Chapter 5 Study Notes: No Freedom
No Freedom
Views and Arguments
The views and arguments presented in this chapter are not necessarily endorsed by the author of the textbook, nor are they original to the author. They are intended to illustrate different philosophical perspectives and may not be consistent with the arguments found in other chapters.
1. Introduction
The chapter opens with the fundamental question: Do we ever act out of our own free will? At first glance, it seems obvious that people can act freely since they often think about their choices and then proceed to act on those choices. For instance, deciding to read this chapter appears to be a free act—one considered and executed without coercion.
However, the author proposes a radical thesis: that nothing anyone does counts as a free action. The implications of this thesis are profound, particularly concerning moral responsibility. If no actions are performed freely, it follows that no one should be held accountable for their actions. The author acknowledges the radical nature of this claim and intends to support it through two primary arguments:
Everything we do is the result of our desires, which are not within our control (Sections 3-5).
Everything we do results from events that occurred long before we were born (Sections 6-9).
Those who uphold the intuitive belief that some actions are performed freely must identify flaws in each argument presented.
2. Freedom Unmotivated
Before propounding the arguments against free action, the author confronts the powerful intuition suggesting that people often act freely. This intuitive belief stems from the observation that individuals appear to examine choices, decide on an action, and then execute that action. To clarify this intuition, the author frames it into an explicit argument in favor of free action:
The Argument for Freedom:
- (FR1) Sometimes you perform an action after deciding to perform that action.
- (FR2) If one performs an action after deciding to perform it, then one performs that action freely.
- (FR3) Therefore, some of your actions are performed freely.
Premise FR1 is unquestionably true as people often make decisions followed by corresponding actions. The author concedes that premise FR2 seems plausible. For instance, having chosen to read the chapter, the act of reading aligns with the decision—indicating a free action.
However, FR2 does not imply that all actions are free. To demonstrate this, the author presents a hypothetical case inspired by the movie Now You See Me:
Hypnotic Action
Tia, a master hypnotist, hypnotizes Jordan on the street, implanting a post-hypnotic suggestion that compels him to tackle anyone who shouts "Freeze!" When a police officer, Kabir, shouts "Freeze!", Jordan tackles him not from free will, but due to Tia's command. The key point here is that Jordan never made a conscious decision to tackle Kabir; he acted under hypnosis, illustrating that his action wasn’t free even though he was functioning under the impression of having made a choice.
This example shows that FR2 must be reconsidered since it fails to classify all actions performed after a decision as free actions.
Hypnotic Decision
To further challenge FR2, the author advances a modified scenario in which the hypnotist controls not only actions but decisions, termed as "Hypnotic Decision". In this scenario, Tia implants a suggestion in Colton, making him feel anger when he hears "Freeze!", leading him to consciously decide to tackle Kabir. Although Colton may believe he made a free decision, he did not; Tia's influence limited his autonomy over that decision. Consequently, the mere act of making a decision does not guarantee that it was a free action, revealing a flaw in FR2.
This realization necessitates a reassessment of the intuitive belief in free will, as FR2 cannot reliably reflect the nature of all actions, thereby undermining our ordinary beliefs about free action.
3. The Desire Argument Against Free Action
Having established that the acts performed under hypnosis do not reflect free actions, the author now shifts to the first argument against the concept of free action focusing on desires:
The Desire Argument:
- (DS1) What you choose to do is always determined by your desires.
- (DS2) You can’t control your desires.
- (DS3) Therefore, what you choose to do is always determined by something you can’t control.
- (DS4) If what you choose to do is always determined by something you can’t control, then you never act freely.
- (DS5) Therefore, you never act freely.
Desire, here, encompasses any type of wanting, from strong yearnings to mild preferences. The essence of DS1 lies in the understanding that decision-making inherently involves a hierarchy of desires; thus, your choices about lunch are influenced by which desire is strongest, rather than being free volitions. When contemplating what to have for lunch, numerous desires compete: the desire for a healthy meal may overpower the craving for fast food, leading to the choice of a salad over Taco Bell.
DS1 argues that while one might not act upon every desire, the choices made still stem from the strongest desires at play—a concept framed metaphorically as desires are soldiers on a battlefield, with the strongest leading to action.
Expanding on DS2, the author argues that desires are not chosen; for instance, one doesn't select to dislike a particular food or to favor a certain hobby—they arise unbidden, influencing choices without conscious control.
As indicated in DS4 and motivated by examples like Hypnotic Decision, actions cannot be free if triggered by desires beyond one's control. Critics may object by asserting that personal desires still count as those influencing one's actions, which the author argues against by revealing that choices dictated by uncontrollable desires, as in Colton's case, lack the essence of freedom.
Two objections to the Desire Argument are then raised:
Objection to DS1: A counterexample suggests that one can sometimes act in a way contrary to one's strongest desires.
Objection to DS2: One might argue that it is possible to control one’s desires.
