Federalist 10, Federalist 51, Brutus 1
Madison defines a faction as
“a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who
are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”
(Federalist No. 10).
He gives this definition in the opening paragraphs of the essay.
2. What are the causes of faction, according to Madison?
Madison explains that the causes of faction are sown in the nature of man. He writes that differences in
opinions, passions, and interests naturally arise because
“the reason of man… is fallible,”
and people form different views and interests as a result (Federalist No. 10).
3. What is the primary object of government, according to Madison?
Madison states that
“The protection of these faculties is the first object of government”
(Federalist No. 10).
By “faculties,” he means people’s abilities to acquire property and form opinions.
4. Where do the rights of property originate, according to Madison?
Madison explains that property rights originate from
“the diversity in the faculties of men,”
which leads to unequal possession of property (Federalist No. 10)
5. What is the most common and durable source of faction, according to Madison?
Madison identifies
“the various and unequal distribution of property”
as
“the most common and durable source of factions”
(Federalist No. 10).
6. How could we cure the “mischiefs of faction,” according to Madison? Why are these remedies worse
than the disease?
Madison says there are two methods of removing the causes of faction:
1. Destroy liberty
2. Give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests
He argues both are unacceptable because:
“Liberty is to faction what air is to fire,”
and removing it would destroy political life (Federalist No. 10).
● Enforcing uniform opinions is impossible due to human nature (Federalist No. 10).
Thus, the cures are worse than the disease.
7. What is Madison’s solution for controlling the effects of factions?
Madison concludes that the only practical solution is
“to control its effects”
rather than remove its causes (Federalist No. 10), especially by preventing majority factions
from oppressing minorities.
8. What is a republic, what is a pure democracy, and how do they differ?
Madison defines a pure democracy as a system where citizens
“assemble and administer the government in person”
(Federalist No. 10).
A republic, by contrast “derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people”
and operates through representation (Federalist No. 10).
They differ in scale, structure, and stability.
9. How does a republic inhibit the effects of factions, according to Madison?
Madison explains that a republic controls factions by:
● Refining public views through representatives (Federalist No. 10)
● Enlarging the sphere, which makes it
“less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights
of other citizens”
(Federalist No. 10)
Federalist No. 51
1. What are the three branches of government?
The three branches are the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Madison discusses them
throughout Federalist No. 51 in the context of separating and balancing power.
2. Which branch did Madison think would be the weakest?
Madison believed the judicial branch would be the weakest because it has
“neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment”
(Federalist No. 51).
3. Which methods does Madison suggest to check the powers of government?
Madison suggests:
● Separation of powers
● Checks and balances
● Giving each branch the constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments by
the others
As he famously writes:
“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition”
(Federalist No. 51).
4. How is the separation of powers between the three branches assured?
Separation of powers is assured by:
● Giving each branch independent authority
● Preventing any branch from having total control over another
Madison explains that:
“The great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others”
(Federalist No. 51)
5. Give two examples of the “checks and balances” in the U.S. constitutional system.
Two examples include:
● The presidential veto of congressional legislation
● The Senate’s power to approve or reject executive appointments and treaties
These mechanisms ensure that no single branch dominates (Federalist No. 51).
6. Which branch appears as an exception to the separation of powers norm? Why is this exception not
dangerous?
The legislative branch appears to be an exception because it is divided into two houses (House of
Representatives and Senate). Madison argues this is not dangerous because the division actually checks
legislative power, preventing it from becoming tyrannical (Federalist No. 51).
7. What is federalism?
Federalism is the division of power between the national government and the state governments.
Madison describes this as a system in which authority is shared rather than centralized (Federalist No.
51).
8. What are the two great advantages of federalism, according to Madison?
Madison explains that federalism provides:
1. A double security to the rights of the people
2. Multiple levels of government that control each other while being controlled by the people
As he writes:
“The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be
controlled by itself”
(Federalist No. 51).
9. What is the “end” (supreme goal) of government, according to Madison?
Madison states clearly:
“Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society”
(Federalist No. 51)
10. What is Madison’s view of human nature and how does it affect his prescriptions for the republic?
Madison holds a realistic (pessimistic) view of human nature. He famously writes:
“If men were angels, no government would be necessary”
(Federalist No. 51).
Because humans are not angels, government must be structured so that:
● It can control the governed
● It can also control itself
This belief leads Madison to advocate for separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism
(Federalist No. 51)
Brutus 1
debate with federalist 10, Argues against ratification of the constitution
Main question: weather a confederated government be the best for the United States or not
• confederate meaning the typ-e of government we had under the articles of confederation
where the states had all the p;over and the central government was hands off
• Which is better for this new freedom loving natioN, A CONFEDERACY OF STATES OR ONE
POWERFUL central government
• Brutus says a confederacy is 100 percent better than the republic the construction would
establish
Argument one: necessary and proper clause
Argument two: the supremacy clause
From these two clauses, Brutus thinks that by making a central government who under the
NAP cause can pass any law imaginable and which the sup clause can crush any state laws
that stature governments will just die.
He then goes on to list many examples of how this could happen to the state governments but
the most pressing is the collecting taxes
He argues that any government that exists can only collect a small amount of taxes or the
citizens will grow wary of that taxation and throw the government off, so if the federal
government is going to collect taxes and only a small amount, how will the states get taxes AND
if the states cant collect taxes then they will shrivel up and die.
In this case, all that will be left is one big and powerful government
He also argues if the federal; courts trump the state counts (under the supremacy clause) than
the state courts will become obsolete
he finally argues that the size of the nation makes it unfit for a republic. With a nation as large
as the United States, how could elected representatives possibly keep their fingers on the pulse
of everyone they represent. Brutus answers,
“three can’t.
” They then go on to say the problem
with that is the people of a republic require confidence on their ruler and with a nation of this
size it would be impossible for the people to know and trust ther representatives and most of all
change them
In summary, bruits 1 is an argument against federalist 10 trying to convince people that they
should not ratify the construction. This argument stems from the necessary and proper clause
and the supremacy clause. He believes that these two things will make the state governments
become obsolete since the national government has all power to create laws and their laws will
then supersede state laws. He fears that the state government will be killed out entirely and we
will be left with one big national government. He offers an example in taxation, claiming that if
the national government can tax citizens and only a small amount (because if they ask for too
much the people will be mad) that it would make state governments impossible to collect money
and thus they would die. He also asserts that the federal courts would render their state courts
obsolete because their rulings superseded the state ruling’s. Finally Brutus argues that the
United States is simply too big for a republic. Due to its size, they would be forced to elec