Elasticity, Price Rigidity & Price Discrimination – Comprehensive Lecture Notes

Elastic Demand, Total Revenue, and Pricing Moves

  • Elastic demand zone

    • Defined where price elasticity of demand ∣Ed∣>1|E_d| > 1 (upper half of a linear demand curve).

    • If a firm discovers it is in this zone, lowering price increases total revenue (TR) because the percentage increase in quantity demanded outweighs the percentage fall in price.

    • Total revenue identity: TR=P×QTR = P \times Q.

    • At the midpoint of a straight‐line demand curve (where ∣Ed∣=1|E_d| = 1) TR is maximised; above that point (elastic region) a price cut pushes you “toward the midpoint,” raising TR.

  • Competitive interaction caveat

    • In reality, rival firms often match price cuts/ rises.

    • If a firm raises price while competitors do not, its own product becomes relatively expensive, demand faced becomes more elastic than initially estimated.

    • Conversely, if rivals also raise price, demand may be less elastic than thought.

Kinked Demand & Price Rigidity (Oligopoly Insight)

  • Lecturer sketches a kinked demand curve intuition:

    • Upper segment: relatively elastic (firm reluctant to raise price— loses customers).

    • Lower segment: relatively inelastic (competitors follow price cuts, so gains in Q are small).

  • Implication: Profit-maximising oligopolists are resistant to changing price even if costs or market conditions move— explains observed price rigidity.

Simplifying Heterogeneous Demand: Two Consumer Types

  • Assume only two discrete consumer groups to make analysis tractable:

    1. High-demand / low‐elasticity consumers (high willingness to pay).

    2. Low-demand / high‐elasticity consumers (low willingness to pay).

  • Pricing question: Which group gets the higher price? → The low‐elasticity (high WTP) group, because demand is less sensitive to price.

Preconditions for Price Discrimination (PD)

  1. Market power: Firm must face a downward-sloping demand curve.

  2. Identifiable sub-markets: Ability to distinguish consumer types (directly or indirectly).

  3. No (or costly) resale/ arbitrage between sub-markets — prevents low‐price buyers selling to high‐price buyers.

    • Services frequently satisfy this better than physical goods (harder to resell a haircut than a bottle of shampoo).

First-Degree (Perfect) Price Discrimination

  • Also called personalised pricing.

  • Firm charges each individual exactly their maximum willingness to pay (reservation price).

  • Graphically:

    • Demand curve = marginal benefit curve.

    • Price on each unit equals height of demand curve.

    • Profit (producer surplus) captures entire area under demand curve above marginal cost (MC) – eliminates all consumer surplus.

    • Output expands to point where P=MCP = MC (efficient output, unlike monopoly without PD).

  • Firms attempt approximations using data analytics:

    • Optometrists adjusting lens prices after gauging buyer’s reactions.

    • Amazon varying book prices by tracking browsing & purchase history; demographics (age, gender) help refine willingness to pay.

  • Privacy & ethics: Consumers may unwittingly enable higher personalised prices when they overshare information.

Third-Degree Price Discrimination (Segmented Pricing)

  • Firm sets different uniform prices to recognisable groups; each group still pays one price.

  • Profit-maximisation condition: MR<em>1=MR</em>2=MCMR<em>1 = MR</em>2 = MC across segments (subscript denotes group).

A. Group Pricing (direct segmentation)

  • Preconditions: Firm can verify group membership.

  • Examples:

    • Movie tickets cheaper for students/ seniors (ID cards verify).

    • Delta Airlines charging higher fares to its own frequent fliers:

    • Frequent fliers accumulate Delta miles → regard other carriers as poorer substitutes → demand is less elastic → higher optimal price.

    • Income effect logic: lower-income buyers often receive lower prices because any given expenditure forms a larger income share → higher price elasticity.

B. Menu Pricing (self-selection / screening)

  • Firm cannot directly observe type but designs a “menu” so consumers sort themselves.

  • Mechanism: Options differ along price–quality, price–flexibility, or price–time trade-offs.

  • Examples:

    • Airline fare classes:

    • Advance, non-refundable, no-bag tickets vs flexible, refundable ones.

    • Friday-out/Monday-back itineraries indicate leisure vs business.

    • Amazon’s Super Saver Shipping: cheaper shipping in exchange for slower delivery; attracts price-sensitive, patient buyers.

  • Design principle: Option attractive to elastic customers offers low price but imposes non-monetary “costs” (inconvenience, risk, delay) the inelastic customers will avoid.

C. Versioning

  • Firm produces multiple versions that cost nearly the same to make but are priced differently.

  • Examples:

    • Software with disabled features (Basic vs Pro).

    • Pink tax: identical product made in pink version priced higher because some consumers (often female) value that colour more → lower elasticity.

    • Uniforms/ sports jerseys: US vs NZ online stores charging different country-specific prices; website geoblocking prevents cross-market resale.

Intertemporal / Multi-Period Price Discrimination

  • Also called temporal pricing or sequential skimming.

  • Firm lowers price over time to capture surplus from impatient (inelastic) consumers first, then from more patient (elastic) ones.

  • Common settings:

    • Fashion collections: full price at season launch → discounted end-of-season → clearance after season.

    • Books: hardback (high price) released first, paperback (lower price) later; production cost difference ≈ cost of hard cover, yet large price gap.

    • Sales & coupons: price-sensitive shoppers wait/collect coupons; impatient pay list price.

Detecting Price Discrimination in Everyday Life

  • Once aware, students should look for:

    • Same good/service sold at different prices not explained by cost differences.

    • Restrictions on transfer/ resale (non-transferable tickets, personalised barcodes).

    • Requirement of IDs, memberships, or log-ins (enables segmentation).

    • Timed price drops, coupons, or shipping choices signalling self-selection mechanisms.

Broader Connections & Implications

  • Link to monopoly & marginal revenue: With perfect PD, firm no longer needs MR curve— simply sells until P=MCP=MC. With third-degree PD, separate MR curves exist for each segment.

  • Equity concerns: PD can shift surplus from consumers to producers; but may expand output, lowering deadweight loss (welfare trade-off).

  • Regulation & ethics: Data privacy rules (e.g., GDPR) and fair-trading regulations may limit discriminatory practices, but many forms remain legal.

  • Strategic behavior: Consumers may employ VPNs, arbitrage, or delay purchases to defeat PD; firms respond by strengthening sub-market barriers.

Summary Cheat-Sheet

  • Elastic demand ⇒ lower price → higher TR.

  • Oligopoly kinked demand explains price stickiness.

  • Price discrimination requires market power, identification, & no resale.

  • First-degree (personalised), second-degree (menu/ versioning), third-degree (group) frameworks.

  • Intertemporal PD captures surplus across time.

  • Real-world markers: student discounts, fare classes, software tiers, pink tax, fashion markdowns, hardback → paperback cycles.