4. The Argument from Undesired Actions
A natural objection against DS1 posits cases where individuals act against their strongest desires. For instance, waking up early and going to class, when the overwhelming urge is to stay in bed, could be perceived as counterevidence against the idea that choices align with desires. However, this counterexample is examined through the lens of Undesired Action:
(UA1) Your desire to stay in bed might be stronger than your desire to get out of bed.
(UA2) If that’s true, it doesn’t imply that what you did is not determined by desires.
(UA3) Therefore, your actions are still contingent on underlying desires.
The author stresses that the desire to honor a commitment—like attending class—while reluctantly leaving the comfort of bed constitutes a powerful counter desire that dictates the action taken. Thus, every action reverts back to the dynamics of desires at play.
Furthermore, the author explores various scenarios, like randomly spilling water due to twitching, but concludes these occurrences don’t provide substantial challenges against DS1 since they don't represent choices.
5. The Argument from Desire-Defeating Actions
To address DS2, the author acknowledges potential counterexamples claiming that individuals can indeed exert control over their desires via deliberate actions. A hypothetical akin to deciding to become a vegetarian despite overwhelming cravings for meat showcases this contention. Actions taken towards modifying desires could include exposure to ethical arguments against eating meat or undergoing rehabilitation for addiction.
The counterargument against DS2 can be encapsulated as follows:
(DD1) Desires can be changed through desire-defeating actions.
(DD2) If desires can be changed, one can control their desires.
(DD3) Thus, one has control over their desires.
The author critiques this perspective by highlighting the innate necessity of prior desires to enact desire-defeating actions. If initial motivation lacks, the action to modify them wouldn’t emerge. Therefore, no control is present to initiate the desire-defeating action by its very nature, acting as a critique against DD2.
6. Determinism
Next, the chapter introduces the devastating implications of determinism for the concept of free action:
Definition of Determinism: The principle suggests that all events, including human actions, are necessitated by preceding events—going far back into our history and the laws of nature. Hence, all present and future occurrences were determined by previous states of the universe.
Physical Necessitation: The assertion that a state leads logically to another state given specific laws of nature is central to the conceptualization of determinism.
The chapter posits an analogy with a game of pool, likening the deterministic unfolding of events to inevitable outcomes in a given playing scenario, governed by previous arrangements and present laws without interference. According to determinism:
(DT1) Determinism is true.
(DT2) If determinism is true, you cannot do otherwise.
(DT3) If you cannot do otherwise, none of your actions are genuinely free.
(DT4) Conclusively, none of your actions are free.
The author qualifies DT1’s acceptance by suggesting scientific rationale—a physics exam involving predictive calculations rooted in deterministic principles exemplifies a logical consideration for the veracity of determinism. Any deviations from determinism undermine the reliability of predicting outcomes.
Moreover, DT2 emphasizes that if actions emerge only from determined conditions, one cannot deviate from predetermined actions, thus negating the essence of free action.
7. On Rejecting Determinism
In addressing the determinism argument, challenges are proposed:
Decisions may not be determined and are thus free.
Genuine randomness exists in the universe.
Discussion surrounding quantum mechanics implies possible randomness, suggesting potential rejection of deterministic narratives but offers no vindication for free action. The author critiques randomness by asserting that chance-based decisions lack control and, thus, do not represent true freedom.
8. Compatibilism
The author presents compatibilist perspectives, affirming determinism while arguing that it can coexist with free action. The compatibilist must reject either DT2 or DT3. Revising DT2 to propose that decisions also are not free leads the compatibilist to struggle with defending actions as free when controllability is fundamentally absent.
9. Freedom and Responsibility
The conclusions drawn in this chapter present challenges to ethical constructs around moral responsibility and punishment. The author elucidates that in a universe devoid of free will, punishment loses its moral grounds, necessitating a focus on future ramifications of actions rather than sought retribution for past misconduct.
Reflection Questions
How does the influence of beliefs challenge the Desire Argument?
The influence of beliefs challenges the Desire Argument by highlighting that beliefs can shape our desires, affecting our decision-making processes. If our beliefs change, our desires might also change, which could imply that actions are not solely determined by uncontrollable desires.
Can the Argument from Undesired Actions withstand the objections raised?
The Argument from Undesired Actions could withstand objections by clarifying that even when acting against one’s stronger desires, such as attending class instead of sleeping, the action is still influenced by a competing desire. This means underlying desires are at work, suggesting actions are still contingent on desires, albeit conflicting ones.
Is there a viable middle ground that suggests all actions are not strictly determined or random?
A viable middle ground might suggest that while some actions are determined by desires and conditions, others can involve elements of randomness or unpredictability that allow for some degree of free will. This perspective could bridge determinism and the notion of free will.
Can you revise arguments to assert knowledge regarding the past?
Revising arguments to assert knowledge regarding the past could involve acknowledging that while past