PHIL wk2 reading Slors et al (2015) Chapter 1 (1.4-1.7)

The Mind-Body Problem

Introduction to Identity Theory

• Water Analogy: Water's identity as H2O is compared to mind-brain identification.

• Limitations of Comparison: While water can be defined by its properties (freezing point, boiling point, transparency), the same clarity is lacking in the identification of mental states with brain states.

1.4 Functionalism

• Shift in Theory: Functionalism supplanted identity theory, offering better solutions to key problems.

• Key Problems Addressed:

  • Multiple Realization: How can different brain states correspond to the same mental state?

  • Explanation of Mental States: Why are some brain states classified as mental states?

• Behaviorism and Definitions: Emphasizes defining mental states based on their functional roles instead of their material composition.

1.4.1 Behavioral Dispositions as Brain States

• David Armstrong's Idea: Logical behaviorism and identity theory can coexist.

• Dispositions as Properties: Dispositions exist as abstract properties rather than concrete realities, tied to specific conditions.

• Comparison with Glass Fragility: The fragility of glass illustrates how behaviors can be produced by specific physical structures.

1.4.2 Folk-Psychology and Mental Holism

• Sellars' Contribution: Introduced the concept of folk-psychology, a theoretical framework for understanding mental states and behaviors.

• Inner Aspect of Mind: Acknowledges a hidden inner aspect to mental states that behaviorism fails to address.

• Comparison to Scientific Postulation: Similar to scientists hypothesizing about unseen elements to explain observations.

1.4.3 Causal Roles and Neural Realizations

• Lewis' Analytical Functionalism: Mental states defined by their causal roles.

• Inputs, Outputs, Consequences Model:

  • Inputs: What causes a mental state?

  • Outputs: The behavioral effects of mental states.

  • Consequences: Internal consequences affecting susceptibility to stimuli.

• Example of Pain: Characterized by its causes and effects, linking mental states to physical realizations in the brain.

1.4.4 Explanation of Mental States

• Functionalism's Advantage: Provides a clear explanation of why certain brain states correspond to mental states through causal roles.

• Analogy with Genes: Drawing parallels between the relationships of mental states to brain states with the relationship of genes to DNA.

1.4.5 Multiple Realisation Explained

• Causal Role Distinction: Different brain states can fulfill the same causal role, allowing for multiple realizations of mental states.

1.5 Mind as a Computer Program

• Historical Background: Concept of machines thinking dates back to the 19th century; Turing's pivotal role in artificial intelligence.

• Functionalism and Thinking Machines: Thinking defined in terms of functional properties, not limited to biological systems.

1.5.1 Symbols, Syntax, and Semantics

• Symbols: Representational elements that can take various physical forms.

• Syntactical Properties: Physical characteristics enabling symbol recognition.

• Semantical Properties: Meanings derived from symbols’ relationships to the world.

1.5.2 Thinking Machines

• AI and Intelligence Debate: Discusses conditions under which AI can be considered intelligent.

• Crucial Distinctions: Understanding how symbols acquire meaning remains a primary challenge.

1.5.3 The Language of Thought

• Biological Computer Theory: Brains function as biological computers programmed by evolution.

• Chomsky's Influence: Universal grammar and the innate structure concept.

1.5.4 The Chinese Room Argument

• Searle's Experiment: A thought experiment challenging computationalism by illustrating the difference between understanding and manipulation of symbols.

• Responses to the Argument: Debate surrounding whether understanding resides in the clerk or the system as a whole.

1.5.5 Connectionism

• Emergence of Connectionism: A response to limitations of classical AI, employing bottom-up approaches to learning and flexibility.

• Neural Networks: Mimics brain functions, allowing for self-learning and creativity.

1.6 Eliminativism

• Paul Churchland's Critique: Folk-psychology is a remnant of outdated thinking; neuroscience offers a superior explanatory framework.

• Criteria for Theories:

  1. Ability to explain phenomena.

  2. Capacity for development with new findings.

  3. Compatibility with broader scientific theories.

• Future of Folk-Psychology: As scientific understanding advances, folk-psychological explanations will diminish.

1.7 Interpretationism

• Dennett's Perspective: Distinguishes between personal and sub-personal descriptions of the mind, supporting the existence of mental states but not in a traditional physical sense.

• The Intentional Stance: Proposes that understanding behavior can be achieved through ascribing mental states, akin to viewing stock indices as real entities.

• Reality of Mind: Mental states, while not tangible, uncover patterns that aid in predicting behavior, similar to abstract concepts in science.