Ostrom 2008 tragedy of the commons

Tragedy of the Commons

Introduction

  • Concept introduced by Garrett Hardin in 1968.

  • Describes a scenario where common-pool resources (CPRs) are overused due to individual self-interest.

  • Resources, finite in nature, become exhausted as individuals maximize their own utility without regard for community well-being.

Key Concepts

  • Common-Pool Resources (CPRs): Yield finite benefits; difficult and costly to exclude potential users. Examples: fish stocks, forests, water supplies.

  • Rational Utility Maximizing Individuals: Each user prioritizes personal gain, leading to collective depletion of resources.

  • Free Rider Problem: Users benefit from resources without contributing to their management or sustainability.

Hardin's Model

  • Utilizes the example of a shared pasture to illustrate the pitfalls of open access.

  • States that herders continue to add animals, leading to overgrazing and eventual ruin of the pasture.

  • Hardin concludes that each individual, pursuing their best interest, ultimately leads to communal destruction.

Implications of Hardin’s Theory

  • Centralized Control: Pessimism about user cooperation has led to government control of CPRs.

  • Centralized Overuse: Evidence suggests government management often exacerbates resource degradation due to inefficiency and corruption.

Evidence Against Hardin’s Consensus

  • User Cooperation: Many studies show that with effective communication, users can develop rules to manage CPR sustainably.

  • Self-Organization: Users can create institutions to govern themselves, contrary to Hardin’s assertion.

Factors Influencing Successful Management

  • Conditions Favoring Self-Organization:

    • Homogeneous interests and technologies among users

    • Secure tenures that encourage investment in the resource

    • Low costs of communication and agreement

  • Large groups face more difficulties in governance; small to moderate groups have more success in managing CPRs.

Design Principles for Sustainable Governance

  • Successful CPR regimes exhibit specific guidelines:

    • Boundary rules defining user rights and responsibilities.

    • Collective agreements on duties and shared benefits.

    • Adaptive processes allowing for error correction and learning from failures over time.

Findings from Field Research

  • Evidence shows effective governance from both community-driven and state-managed systems.

  • Self-govened institutions often provide more adaptable and resilient management solutions.

Conclusion

  • The need to evolve a modified theory of commons management is critical, integrating empirical research to identify consistent factors for success in resource governance.

References

  • Hardin, G. 1968. "The Tragedy of the Commons", Science 162

  • Ostrom, E. 1990. "Governing the Commons", Cambridge University Press.

  • National Research Council, various reports, showing evidence against simplistic views of CPR management.