Decision Making in Political Systems

• Key Concept: Veto Players

  • Veto players are individuals or groups whose agreement is necessary for a change in policy.

  • Two types: Institutional (e.g., presidents, legislative chambers) and Partisan (e.g., political parties).

• Capacity for Policy Change:

  • The potential for policy change decreases with:

  • The number of veto players.

  • Disagreement among veto players (lack of congruence).

  • Internal cohesion of each veto player.

• Comparative Framework:

  • The framework allows comparisons across different political systems, revealing consistent patterns in policy stability.

  • Notably, presidential systems can have similar policy stability characteristics to coalition governments in parliamentary systems.

• Empirical Support:

  • The model aligns with existing empirical studies and allows for predictions about government and regime stability based on the structure of veto players.

  • Areas of government instability in parliamentary systems and regime instability in presidential systems correspond to the presence of multiple veto players.

• Independent Variables Influencing Policy Stability:

  • Number of veto players: More players = more stability.

  • Congruence: Players with similar positions increase stability.

  • Cohesion: High cohesion within a veto player group leads to greater stability.

• Predictions:

  • Changes in policy are likely when the identity or positions of veto players change.

  • Systems with multiple incongruent veto players are more stable than those with single or congruent veto players.

• Results and Implications:

  • The interaction of the number, distance, and cohesion of veto players offers insights into policy change dynamics.

  • The framework can accommodate other types of veto players (e.g., interest groups, courts, referendums).

  • Legislative procedures will vary significantly between systems with multiple and single veto players.