The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism Summary
The Political Economy of New Asian Industrialism
Edited by Frederic C. Deyo, Cornell University Press (1987)
Key Contributors
Richard E. Barrett, Tun-jen Cheng, Soomi Chin, Bruce Cumings, Frederic C. Deyo, Peter Evans, Stephan Haggard, Chalmers Johnson, Hagen Koo
Structural Overview of Contents
Preface and Introduction: Overview of export-oriented industrializing states in the capitalist world system.
Chapters:
Export-oriented industrializing states: Similarities and differences.
Origins and development of the Northeast Asian political economy.
Role of state and foreign capital in East Asian NICs.
Political institutions and economic performance in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
Interplay of state, social class, and world system.
Modes of political exclusion in East Asian development.
Economic lessons for Latin Americanists.
Institutional models of East Asian economic development.
Economic Growth Metrics
South Korea (1950): per capita income of $146.
Taiwan (1950): per capita income of $224.
By 1980, South Korea: $1,553; Taiwan: $2,720.
Japan's per capita income (1980): $8,870, leading East Asian growth.
Governance and Economic Performance
Theories on state influence in economies:
Japan's combination of soft authoritarianism and capitalism fosters economic growth.
Post-1947 Japan moved to a democratic structure while retaining some autocratic features.
Critique of theories attributing Japanese economic success solely to culture.
Role of Government
Strong governmental role does not equate to corruption or inefficiency in capitalist development.
Key factors include political stability, elite education, and bureaucratic independence.
Developmental elites work toward growth goals without prioritizing elite privileges.
Labor Relations Framework
Variation in labor relations across Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.
Japan: enterprise unionism, low strike activity.
Korea: limited unionization, strict regulations against striking.
Taiwan: similar to Korea with strict control over labor unions.
Financial Control and Investment
Reliance on bank-based financing over capital markets.
Quality control through governmental credit allocation mechanisms.
Autonomy of Economic Bureaucracy
Distinction between bureaucratic independence in Japan vs. military influence in Korea.
Government strategies must remain insulated from populist political pressures.
Conclusion
The capitalist developmental state model suggests: adaptability outperforms rigid systems.
Future prospects hinge not just on export-oriented strategies but also on internal political-economic dynamics.