiced publicly by Putin in 2013 during a visit to Kyiv with Patriarch Kirill (head of the Russian Orthodox Church).
- The joint appearance with Kirill signals religio-imperial roots of the argument.
Key argumentative structure:
- Draws almost verbatim on late-19^{th} → early-20^{th}-century Imperial Russian historiography that classified East Slavs as:
- Great Russians (русские)
- Little Russians (малороссы / Ukrainians)
- White Russians (белорусы / Belarusians)
- Acknowledges minor “dialectical” or cultural quirks (e.g.
  “Ukrainians dance funny”) yet dismisses them as irrelevant to unity.
Overarching flavor: Empire first, nation second; independence of the “branches” is illegitimate.
Political instrumentality:
- Functions as ideological groundwork for any action undermining Ukrainian sovereignty (e.g.
  2014 annexation, 2022 invasion).

Late-Imperial strategy (pre-1917):
- Empire confronted rising nationalism → co-opted it by promoting Russian ethnic nationalism as an umbrella identity.
Soviet disruption (1917 Revolution):
- Not only social–economic upheaval but a multi-national revolt against Empire.
Bolshevik concessions to non-Russian peoples:
- Formal recognition of Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians as distinct nations.
- Creation of republic borders, institutions, symbolic autonomy.
Exception—the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC):
- Left unreformed; theological development “frozen” at 1917 level.
- Continued propagating the imperial mantra of a single “Russian” people through 1991 and into the 2010s.

All ex-Imperial states rummage the past for nation-building myths:
- Ukrainians / Estonians / others → pre-1917 liberal nationalist thinkers or, in Ukraine’s case, sometimes pre-1945 radical nationalist Bandera tradition.
- Russian elites → pre-Bolshevik imperial blueprints, finding only empire-centric ideas.
Result: Putin’s essay resurrects those imperial templates unfiltered.

Stalin’s approach:
- Needed the largest ethnic group onboard for the Soviet project; encouraged a limited Russian nationalism yet accepted Ukrainian & Belarusian nationhood.
Putin’s approach:
- Retreats pre-Stalin, pre-Lenin; denies separate nationhood, framing Ukrainians/Belarusians as mere subdivisions.

Observable closeness:
- Shared Slavic language family.
- Widespread Russian language use in Eastern Ukraine & major cities.
- Inter-regional entertainment circuits: Ukrainian singers in Russia, Russian performers in Ukraine.
- President Zelensky’s career in Russian-language comedy and film.
Popular perception before 2022: “Close cultures, separate states.”

Ukraine:
- Identity forged against successive empires (Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Polish-Lithuanian, Ottoman).
- Rebellion → dialogue → pluralism.
- Example: Maidan 2013–14—police violence sparks rather than ends protest.
Russia:
- Identity fused with the state; difficulty imagining itself outside an imperial framework.
- Protest suppression usually ends mass action.
Phrase encapsulating dichotomy: “Ukraine is Not Russia” (title of former President Kuchma’s book).

Widespread prior belief: Moscow uses brutal force (Chechnya, Syria) only where a “huge cultural gap” exists.
Shared language/history → many Ukrainians failed to anticipate “that sort of ferocity & war crimes.”
Psychological impact: **Greater betrayal when violence comes from an allegedly “brotherly” people.

Pre-1991 pattern: Excellent at revolt, poor at sustaining governance (e.g.
Makhno’s peasant army in Civil War).
Post-1991—especially after 2020–22:
- Public now identifies with the state rather than viewing it as alien.
- Ukrainian Armed Forces enjoyed highest public trust even before invasion.
- Government & local administrations function efficiently under missile fire, reinforcing legitimacy.
Analogy: Like 13 original U.S. colonies—must negotiate internally to stay united.

Historical determinism vs. agency: Putin’s narrative claims immutable unity; Ukrainian experience shows nations are choices reinforced by collective action.
Religion & power: Unreformed ROC serves as a storehouse of imperial ideology, highlighting how religious institutions can freeze historical mindsets.
Nation-state vs. Empire: Revival of imperial narratives in a nuclear-armed power creates security dilemmas for neighboring states and the broader international order.
Cultural similarity ≠ political unity: Shared language or culture does not preclude radically different political trajectories or moral choices.

Imperial Identity Formula: \text{Empire} = \text{State} + \text{Largest Nationalism (Russian)}
Ukrainian Political Transition: \text{Rebellion} \rightarrow \text{Dialogue} \rightarrow \text{State-Building}
Identity Contrast: \text{Russian Self-Concept} : \text{State} :: \text{Ukrainian Self-Concept} : \text{Anti-State / Pluralism}