Institutional Design, Collective Action Dilemmas, and the Tragedy of the Commons
The Fundamental Dilemma of Collective Action
Traditional theories posit that groups with common interests naturally act to advance these interests. Examples include Marxian class action and political models by Arthur Bentley and David B. Truman.
Mancur Olson Jr. (1965) refuted this notion, arguing that rational, self-interested individuals do not voluntarily work towards collective interests in large groups.
Free Riding Mechanism: Individuals foresee that their small contributions won't influence group success, leading them to refrain from participation.
Primary Purpose and Function of Organizations
Organizations exist to serve their members' common interests.
Historical Foundations:
Aristotle: Men join for specific and general advantages.
Leon Festinger: Group membership attracts due to objective attainment.
Examples:
Labor Unions: Higher wages
Farm Organizations: Favorable legislation
Corporations: Higher dividends
Contrast Between Individual and Collective Action
Individual actions serve personal interests best through unorganized means, while collective interests require organized group action due to inherent conflicts.
Public Goods and the Market Analogy
Large organizations resemble firms in competitive markets; each firm benefits from higher prices but risks lowered profits through increased output.
Lobbying groups form when firms seek government support, leading to significant financial expenditures without individual contributions.
Non-Economic Motives and the Test of the National State
National states exemplify the balance of non-economic allegiances and necessary economic benefits, such as taxation.
Max Weber highlighted that mass human behavior cannot be sustained solely on ideological grounds.
Technical Definition and Properties of Public Goods
Definition: A public good's consumption by one member does not exclude others.
Jointness of Supply: Non-excludability remains crucial; organizations must incentivize membership as collective goods can't exclude non-payers.
The Tragedy of the Commons
Shared resources lead to overuse when individuals exploit common interests, as articulated by J.B. Wiesner and Garrett Hardin.
Examples include overgrazing and resource depletion due to unregulated access.
Pollution and Governance
Pollution represents a reverse commons where individuals find discharging waste cheaper than treating it.
Administrative Law: Detailed regulations require delegation to agencies; a bureaucratic dilemma arises in enforcing compliance without abuse of power.
Population Dynamics and Responsibility
Welfare states distort natural population control, leading to a tragic commons in child-rearing.
Ineffective appeals to conscience fail to alter exploitative behaviors, highlighting the need for mutual coercion to enforce social arrangements.