Exploring Extremism in Prisons Notes

Exploring Extremism in Prisons: A Qualitative Study

Study Overview

An exploratory qualitative study was conducted to understand the extent and nature of prisoner radicalization in three high-security prisons in England.
The study also examined how these prisons manage extremist prisoners and respond to the risk of radicalization.
Data was collected through interviews with 83 male prisoners and 73 staff members from various disciplines (prison wing officers, security staff, psychologists, offender supervisors, and chaplains).
Interviews were conducted between January 2014 and January 2015.
Thematic analysis was used to analyze the interview material.
A key limitation is that the views presented may not be representative of all prisoners or staff.
While the study aimed to examine all forms of extremism, only Islamist extremism was reported by respondents as the most prevalent ideology at the time.

Key Findings

Prisoners convicted of Islamist extremist offences, though small in number, had a disproportionately disruptive influence, exerting power and influence over other prisoners.
Some were motivated by an extremism agenda, while others orchestrated anti-establishment and criminal activities, forming what was described as a ‘prison gang’.
Those motivated by extremism attempted to radicalize others.
Prisoners considered more susceptible to Islamist radicalization were vulnerable, experiencing loss, loneliness, and alienation. They also had grievances against society and the prison system.
Conversions to Islam were reported to be higher than for any other faith, often to help prisoners survive in prison, offering friendship and support.
Religious behavior was generally seen as a useful aid to rehabilitation.
Fostering a supportive environment with staff building relationships with prisoners was crucial in countering radicalization, facilitated by ongoing staff training and sufficient staffing levels.
Strategies used to disrupt the influence of extremists were largely effective, including moving problematic prisoners and gathering intelligence.
Imams played an important role in countering extremism, but their role was challenging and expanding, requiring sufficient support.
Media reporting was thought to increase divisions between Muslim prisoners and staff, with negative stereotypes perpetuated, necessitating strong counter-arguments.

Contemporary Policy and Operational Context

Since the study, the terrorist offender population has more than doubled, with increasingly diverse drivers of offending and a significant increase in Extreme Right Wing prisoners.
HMPPS has significantly strengthened its approach to managing terrorist and terrorist risk offenders.
In 2016, the Security, Order and Counter Terrorism Directorate (SOCT) was established.
A Home Office and HMPPS Joint Extremism Unit (JEXU) was created in 2017.
The counter-terrorism operating model in HMPPS is delivered through a dedicated network of CT staff.
Control measures include Separation Centres, communications monitoring, and the removal of extremist literature.
Assessments and rehabilitative interventions are applied to the terrorist and terrorist risk cohort.
HMPPS has trained and supported prison chaplains to deliver theological and ideological interventions.
Following terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020, HMPPS has further reviewed its counter-terrorism policies and operations.
A new multi-agency intelligence hub coordinates information exchange between operational partners.
A dedicated counter-terrorism assessment and rehabilitation center is being introduced.
New and professionalized training will be rolled out to staff to better understand and respond to radicalization and terrorism risk across ideologies.
HMPPS will continue to prioritize work to understand radicalization in prisons and develop effective responses and stronger operational safeguards, including assessing the feasibility of another study on radicalization in prisons.

Introduction

The number of individuals convicted of extremist offenses has increased in Western countries.
In Great Britain, there were 221 individuals in custody for terrorism-related offenses by the end of December 2018, with the majority (79%) holding Islamist-extremist views.
Prisons face challenges in limiting problems associated with extremists preaching their views, threatening prison security, and disrupting the prison regime.
Prison can be an ideal environment for extremist ideologies to flourish, where vulnerable prisoners can be recruited.
Concern is growing about the radicalization of prisoners, especially into Islamist extremism.
Commentators are divided on whether Muslim groups in prison are breeding grounds for terrorism or if there is no relationship between prisoner conversion and terrorism.
This study explores the perceived extent and nature of prisoner radicalization in three High-Security prisons in England and how the establishments manage extremist prisoners and respond to the risk of prisoner radicalization.

