Ordinary Meaning Rule and Multilingual Interpretation

Ordinary Meaning Rule

Section 6(1) of the Constitution: 11 official languages.
Section 6(2): Recognizes that indigenous languages no longer have ‘diminished status’.
Section 6(3): Government may use any official language.
Statutory Bilingualism (until 27 April 1994):
- English & Afrikaans were equally authoritative.
- Signing of a particular version was a matter of chance.

Section 65, 1961 Constitution:
- Court’s conciliatory approach to interpreting conflicting constitutional provisions caused confusion.
- One language version signed into law while amendment in another language was signed separately; amendment treated as part of original law.
Question: Was conflict (1) prima facie linguistic or (2) only discerned after construction canons invoked?
- Van den Heever JA (New Union Goldfields Ltd v CIR): Compared versions at the outset.
- Hoexter JA (Peter v Peter): Texts fully construed separately, then compared.
- Steyn: Favored first possibility.

Comparison on immediate intra-textual context.
Courts had a conciliatory attitude and relaxed approach to conflict, despite calls for strict literal reading.

Separate conflict provisions for Constitution & other legislation.
Originally silent on language conflict in the Constitution itself.
Section 15 Amendment Act added provision for this.
- Section 15: English version prevails for interpretation, notwithstanding Afrikaans version being signed.
- Inconsistent with Section 35: Signed Afrikaans version had to prevail if an inconsistency arose.
Section 65: Any law passed by Parliament officially recorded in all necessary official languages.
Conflict between different language versions was resolved by the version signed by the President prevailing.
Section 240 of 1996 Constitution: Inconsistency results in the English text prevailing.

Pre-1994 case law remains applicable to conflicts between different versions of both constitutions since 1994.
Kentridge JA (Du Plessis v De Klerk) interpreted Section 7(2) of Afrikaans version of Interim Constitution despite Section 15.
- View:
  - (1) No actual conflict between versions.
  - (2) One version clear, the other not – clear version prevails.
  - (3) Both versions represent Parliament’s intention.
  - (4) Afrikaans still an official language, so use is valid.

Section 81: A bill becomes law when the President signs and it is published, taking effect on that date or a date set by the law.
Section 82: Signed copy of an act is conclusive proof of what the law says and is kept safe by the Constitutional Court.
Section 124: Similar rule for provincial laws.
Section 82 is silent on conflicts between different language versions, assuming all agree in meaning.
Botha: If versions differ, prefer one that best reflects the Bill of Rights.
Lack of specific conflict-resolution rule:
- How will the court interpret conclusive evidence?
- Only the signed version counts – too simplistic:
  - (1) President randomly signs different versions, so the best one can’t always be signed.
  - (2) Calling the signed version ‘conclusive evidence’ is a formality.

Language evolves over time.
The rule assumes that time-bound words & expressions be understood with conventions at the time the statute came into existence – equated with intention.

Technical words generate technical meaning, given effect only if the meaning is generally known.
Ascertain meaning from (1) expert evidence, (2) technical dictionaries, or where a word has a popular meaning, (3) ordinary dictionary.
Judicial interpreters decide the meaning of legal words as questions of law.
If a word bears a legal meaning for which another word is normally used, the word is understood in a non-legal sense.
Same rule applies if a word with legal & non-legal connotation is used in conjunction with a non-legal word.

Definition clause defines the meaning of words used in a statute.
It may assign a technical meaning deviating from ordinary meaning.
If a definition is uncertain/vague, the court cannot simply ignore it; it has a duty to give it meaning.

The definition clause applies unless stated otherwise to the interpretation of all law in the Republic.
Orders in Section 1 do not apply to administrative orders.
Definitions do not apply where legislative instruments expressly exclude them/context suggests exclusion or a contrary intention.

Language is not used unnecessarily.
Literalist manifestation: each word must be given meaning.
Linked to the presumption that statute law is not invalid/purposeless.
Du Plessis - Rule and presumption remain distinct – (1) presumption fights invalidity of statute (2) rule does not look at statute holistically but focuses on wording
Functional repetition absent: different words are meant to generate different meanings.
Not absolute: laws repeat things on purpose for emphasis/clarity, so repetition in different terms can mean the same thing.
If certain words are superfluous, they do not serve to qualify the meaning of the non-superfluous remainder.
Words may not be read in a provision if they render it superfluous.

Paragraph and section divisions should not result in fragmentation of the legislative instrument as a whole.
Golden thread: interrelated parts of a whole, read as such.
This doesn’t mean it’s the final word on the meaning of the law, but merely the words it uses.
Courts can still use other versions to understand the signed one.

Pre-1994 constitutional rules about language conflicts did not apply to delegated legislation, nor did the 1996 rules.
Main difference: More than two versions exist; different versions used to clarify each other.
Differences in versions are reconciled by:
- (1) Using one version to explain an unclear part in another.
- (2) Choosing the most sensible & rejecting absurd ones.
- (3) Removing conflicting parts if the rest of the law becomes more understandable.
If reconciliation doesn’t work, problematic parts are declared invalid.