Mind and Behavior: Behaviorism Practice Flashcards
The Foundations of Behaviorism
Origins and Methodology: Behaviorism begins in psychology rather than philosophy. It initially emerged as a methodological thesis concerning the practice of psychology, rather than an ontological thesis about what exists.
Motivation for the Movement: The shift was a reaction to early psychology, which had become highly speculative and based on complex theories that were difficult to verify (e.g., Freudian psychology).
Critique of Freudianism: The lecturer notes that Freudian psychology involved speculative interpretations of dreams and symbolic patterns that lacked a standard for being proven true or false. Behaviorists sought to transform psychology into a rigorous, proper science.
Empirical Focus: Behaviorists argued that because we cannot literally peer into minds, we can only empirically study behaviors. Even when individuals describe their thoughts, psychologists are actually studying "speech behaviors."
Foundational Premise: Psychology should be defined as the study of behavior because behavior is the only observable aspect of other people’s minds.
Goals of Behaviorism: The primary goals were the prediction and control of behavior, rather than changing how people felt or thought internally.
Ethical Implications: This focus led to troubling directions; if psychologists only concern themselves with behavior, any means of modification (e.g., utilizing painful shocks to suppress behaviors) might be viewed as equally valid, regardless of the internal distress caused to the subject.
Current Status: While strict behaviorism is no longer the dominant methodology, it left an impact. Modern psychologists acknowledge that a "theory of mind" or model of internal processes is necessary to explain behavior.
Philosophical Behaviorism and the Cartesian Critique
Jump from Methodology to Ontology: Philosophical behaviorism takes the methodological principles of psychology and applies them to existence. It claims that there is no inner mental life; behavior is all that exists in relation to the mind.
The Cartesian Theater: Behaviorists reject the Cartesian model (attributed to Ren Descartes) where mental actions take place in a private "theater" for an "audience of one" (the self).
The Regress Problem: The lecturer critiques the Cartesian view by asking who is watching the theater. If there is a "little man" inside the head (a homunculus) observing experiences, does that man have another man inside his head? This leads to an infinite regress.
The Intuition Challenge: Despite the behaviorist view, the idea of having a private inner experience is powerful and seemingly obvious. Behaviorists must provide counter-intuitive arguments to convince people they lack a mental life except for the words they speak or the actions they take.
Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Beetle in a Box Argument
Source: Found in Jangwon Kim’s book on page . This argument addresses how language gains meaning.
Social Meaning of Language: Words do not get their meanings from the physical objects they represent (e.g., the word "ceiling") or from mental pictures. Instead, meaning is derived from social interactions and use-cases in shared scenarios.
Example: The Word "Broken": There is no single commonality between a broken hard drive, a broken heart, and a broken vase. The word is used because these scenarios share social cues we respond to. Meaning is social and shared, not individual or internal.
The Problem of Pain: Pain is a private experience; we cannot see another's pain. If the meaning of the word "pain" were purely an internal feeling, we could not share the word or understand each other.
Public Behavior as Definition: Since we cannot share internal feelings, the word "pain" must refer to observable behaviors (screaming, crying, gritting teeth, saying "ow"). These are public and verifiable, making them the only possible basis for shared meaning.
The Beetle Metaphor: Imagine everyone has a box containing a "beetle." You can only see into your own box. If the "beetle" is a mysterious creature no one else can see, we could never communicate about it meaningfully. If we do communicate about it, it is because we are referring to the box or something public.
Two Readings of Wittgenstein:
Strict Behaviorist Reading: Inner life is a fiction; it does not exist.
Linguistic/Practical Reading: An inner life may exist, but it is outside the realm of philosophical analysis and shared language. Because words require shared behavior, the "mind" as a subject of talk must be physical/behavioral.
Logical and Analytical Behaviorism
Tradition: Rooted in Logical Positivism and the Vienna Circle (s). Figures like Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel aimed to eliminate metaphysics in favor of science and logic.