Background

Prison can be a vulnerable time, and religion can help individuals cope with incarceration.
Conversion to Islam can be appealing to prisoners, providing a daily structure and moral framework.
The Muslim faith is growing within prisons across the Western world.
In England and Wales, the number of Muslim prisoners increased from 8% in 2002 to 15% by 2018, with a count of 12,847 by March 2018.
It cannot be assumed that prisoners converting to Islam are showing support for extremist ideologies.
Research indicates that many prisoners convert to Islam, but only a small percentage become violent extremists or join terrorist organizations.
Understanding which prisoners are most susceptible to extremist influences is complex due to different characteristics and social backgrounds.
Extremism can flourish in overcrowded prisons where rehabilitation opportunities are reduced and social interactions are more strained.
Prisons with both extremists and a higher percentage of Muslims may see prisoners more vulnerable to radicalization, especially with poor control and a failure to adapt regimes.
Situational factors such as the absence of skilled frontline staff, poor physical conditions, limited constructive activity, overcrowding, and geographical remoteness contribute to prison violence and radicalization.
High-security prisons present particular challenges due to long sentences and restrictive regimes.
The High-Security Estate (HSE) holds prisoners considered to be the greatest security risk, including those convicted or suspected of extremist offenses.
A study of a high-security prison found a new population mix of younger, more ethnically diverse prisoners, with high numbers of Muslim prisoners, disrupting established hierarchies and creating tensions.
In-prison conversions to Islam were high, but knowledge of the faith was limited, allowing extremist prisoners to fill the gap with a misinterpreted, extremist version of Islam.
Most prisoners were resistant to extremist influences, with reasons for converting including seeking identity, meaning, friendship, support, and structure.
Prison regimes can vary across establishments depending on management styles and the political climate.
Further research is needed to explore whether prisoners are being radicalized in high-security prisons in England, which prisoners are more susceptible, and how prisons are responding to the threat of extremism.

Methods

Data collection took place over 12 months, from January 2014 to January 2015, as part of a larger study examining gang activity and radicalization in high-security prisons.
The study had two central aims: (1) to examine group and gang-related activity and (2) to examine the extent, nature, and management of prisoner extremism.
This report describes the research that addressed aim 2.
The study received ethical approval from both the MoJ/HMPPS National Research Committee and the University of Birmingham’s ethical boards.

Design

As little research has been carried out into radicalization in prisons, this study used an exploratory, qualitative approach that allowed themes to be explored and developed.

Participants

Interviews were conducted with 83 male prisoners at three male High Security Prisons in England.
All prisoners located in the main wings of each establishment were invited to take part in the research.
A response rate of 88% was achieved.
Respondents were randomly selected from those who had agreed to be interviewed.
Forty-one percent (n=34) of respondents described their ethnicity as being White British, 34% (n=28) as African/Caribbean, 14% (n=12) as Asian, and 11% (n=9) as mixed/other.
Forty-six percent (n=38) reported that they were Muslim, 29% (n=24) Christian, and 25% (n=21) other/no religion.
The mean age of participants was 26 years (range 19–56 years).
Seventy-three members of staff were also interviewed.
The sampling of staff was opportunistic, with selection based on staff who were available on the day(s) of interview, who were then randomly selected from those who had agreed to participate.
They were drawn from the following disciplines: Security (n=15), officers (n=20), psychology (n=13), offender supervisors (n=13), and chaplaincy (n=12).
Their mean age was 42 years (range 22–59 years).
The majority of the staff described their ethnicity as being White British (88%, 64), with the remainder describing their ethnicity as Asian/Asian British (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi (7%, 5)) or Black/African/Caribbean/Black British (5%, 4).
Forty-eight were male and 25 were female.

Materials

A semi-structured interview schedule was designed and piloted to ensure it was clear, concise, and able to capture all important information.
The questions included the following topics:
1. The extent of extremism in each prison.
2. The nature of the extremism and factors associated with prisoner susceptibility to extremism.
3. Management of extremist behavior and extremist prisoners in the establishment.

Procedure

Interviews were carried out individually, face to face, and in a private setting with handwritten notes being taken.
Audio-recording was not used because of security guidelines.
The primary author led the interviews and was independent of establishment staff.
All participants were fully briefed on the aims of the study and their rights to confidentiality and anonymity before the interviews began.
Informed consent was then obtained from all participants who were asked to sign a consent form.
Interview length ranged from 45 minutes to two hours.
In total, more than 150 hours of interview material was obtained (over 90 hours of prisoner interviews and 60 hours of staff interviews).

Analysis

Interviews were analyzed using thematic analysis, which was both inductive and deductive.
For the deductive analysis, codes were defined a priori.
The inductive analysis allowed for themes to develop from the data, which were added to the original coding frame.
Interviews were analyzed and responses systematically categorized to fit within the coding frame.
The codes that were produced were then reviewed and collated into broader, superordinate themes and subordinate themes.
Once coding was completed, themes were named, and extracts from the interviews were selected to illustrate each theme.
In order to maintain consistency, coding and theme generation was carried out by the primary author.
Coding and theme generation was discussed with a second member of the research team who had read all interview transcripts.
In addition, the second researcher coded 20 randomly selected interviews (10 staff and 10 offender interviews) alongside the primary author, which allowed coding to be compared and any anomalies were discussed.
Interview notes were entered into the QSR NVivo Version 10 data management program, which was used to analyze the data.

Interpreting the findings

There were a number of limitations to the study, which should be considered when interpreting the findings.
As with all qualitative research, the findings are subjective, and the views of those interviewed may not be representative of all staff and prisoners at the establishments.
Because the subject under investigation is highly topical, with much discourse in the media, there may have been some bias in the interview responses, with some respondents exaggerating the extent of extremist activity as a way to highlight the issue, while others may have moderated their responses to mask the problem and divert attention away from any activities.
The researchers were experienced in conducting interviews with prisoners and staff and were aware of the potential for bias in responses.
The large qualitative sample size also meant they were able to analyze data from a wide range of respondents and so identify if there was any suspected bias.

