Rise of Illiberal Democracy – Comprehensive Study Notes

Richard Holbrooke’s 1996 Bosnia question: What if “free & fair” elections empower “racists, fascists, separatists” opposed to peace?
Illustrates the global dilemma: elections alone do not ensure liberty or constitutional restraint.
Fareed Zakaria labels this worldwide pattern “illiberal democracy.”

Democracy (minimalist / procedural):
- Competitive, multiparty, free & fair elections.
- Public participation (e.g., women’s suffrage) → “more democratic.”
- Does NOT automatically include a full catalogue of rights or good governance.
Constitutional Liberalism:
- Goal-oriented doctrine limiting state, church, or societal coercion.
- Protects individual autonomy & dignity: life, property, religion, speech, assembly.
- Rooted in Greek liberty + Roman rule-of-law traditions.
- Canonical lineage: Milton, Blackstone, Hobbes, Locke, Smith, Montesquieu, Jefferson, Madison, Mill, Isaiah Berlin.
Illiberal Democracy:
- Regime produced by elections yet routinely violating constitutional limits & basic liberties.
- Exists on a spectrum: from “modest offenders” (e.g., Argentina) to “near-tyrannies” (e.g., Kazakhstan, Belarus).

118 of 193 states (~54.8\%) are democratic (1997).
Illiberal-democracy share among “democratizing” states:
- 22\% (≈7 yrs earlier) → 35\% (≈5 yrs earlier) → 50\% (1996-97).
Freedom House: half of all transitioning regimes score higher on political than on civil liberties.

Latin America: Peru (Fujimori), Argentina (Menem) – decrees & constitution-bending (~300 presidential decrees by Menem in 8 yrs).
Post-Soviet: Russia (Yeltsin’s rule-by-decree), Kazakhstan (Lukashenko-style concentration), Belarus.
Middle East: Iran (elected parliament restricts speech/dress), Palestinian Authority.
Africa: Sierra Leone, Ethiopia (security forces vs. journalists), Zambia, Benin.
Asia: Pakistan, Philippines (illiberal), East-Asian semi-democracies (South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand more liberal than democratic), Singapore & Malaysia (liberalizing autocracies), Japan (only liberal democracy), Papua New Guinea & pre-People-Power Philippines (illiberal democracies).

Europe & N. America (1800s):
- Widespread liberal autocracies; tiny franchises (GB voting: 2\% in 1830 → 7\% after 1867 → 40\% by 1880s).
- Constitutional liberalism (property rights, separated powers) preceded full democracy by ~100 yrs.
- “Western model” symbolized by the impartial judge, not the plebiscite.
East Asia’s Western-style path:
- WWII → authoritarianism → liberalizing autocracy → semi-democracy.
- Economic liberalization fosters civil rights & middle class (bourgeoisie) → prerequisites for liberal democracy.

Tyranny of the Majority: Madison, Tocqueville warned majority rule can oppress minorities.
Majoritarian Mind-set: Lukashenko (1994): “I am of the people.” → justification for unchecked power.
Democracy’s logic = accumulation of power; constitutionalism’s logic = limitation of power.

Ethnically divided societies + winner-take-all elections = instability.
- Scholars Rabushka & Shepsle, Horowitz: examples in Zambia (Bemba vs. Nyanja), Benin (north vs. south).

Popular claim: No two modern democracies fight wars.
Zakaria’s refinement: correlation is actually a “liberal peace.”
- Kant’s “republican” peace linked to separation of powers, checks and balances, free trade.
- Doyle: Democracies without constitutional liberalism do fight.
Mansfield & Snyder dataset (200 yrs):
- Democratizing (illiberal) states go to war more than stable autocracies or liberal democracies.
- Transitional openings → hyper-nationalism (Napoleon III’s France, Wilhelmine Germany, Taisho Japan, Serbia under Milošević, Armenia–Azerbaijan).

U.S. distinctiveness = deliberate undemocratic constraints:
- Supreme Court: 9 life-tenured unelected justices.
- Senate: equal representation → \approx16\% of population can veto any bill.
- Federalism + vibrant intermediate associations (Tocqueville).
American vs. French models:
- U.S.: pessimistic view of human nature → checks & balances.
- French Revolution: faith in popular sovereignty → centralization, periodic chaos (2 monarchies, 2 empires, 1 proto-fascist regime, 5 republics post-1789).

Humility: elections are easy to schedule, hard to translate into liberty.
Broaden the toolkit:
- Support rule of law, independent judiciaries, free markets, civil society, not just ballots.
- National Endowment for Democracy, USAID already do this, but election day still dominates optics (easy to film; rule of law isn’t).
Evaluate regimes on liberties, not ballots alone:
- Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand: limited democracy yet offer citizens more life-quality & autonomy than illiberal democracies (Slovakia, Ghana) or pure dictatorships (Iraq, Libya).
- China: still repressive but has expanded economic & some personal autonomy → step toward “liberalizing autocracy.”
Revive constitutional craftsmanship:
- Montesquieu/Madison vision = complex mix of unelected bodies, indirect voting, federalism, horizontal & vertical checks.
- Avoid “Weimar syndrome” fatalism; constitutions do matter.
- Winner-take-all in fragile states = “winner takes all power.” Need inclusive, power-sharing designs.

Illiberal democracy → erosion of liberty, abuse of power, civil conflict & war.
Danger: may discredit liberal democracy itself, as inter-war fascism once did.
21st-century challenge: not just to spread democracy, but to safeguard liberty within it.
Zakaria’s inversion of Wilson: make “democracy safe for the world.”

ff118/193 countries democratic (1997) → 54.8\% of world population.
Illiberal share of democratizers: 22\% \rightarrow 35\% \rightarrow 50\% (1989-90, 1992-93, 1996-97).
Menem’s decrees: \approx300 in 8 yrs (≈3× previous Argentine total).
19th-century British franchise: 2\% (1830) → 7\% (1867) → \approx40\% (1880s).
U.S. Senate imbalance: California 30\,\text{m} vs. Arizona 3.7\,\text{m} = same vote weight; 16\% of population can block legislation.

Illiberal democracy is “a growth industry.” If unchecked, it risks global instability, ethnic violence, and the tarnishing of democratic ideals. The sustainable path is constitutional liberalism first, democracy second—or at least both together.