Hempel’s Principles of Logical Behaviorism:
Any meaningful psychological statement can be translated, without loss of content, into statements about behavioral and physical phenomena.
Psychological explanations must be defined solely in terms of behavioral and physical expressions.
Definition as Necessary and Sufficient Conditions: In philosophy, a definition (like "bachelor" meaning an "unmarried male") provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a term. Hempel believed mental terms could be defined this way using physical terms.
Scientific Analogy: Concepts like temperature are defined by physics as "mean kinetic energy." Logical behaviorists argue that beliefs and pains should be similarly defined by physical states.
The Verification Argument for Behaviorism
Source: Page of Kim’s text.
Premise 1: The meaning of a sentence is given by its verification conditions (the tests that would show if it is true or false).
Category of "Nonsense": Claims that cannot be verified (e.g., claims about intrinsic beauty, moral norms, or complex "psychic forces") are considered "meaningless" or nonsense in a strict logic-bound sense, even if they are useful or aesthetically pleasing.
Premise 2: If meaning is shared between speakers, the verification conditions must be accessible to every speaker.
Conclusion: Only behavior and physical phenomena are publicly observable; therefore, shareable psychological meaning must involve behavioral phenomena.
Case Study: Paul's Toothache: Hempel translates "Paul has a toothache" into physical observations:
Paul weeps and gestures.
Paul says, "I have a toothache."
Clinical examination shows a decayed tooth with exposed pulp.
Blood pressure and reaction speed change.
Central nervous system signals travel from the tooth nerve to the brain.
Difficulties and Critiques of Behaviorism
The Problem of Beliefs: Defining a belief as a disposition to act (e.g., believing means you are disposed to say "Yes" when asked if is true) is problematic.
The Competence Objection: A person might have a belief but fail to answer "Yes" because they do not understand the question or have a broken hearing aid. To fix this, one must assume the person "understands," but "understanding" is itself a mental state requiring a behavioral definition.
Lying and Inauthenticity: Logical behaviorism leaves no room for lying. If a belief is the disposition to behave, then any outward behavior is by definition the "authentic" state. Being "dishonest" about one’s private life becomes logically impossible if the behavior is the reality.
Belief-Desire-Action Principle: Using the example of Mary opening a window (Kim, page ):
If Mary desires fresh air () and believes opening the window is the best way (), she will do .
However, if she believes opening the window lets in loud noise, she won't do it.
One must add infinite antecedents to account for every possible belief and desire. This results in an infinite definition that no human could understand or share.
Cross-Species Diversity (Multiple Realizability): Pain behavior varies wildly across species (humans vs. cats vs. dogs vs. lobsters). An alien species might experience pain with entirely different brain structures or behaviors.
Biological Diversity: Even among humans, brain structures differ. The language center in a right-handed person is in a different location than in a left-handed person. Therefore, a universal neurological or behavioral definition of pain is impossible.
Ontological Behaviorism and Eliminativism
Key Figures: Paul Churchland and Daniel Dennett.
Rejection of Translation: These thinkers admit that we cannot translate mental terms into behavioral terms (rejecting logical behaviorism).
The Eliminativist Move: They argue that because mental terms cannot be defined physically, we should reject the reality of those terms (beliefs, desires, pains) entirely.
Folk Psychology: Mental terms are part of a "folk science" similar to the outdated theory of the four elements or the idea that fire is a substance called phlogiston.
The Future of Science: Scientists of the future may replace "beliefs" with descriptions of specific brain states.
Review of the Mind-Body Problem Landscape
Occam’s Razor (Ontological Parsimony): The motivation for behaviorism is to explain the world with as few entities as possible (believing in only physical things).
Common Sense Motivation: The motivation for dualism is consistency with our internal experience, which feels non-physical.
Conclusion: Behaviorism fails to capture the full essence of the mind, while dualism fails to explain the mind-body connection. The remainder of the course seeks a middle ground between these extremes.