Consciousness in Second Language Learning Notes

The Role of Consciousness in Second Language Learning

Introduction

• The role of conscious and unconscious processes in second language learning is a controversial issue.
• Some believe conscious understanding of the target language is necessary for learners to produce correct forms.
• Errors are attributed to not knowing the rules, forgetting them, or not paying attention.
• There's limited theoretical support for conscious grammar study as a necessary or sufficient condition for language learning.
• Bialystok (1978) provides a framework for conscious knowledge, and Rutherford and Sharwood Smith (1985) argue that 'consciousness-raising' facilitates learning.
• Others believe language learning is essentially unconscious (Seliger, 1983).
• Krashen (1981, 1983, 1985) distinguishes between subconscious 'acquisition' and conscious 'learning,' with the former being more useful for language production.
• Gregg (1984), a critic of Krashen, agrees that most language learning is unconscious.
• A third position suggests avoiding the issue of consciousness altogether (McLaughlin, Rossman, and McLeod, 1983; Odlin, 1986).
• The most common attitude towards consciousness in second language learning is skepticism.
• Behaviorists opposed the role of consciousness, considering it epiphenomenal and not scientifically investigable.
• Freud's claim that unconscious processes are complex and ubiquitous is widely accepted.
• Second language field, influenced by Chomsky, emphasizes implicit (unconscious) mental grammar reflected in learner intuitions (Coppieters 1987; Bialystok and Sharwood Smith 1985; Liceras 1985).
• Reconsideration of consciousness in language learning is timely.
• Psychology recognizes consciousness as important for explaining psychological phenomena (Mandler, 1975).
• Mainstream cognitive psychology claims that learning without awareness is impossible (Brewer, 1974; Dawson and Schell, 1987; Lewis and Anderson, 1985).
• The article posits that consciousness ties together concepts like attention, short-term memory, control vs. automatic processing, and serial vs. parallel processing.
• Conscious processing is a necessary condition for one step in language learning and facilitative for other aspects.
• Unconscious processes are crucial in comprehension and production (Jackendoff 1987), but less research is available regarding language learning.
• Both conscious and unconscious processes are involved in second language learning.

Definitions: Dimensions and Degrees

• Consciousness has several senses in everyday language and scientific discussion.
• Conflicts arise from terminological vagueness (White, 1982).
• It's crucial to distinguish between consciousness as awareness, consciousness as intention, and consciousness as knowledge.

Consciousness as Awareness

• Consciousness is commonly equated with awareness (Battista, 1978; Rotner, 1987).
• There are degrees or levels of awareness (Baruss, 1987; Battista, 1978; Bowers, 1984; James, 1890; Lunzer, 1979; Natsoulis, 1987; Oakley, 1985b; O'Keefe, 1985; Tulving, 1985).
• Three crucial levels:
  • Level 1: Perception. All perception implies mental organization and the ability to create internal representations of external events (Oakley 1985b; Baars 1986). Perceptions are not necessarily conscious; subliminal perception is possible.
  • Level 2: Noticing (focal awareness). Bowers (1984) distinguishes between perceived and noticed information. Noticing refers to subjective experience and can be operationally defined as availability for verbal report (Ericsson and Simon, 1980, 1984; Fserch and Kasper, 1987).
    • Lack of verbal report isn't evidence of failure to notice unless gathered concurrently or immediately following the experience.
    • Some experiences are hard to describe (e.g., regional accent).
    • Verbal reports can verify/falsify claims about noticing.
    • Other terms for noticing: focal awareness (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968; Kihlstrom 1984), episodic awareness (Allport 1979), and apperceived input (Gass 1988).
  • Level 3: Understanding. After noticing, we analyze and compare experiences, reflect on their significance, and experience insight and understanding. This includes problem-solving and metacognitions.

Consciousness as Intention

• There is ambiguity between passive awareness and active intent.
• Conscious actions are often intentional.
• We refer to conscious efforts and strategies as volitional and deliberate.
• Bialystock (1981a) restricts the conscious strategy of 'practice' to deliberate attempts by a learner to increase exposure to the language outside of class.
• It's important to distinguish between awareness and intentional behavior, as they're often dissociated.
• Intentions may be conscious or unconscious (Baars 1985), and we often become aware of things we do not intend to notice.

Consciousness as Knowledge

• White (1982) notes the assumption that to know something is to be conscious of it, but argues experiential consciousness and knowledge are not the same.
• The contrast between conscious and unconscious knowledge is unclear due to combined ambiguities of consciousness and knowledge.
• Most discussions of consciousness in language focus on conscious/unconscious knowledge distinctions, leading to confusion.
• Chomsky (1986: 263-73) discusses the distinction using sentences:
  • $1. <br /> ewline John <br /> ewline is <br /> ewline too <br /> ewline stubborn <br /> ewline to <br /> ewline talk <br /> ewline to <br /> ewline him.$
  • $2. <br /> ewline John <br /> ewline is <br /> ewline too <br /> ewline stubborn <br /> ewline to <br /> ewline talk <br /> ewline to.$
• Native speakers know John is the subject of 'talk' in $1$ but not in $2$, and that 'him' in $1$ cannot refer to John.
• Chomsky relates this to universal grammar principles that are unconscious,