PHIL wk2 reading Slors et al (2015) Chapter 1 (1.4-1.7)
The Mind-Body Problem
Introduction to Identity Theory
Water Analogy: Water's identity as H2O is compared to mind-brain identification.
Limitations of Comparison: While water can be defined by its properties (freezing point, boiling point, transparency), the same clarity is lacking in the identification of mental states with brain states.
1.4 Functionalism
Shift in Theory: Functionalism supplanted identity theory, offering better solutions to key problems.
Key Problems Addressed:
Multiple Realization: How can different brain states correspond to the same mental state?
Explanation of Mental States: Why are some brain states classified as mental states?
Behaviorism and Definitions: Emphasizes defining mental states based on their functional roles instead of their material composition.
1.4.1 Behavioral Dispositions as Brain States
David Armstrong's Idea: Logical behaviorism and identity theory can coexist.
Dispositions as Properties: Dispositions exist as abstract properties rather than concrete realities, tied to specific conditions.
Comparison with Glass Fragility: The fragility of glass illustrates how behaviors can be produced by specific physical structures.
1.4.2 Folk-Psychology and Mental Holism
Sellars' Contribution: Introduced the concept of folk-psychology, a theoretical framework for understanding mental states and behaviors.
Inner Aspect of Mind: Acknowledges a hidden inner aspect to mental states that behaviorism fails to address.
Comparison to Scientific Postulation: Similar to scientists hypothesizing about unseen elements to explain observations.
1.4.3 Causal Roles and Neural Realizations
Lewis' Analytical Functionalism: Mental states defined by their causal roles.
Inputs, Outputs, Consequences Model:
Inputs: What causes a mental state?
Outputs: The behavioral effects of mental states.
Consequences: Internal consequences affecting susceptibility to stimuli.
Example of Pain: Characterized by its causes and effects, linking mental states to physical realizations in the brain.
1.4.4 Explanation of Mental States
Functionalism's Advantage: Provides a clear explanation of why certain brain states correspond to mental states through causal roles.
Analogy with Genes: Drawing parallels between the relationships of mental states to brain states with the relationship of genes to DNA.
1.4.5 Multiple Realisation Explained
Causal Role Distinction: Different brain states can fulfill the same causal role, allowing for multiple realizations of mental states.
1.5 Mind as a Computer Program
Historical Background: Concept of machines thinking dates back to the 19th century; Turing's pivotal role in artificial intelligence.
Functionalism and Thinking Machines: Thinking defined in terms of functional properties, not limited to biological systems.
1.5.1 Symbols, Syntax, and Semantics
Symbols: Representational elements that can take various physical forms.
Syntactical Properties: Physical characteristics enabling symbol recognition.
Semantical Properties: Meanings derived from symbols’ relationships to the world.
1.5.2 Thinking Machines
AI and Intelligence Debate: Discusses conditions under which AI can be considered intelligent.
Crucial Distinctions: Understanding how symbols acquire meaning remains a primary challenge.
1.5.3 The Language of Thought
Biological Computer Theory: Brains function as biological computers programmed by evolution.
Chomsky's Influence: Universal grammar and the innate structure concept.
1.5.4 The Chinese Room Argument
Searle's Experiment: A thought experiment challenging computationalism by illustrating the difference between understanding and manipulation of symbols.
Responses to the Argument: Debate surrounding whether understanding resides in the clerk or the system as a whole.
1.5.5 Connectionism
Emergence of Connectionism: A response to limitations of classical AI, employing bottom-up approaches to learning and flexibility.
Neural Networks: Mimics brain functions, allowing for self-learning and creativity.
1.6 Eliminativism
Paul Churchland's Critique: Folk-psychology is a remnant of outdated thinking; neuroscience offers a superior explanatory framework.
Criteria for Theories:
Ability to explain phenomena.
Capacity for development with new findings.
Compatibility with broader scientific theories.
Future of Folk-Psychology: As scientific understanding advances, folk-psychological explanations will diminish.
1.7 Interpretationism
Dennett's Perspective: Distinguishes between personal and sub-personal descriptions of the mind, supporting the existence of mental states but not in a traditional physical sense.
The Intentional Stance: Proposes that understanding behavior can be achieved through ascribing mental states, akin to viewing stock indices as real entities.
Reality of Mind: Mental states, while not tangible, uncover patterns that aid in predicting behavior, similar to abstract concepts in science.