Famine, Affluence, and Morality by Peter Singer

Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1972), pp. 229-243 [revised edition]

Date of Writing: November 1971
Context: Famine in East Bengal causing death and suffering due to lack of food, shelter, and medical care.

Causes of Suffering:
- Constant poverty
- Cyclone
- Civil war
- Result: Approximately 9 million people are destitute refugees.
Potential for Aid:
- Richer nations have the capacity to assist and significantly mitigate suffering.

Individual Level: Minimal significant actions taken by individuals to address the crisis.
- Few donations to relief funds
- Lack of political pressure (writing to representatives, protests, etc.)
Government Level:
- Governments have provided insufficient aid; example:
- UK Aid: £14,750,000 (compared to £275,000,000 for the Concorde project).
- Australia contributed less than one-twelfth of the Sydney Opera House cost.
- Total aid from all sources: £65,000,000.
- Estimated cost for one year of aid needed: £464,000,000.
- India's aid needed by end of year: £300,000,000, likely insufficient.

Main Argument:
- Current reaction of affluent nations to Bengal cannot be justified.
- A fundamental reevaluation of moral viewpoints is necessary.

Suffering and Death:
- Assumed bad and unacceptable for lack of food, shelter, or medical care.
Moral Obligation:
- If one can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then one should do so.
- Example:
- Child drowning in a pond; one ought to save the child by getting muddy.

Implications of the Principle:
- Proximity or distance should not affect moral obligations; assistance should be given regardless of geographical distance.
- Number of individuals in similar circumstances should not diminish personal obligation to act.

Absence of Justification:
- Cannot justify inactivity by claiming others will act.
- Example:
- Not less obliged if multiple people fail to act in a drowning scenario.
Misconceptions about Giving:
- Argument stating obligation to only give a small amount (e.g., £5) if everyone else does is flawed unless everyone indeed contributes.
- Reality: Not everyone contributes, hence individuals have a greater obligation to help.

Traditional View:
- Current societal perspective views aid as charitable, therefore not morally obligatory.
- Buying luxury items does not meet any critical need, whereas giving to relief does.
Conclusion:
- It is wrong not to give aid rather than being viewed as merely charitable.
- Distinction between duty and charity requires reevaluation based on current global affluence and famine conditions.

Current Moral Judgments:
- Most do not condemn luxury spending in contrast to aiding those in need.
- Nonetheless, this societal norm does not undermine the moral obligation to give.

Urmson’s Explanation:
- Requirements for a basic moral code must align with societal capability.
- It may lead to a breakdown of both moral compliance and altruism if expectations are too high.

Government Responsibility Debate:
- Argument against private giving suggesting that it excuses government from duty is unsupported.
- Contributing is necessary as failure leads to suffering without any expected benefit.

Concerns Raised:
- Argument that almsgiving delays starvation overlooks the necessity of immediate action.
Long-term Solutions:
- Promoting population control as sustainable famine prevention.

Giving Thresholds:
- Suggests giving until the level of marginal utility, potentially matching conditions of a refugee.
- If all citizens reduced excess consumption, aid outcomes could improve significantly.

Economic growth must be balanced against the need for aid and community responsibility.
- The ethical implications of affluence demand reconsideration of our moral frameworks and expected behaviors in society.