The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Transition and the Path to the Iraq War

The 2000 Presidential Campaign and the Philosophy of Non-Intervention

• The 2000 Election Context: During the fall of the year $2000$, during the presidential campaign involving Texas Governor George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore, Bush expressed significant skepticism regarding the use of American armed forces to influence the internal politics of foreign nations.

• Stance on Nation Building: In the presidential debate held on October $3$, Bush explicitly criticized the "nation building" initiatives undertaken during the Clinton-Gore administration.

  • Bush argued that the primary purpose of the United States military should be to "fight and win wars."

  • He criticized specific efforts in countries such as Somalia and Haiti.

  • He also expressed support for President Bill Clinton's decision not to intervene in the Rwandan genocide in $1994$.

• Post-Election National Security Team: After his election, Bush assembled what is described as one of the most experienced national security teams in recent history. This team generally aligned with his stated opposition to nation building.

Defining Nation Building

• Verbatim Definition: Nation building refers to the act of "actually using the American military to try to influence politics in other country towards some political or developmental goal."

• Administrative Perspective: The Bush team viewed the history of United States nation building as characterized by significant difficulties and failures.

• Physical Military Capacity: Despite opposing nation building, some members of the team supported the use of force as an expression of "basic physical military capacity."

The National Security Principals

• George W. Bush: As President, he served as the "Chief Executive" and the "ultimate decider."

• Dick Cheney (Vice President):

  • Former Secretary of Defense under President George H. W. Bush.

  • Supported armed intervention when based on United States national security interests.

  • A longtime colleague of Donald Rumsfeld.

• Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense):

  • Previously served as Secretary of Defense under President Gerald Ford.

  • During the Clinton years, he worked in the private sector and participated in Republican efforts to increase military and national security spending.

  • Threat Perception: He perceived traditional and non-traditional threats, including those beyond the atmosphere.

  • Space Pearl Harbor: In the late $1990s$, Rumsfeld chaired a commission warning that a foreign entity, government, or terrorist group could target U.S. satellites or spacecraft, resulting in a "space Pearl Harbor."

• Colin Powell (Secretary of State):

  • Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first Bush administration.

  • Advocated for foreign policy restraint.

• Condoleezza Rice (National Security Adviser):

  • A Stanford University political science professor and close campaign adviser.

  • Role of National Security Adviser: Positioned as the "referee," "adjudicator," or "bridge builder" between the Department of Defense (the armed wing) and the State Department (the diplomatic wing).

  • Critiqued the military's use in urban civilian settings, famously stating: "We don't need to have the eighty second airborne escorting kids to kindergarten."

The Powell-Weinberger Doctrine

• Origin: Named after Colin Powell and his mentor, Caspar Weinberger.

• Core Tenets: The doctrine calls for the United States to use military force only when:

  • It is absolutely necessary.

  • There is ample domestic political support for the specific operation.

  • The military is utilized for very specific, clearly defined goals.

• Warning Against Mission Creep: The doctrine opposes putting troops in a country and allowing the mission to change or evolve over time. Examples of failed mission creep cited include:

  • Beirut, Lebanon ($1983$).

  • Mogadishu, Somalia ($1994$).

Iraq and Saddam Hussein Prior to September 11

• Status of Sanctions: The administration was concerned about the weakening of international support for maintaining sanctions against Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

• Potential Scenarios if Sanctions Ended:

  • Nuclear/WMD Threat: Saddam Hussein had pursued nuclear weapons in the $1980s$ (when he was a U.S. partner) and might do so again.

  • Conventional Military Rise: Iraq could return to being a "normal," medium-sized country with a conventional military that could exert influence in the region. This was considered the most likely scenario.

  • Independent Foreign Policy: Iraq would have its own trade and foreign relations, which was an unacceptable outcome for Bush and Cheney.

• Regime Change Policy: Since Desert Storm, Bush and his team generally desired an event that would facilitate the removal of Saddam Hussein from power.

• Mainstream D.C. Attitude: By the late $1990s$, a bipartisan consensus existed that Saddam Hussein "needs to go," though there was discomfort with a direct ground-troop invasion. The strategy was limited to air strikes and sanctions.

• Constraints: For the first $200$ days of the presidency (from January $20$, $2001$, to September $10$, $2001$), a war for regime change was considered "outside the realm of the possible" due to high risks.

The Impact of the September 11 Attacks

• Shift in Security Concerns: The Al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington D.C. magnified existing concerns about Iraq.

• The "New Dimension" of WMDs: As noted by Dan Smith in the Penguin State of the Middle East Atlas, the attacks gave the WMD issue a new dimension.

  • The Threat: The fear was that Saddam could build nuclear or biological weapons and team up with a terrorist organization like Al Qaeda to deploy them in a populated U.S. area.

  • Casualty Potential: While September $11$ resulted in nearly $3,000$ deaths, a WMD attack could kill tens of thousands.

• Saddam-Al Qaeda Link Speculation:

  • Initially, some around Rumsfeld speculated Saddam helped pull off the September $11$ attacks.

  • While evidence showed Saddam did not have a hand in the attacks, the administration (Bush, Cheney, Rice) latched onto any suggestion that he was currently working with Al Qaeda operatives and developing WMDs.

• Transition Period: For the remainder of $2001$, the administration's focus was absorbed by Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

Analytical Framework: Intervention Costs vs. Domestic Risk Tolerance

• The Framework: A grid where the X-axis represents "intervention costs" (low to high) and the Y-axis represents "domestic risk tolerance" (low to high). The "zone of likely intervention" is where risk tolerance exceeds costs.

• Case Studies in the Framework:

  • Afghanistan:

    • Pre-$9/11$: Despite concerns after embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, risk tolerance was lower than intervention costs.

    • Post-$9/11$: Risk tolerance jumped significantly, putting the country on a "war footing." The loss of service members was deemed an appropriate cost, leading to intervention.

  • Iraq Under Saddam Hussein:

    • Costs: Higher than Afghanistan due to a serious army, air defenses, and ground forces.

    • Risk Tolerance Shift: Post-$9/11$, risk tolerance for perceived threats (Iraq, Iran, etc.) spiked. For Iraq, it jumped enough that tolerance exceeded costs, moving it from the "zone of likely negotiation" to the "zone of likely intervention."

• Political Contrast: Unlike the near $100\%$ support for the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against Al Qaeda in September $2001$, the authorization for Iraq had a solid majority but was not as overwhelmingly popular with the public or Congress.

Comparison with Previous Interventions

• Desert Storm ($1991$): Goals were precise and modest—ejecting the Iraqi army from Kuwait and restoring the monarchy. It did not involve regime change.

• Post-Cold War Regime Changes: Operations in Panama and Haiti were nowhere near the scale of Iraq. Iraq featured a larger population, greater geographical size, and a substantial military force that even a dying regime could deploy in self-defense.

• The Result: The plan for regime change in Iraq began to unfold in earnest over the course of $2002$.