Findings

Sixteen superordinate themes and 34 subordinate themes were identified from the analysis of the interview data.
The themes are grouped according to the three research questions:
1. The extent of extremism.
2. The nature of extremism/factors associated with susceptibility to extremism.
3. Management of extremism/extremist prisoners.
Only Islamist extremism was discussed by respondents.
The findings were consistent across all three prisons.

Perceived Extent of Extremism

Influence of Islamist extremist prisoners in custody: Although the number of prisoners convicted of an Islamist extremist offense was small (estimated to be less than 2% of the prison population at each establishment), they were considered to have a disproportionate impact on prison life.
Gang vs. Islamist extremist motivations: Incarcerated offenders convicted of Islamist extremism offenses tended to divide into two groups, depending on their motivations. The first group played a central role in much of the anti-establishment, criminal activity in the prison.
Radicalization by Islamist extremist offenders: There was much speculation among staff and prisoners interviewed as to whether some prisoners were actually being radicalized by the incarcerated Islamist extremist offenders. Opinions were divided.
Conversion to Islam: While more prisoners were reported to be converting to Islam while incarcerated than to any other faith, their reasons for doing so were diverse and complex.
Fitting in: Even offenders who were seen to agree with Islamist extremist views were often thought to be doing so to ‘fit in’ and show support for their fellow prisoners, rather than because they had genuinely been radicalized.
Continued support for Islamist extremism of concern: Prisoners who continued to show support for Islamist extremism over the longer term were of greatest concern and least likely to abandon their beliefs.

Perceived Nature of Extremism. Factors Associated with Susceptibility to Extremist Influences

Vulnerable prisoners: Vulnerable prisoners, who were experiencing difficulties in coping with prison life, were reported to be most susceptible.
Limited knowledge of Islam: Staff and prisoners discussed how ignorance and confusion over the teachings of Islam were more likely to lead to the adoption of extremist ideologies.
Alienation, victimization, and grievances: Prisoners who felt more alienated from society by past experiences and had grievances against society and the prison system were considered to be more at risk of adopting an extremist ideology.
Challenges to Good Staff-Prisoner Relationships: Building a good rapport with prisoners was seen as essential in maintaining safety in the prison and reducing the risk of inmates being radicalized.
Staffing levels and the role of prison officers: Concerns were raised that the primary focus of an officer’s job was now regime implementation rather than supporting individual prisoners.
Influence of the media: There was a strong theme around the influence of the media with continued portrayals of all Muslims as supporters of terrorism.

Management of Extremist Prisoners

Movement of prisoners: A key tool used by the prisons to manage problematic prisoners was to move them to different establishments.
Use of intelligence: The importance of good intelligence in identifying and managing extremist activity was seen as fundamental to running a safe, secure prison by most staff respondents.
Segregation: Staff and prisoners interviewed expressed strong opinions over the segregation of prisoners (within the same establishment), especially whether the prison service should segregate prisoners who supported extremist views and tried to radicalize others. Opinions were polarized.
Role of Imams: Prison Imams were considered to be an important resource in the counter-extremism work with prisoners.

Discussion

The findings support the assertion that there is little evidence of widespread radicalization of prisoners while in custody and prisons being ‘hotbeds’ for extremism.
Most prisoners converting to Islam did so to help them survive in prison through friendship and support.
Following a faith should not automatically be viewed as a threat, and religious behavior can be a useful aid to rehabilitation.
Vulnerable prisoners with loss, loneliness, and alienation were more susceptible to radicalization.
Prisoners with little knowledge of the relevant faith were considered more receptive to extremist rhetoric.
The Prison Service has a role in supporting vulnerable prisoners and ensuring those working with extremist prisoners can offer counter-arguments.
A keyworker scheme helps identify and support prisoners at risk of succumbing to extremist influence.
Separation Centers provide specialized accommodation for extremist prisoners to disrupt their influence.
High-quality, ongoing staff training is crucial to improve understanding of the faith and the ability to identify extremism and challenge gang behavior.
Prison chaplains, especially prison Imams, play a vital role as a link between Muslim prisoners and staff but need support to manage their wide-ranging responsibilities.
Media messages influence relationships between staff and prisoners, with negative stereotypes perpetuated by the tabloid press.
Counter-arguments can challenge media stereotypes and reduce feelings of grievance among Muslim prisoners.

Conclusion

The study provides an in-depth account of prisoner and staff perspectives on faith and Islamist radicalization in high-security prisons in England.
Religion can provide a positive framework for prisoners to structure their lives and find support.
There is little evidence of widespread radicalization in high-security establishments.
Preventative approaches, including education for staff and prisoners, fostering good staff-prisoner relationships, and multi-agency working, are essential in correctional settings.