Trespass to Person -Notes

Continuing the category of torts known as trespass to the person, specifically battery. Assault will be discussed later in the class.

The absence of malice doesn't negate battery; the intention to flick the ear is what matters.
Reference to Thompson v Police: Knocking someone's hat off goes beyond acceptable everyday life.
Analogy: Is flicking someone's ear on a crowded bus beyond what is acceptable?
Cultural Context: Drawing on tikanga, some body parts are more taboo; flicking an ear is not normally accepted.
Explanation

Tikanga: Is the customary system of values and practices that have developed over time and which possess authority within Māori society.

Lord Goff addresses whether malice, anger, ill will, or hostility is relevant.
Touching does not have to be hostile to constitute battery.
Historical context: It was once thought battery had to be in anger (citing Colin Turner).
Lord Goff disagrees with Wilson v Pringle, which suggested hostility is required.

Flicking someone's ear on the bus goes beyond ordinary life.
Malice is not required for battery.
Lord Goff: It used to be thought malice or hostility was required, but that is no longer the case.
- If Wilson and Pringle were the precedent, the answer would be more complicated: Mike could be correct based on that ruling.
The English Court of Appeal might be wrong, and that case should not be followed in New Zealand.
- Battery concerns interference with the body, and malice shouldn't be required.
- Medical treatment without consent = battery, even without malice.
- Requiring malice would demolish informed consent laws.

No, the absence of malice does not negate battery per NRAEF. A bad intention, hostility, anger is not required.

Consider an environment without accident compensation; kids at school, one yanked a backpack, and the other fell and got injured.

The court was carving out an area for normal horseplay that doesn't attract liability.

Lord Goff offers a better principle: consent (express or implied) or the

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This section delves into the category of torts known as trespass to the person, with a specific focus on battery. Assault, another key tort under this category, will be discussed in detail later in the course.

To illustrate the principles of battery, consider a hypothetical scenario: Seb is obstructing the aisle of a bus, causing inconvenience to other passengers.
Mike, intending to gain Seb's attention and request him to move, flicks Seb on the ear.
Mike's defense rests on the argument that he acted without malice, his sole intention being to get Seb's attention and facilitate movement on the bus.

The central issue is whether the absence of malice negates the act of battery. The key consideration is the intention to perform the action (flicking the ear), not the motive behind it.
Reference to Thompson v Police: This case establishes that actions exceeding the boundaries of acceptable everyday conduct, such as knocking off someone's hat, can constitute battery.
Analogy: The question is posed whether flicking someone's ear on a crowded bus falls outside the realm of what is considered acceptable behavior in daily life.
Cultural Context: Drawing on tikanga, it's important to recognize that certain body parts hold cultural significance. Flicking an ear is generally not accepted within this framework.

Explanation

Tikanga: The customary system of values and practices that have evolved over time and carry authority within Māori society.

NRAEF and Lord Goff's Perspective

Lord Goff's analysis in NRAEF addresses the relevance of malice, anger, ill will, or hostility in determining battery.
Lord Goff emphasizes that physical contact does not necessarily need to be hostile to constitute battery; the act itself is the determining factor.
Historical context: Historically, it was believed that battery required an element of anger or hostility (citing Colin Turner).
Lord Goff disagrees with Wilson v Pringle, a case that suggested hostility is a prerequisite for battery.

Applying the principles of NRAEF, flicking someone's ear on a bus goes beyond the scope of ordinary, everyday interactions.
The absence of malice is not a valid defense against a charge of battery.
Lord Goff clarifies that while malice or hostility was once considered necessary, that is no longer the prevailing view.
- If Wilson and Pringle were the precedent, the answer would be more complicated: Mike could be correct based on that ruling.
The English Court of Appeal might be wrong and that case should not be followed in New Zealand.
- Battery concerns interference with the body, and malice shouldn't be required.
- Medical treatment without consent = battery, even without malice.
- Requiring malice would demolish informed consent laws.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the absence of malice does not negate battery, according to NRAEF. A bad intention, hostility, or anger is not a necessary element.

To understand the context, what were the specific facts of the Wilson and Pringle case?

Explanation

Wilson and Pringle:

Consider an environment without accident compensation; kids at school, one yanked a backpack, and the other fell and got injured.

The court was carving out an area for normal horseplay that doesn't attract liability.

Lord Goff offers a better principle: consent (express or implied) or the