Sukin

Sukin argues that Russia’s nuclear rhetoric during the war in Ukraine is neither random nor empty. Instead, it mirrors patterns seen in North Korea, where nuclear threats—however extreme or frequent—reliably reveal what the regime fears most and when it is willing to take risks. The article opens with Dmitry Medvedev warning that the “nuclear apocalypse” is drawing “closer,” one of many Russian statements implying nuclear use against Ukraine or NATO. These threats have been “loud, frequent, and extreme” since early 2022. Some analysts dismiss them as “cheap talk,” but Sukin insists that this view is dangerously complacent.

To understand why, she turns to North Korea, a state that issues nuclear threats constantly yet still uses them meaningfully. Both Russia and North Korea are isolated, heavily sanctioned, reliant on nuclear weapons, and ruled by personalistic leaders surrounded by “yes men.” Both regimes are anxious about their legacies and committed to unrealistic foreign policy ambitions. These similarities make North Korea a useful analogue for interpreting Russia’s behavior.

North Korea’s state media publishes dozens of threatening articles each month—an average of forty‑nine—often tied to U.S.–South Korean military exercises. These threats draw “bright lines” around issues Pyongyang considers intolerable. They rarely compel major policy reversals, but they do aim to prevent escalation. Even when threats seem exaggerated or implausible, they reliably signal genuine strategic concerns. Sukin’s research shows that threats reveal two things: what the regime cares about and when it feels threatened enough to act.

This second insight—frequency—matters most. Although North Korea issues many threats, surges in threat volume correlate strongly with military provocations. Sukin’s analysis of 124,000 KCNA articles shows that months with seventy‑five or more threats have a 60–80 percent chance of a provocation, compared to less than 40 percent in quieter months. A week with nine more threats than usual increases the likelihood of a missile or nuclear test by eleven percentage points. In short: when the regime feels insecure, it threatens more, and when it threatens more, it is more likely to act.

Applying these lessons to Russia, Sukin argues that Moscow’s nuclear threats reflect evolving priority objectives: deterring a NATO “no‑fly zone,” preventing Ukraine from retaking disputed territory, and warning against actions Russia considers intolerable. These are “bright lines,” not attempts to reverse existing Western policies. And they have been effective, not because Russia intends imminent nuclear use, but because the West recognises them as credible signals of willingness to escalate.

But Russia’s threats also have limits. Nuclear rhetoric has failed to stop NATO expansion—Moscow was “unusually silent” after Finland joined—and cannot reverse the massive flow of Western aid to Ukraine. Still, the sheer volume of Russian threats over the past year suggests a regime that feels “deeply precarious” and is willing to take “severe risks” to improve its security. More frequent threats may indicate that “escalation… might be coming,” whether through deploying nuclear weapons to Belarus, expanding dual‑capable delivery systems, or even limited nuclear use.

Sukin warns that dismissing Russia’s threats as “crying wolf” would be “perilous and naïve.” Repetition makes them more—not less—concerning. They reflect “high anxieties in Moscow” that could lead to risky decision‑making. Yet the international community has few tools to curb nuclear threats. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons bans such rhetoric, but no nuclear‑armed state has joined it.

The key, Sukin argues, is managing insecurity. Nuclear bombast often precedes provocations, but escalation can be avoided if the underlying threat recedes. Overreacting—such as scaling up military exercises to “teach a lesson”—risks triggering reciprocal hostility. Conversely, ignoring threats entirely allows insecurity to “stew until it bubbles over.” The challenge is to maintain deterrence while avoiding unnecessary provocation.

Ultimately, Sukin concludes that nuclear threats “convey real meaning” and must be taken seriously. Repeated, condition‑linked threats are most credible. And if Russia ever crossed the nuclear threshold, it must face “immediate, resounding, global condemnation” and severe punishment. The world must reinforce the core principle that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”