China, a World Safe for Autocracy: China's Rise and the Future of Global Politics - Weiss Reading - GVPT 200 - 5/3/25

Xi Jinping’s Global Vision and the Perception of China’s Rise

• President Xi Jinping’s Proclamations:     * In 2016, Xi declared that the Chinese people are fully confident in offering a "China solution" to humanity’s search for better social systems.     * In 2017, he stated that China was "blazing a new trail" for other developing countries to achieve modernization.
• The Authoritarian Turn: Under Xi, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has transitioned toward a more repressive dictatorship while experimenting with a "pluralistic responsive mode of authoritarianism."
• Washington’s Shift in Consensus: Many Western politicians view China’s domestic turn and overseas search for influence as a "life and death attempt to defeat democracy."     * The consensus in Washington has swung from supporting engagement to calling for competition or containment in a "new cold war."     * Vice President Mike Pence (October): Decried China’s "whole of government effort" to influence U.S. domestic politics and policy.     * FBI Director Christopher Wray (February): Described China as a "whole of society threat," not just a government threat.
• Challenging the Narrative: Jessica Chen Weiss argues these fears get the challenge from Beijing wrong.     * China is not currently seeking to export revolution or topple democracy as it did under Mao Zedong.     * Developments reflect the leadership’s desire to secure its position at home and abroad rather than a grand strategic effort to spread autocracy.     * Beijing is described as a "disgruntled and increasingly ambitious stakeholder" in the U.S.-led order, not an "implacable enemy" of it.

The Limitations of the ‘China Model’ for Export

• Xi’s Qualifications on Exportability: Despite rhetoric regarding the "Chinese example," Xi told foreign leaders in 2017 that "managing our own affairs well is China's biggest contribution."     * He explicitly stated: "We will not import a foreign model. Nor will we export a China model nor ask others to copy Chinese methods."
• Economic Uniqueness (Barry Naughton): The economist Barry Naughton identified three conditions that make China’s success difficult to replicate:     * An enormous internal market.     * Abundant labor.     * A hierarchical authoritarian government committed to a transition away from a planned economy.
• Pragmatism vs. Orthodoxy: Political scientist Yuen Yuen Ang argues "directed improvisation" rather than state control brought about China’s economic miracle. There is no coherent "China model" other than a willingness to experiment.
• Historical Context: Rapid growth was driven by the introduction of markets and competition before the state reasserted dominance over the economy in 2012.
• Difficulty of Copying the Political System:     * The CCP relies on a pervasive reach into society backstopped by an internal security apparatus.     * By 2011, China's internal security budget cost more than its military.     * The party-state structure is rooted in a specific history that does not lend itself to an easy "copy and paste" abroad.

China as a Facilitator of Global Authoritarianism

• Legitimacy Through Success: Political scientist Seva Gunitsky notes that China's four decades of growth demonstrate that development does not require democracy. Material success creates its own legitimacy, making regimes appear morally appealing by virtue of triumph.
• Direct Support via International Institutions:     * China, often with Russia, uses its UN Security Council veto to shield authoritarian countries from human rights demands and block interventions.     * Beijing positions itself as a "conservative defender of international norms," prioritizing state sovereignty over humanitarian intervention.     * Heavy trade partners in Africa and Latin America often join Beijing in opposing human rights resolutions in the UN General Assembly.
• Selective Cooperation at the UN: China has occasionally supported sanctions or pressure when it aligns with political costs or avoided unpopularity.     * Voted for UN sanctions against Iran and North Korea.     * Pushed Myanmar and Sudan to curb political violence.     * 2008 Beijing Olympics Context: China pressured Khartoum to accept a peacekeeping force.     * Libya (2011): Voted for sanctions and referring Muammar al-Qaddafi to the International Criminal Court. China did not block the resolution authorizing military intervention, though it later regretted this during the Syrian civil war.

Lending, Infrastructure, and Global Finance

• Unconditional Loans: China provides an alternative source of finance for governments unable or unwilling to meet the requirements of Western lenders.
• Effectiveness in Poorly Governed Areas: Chinese loans are often tied to specific infrastructure projects: roads, schools, power plants, and sewage systems.
• Adopting International Norms:     * The Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has adopted environmental and social consequence norms similar to developed countries.     * IMF Response: Christine Lagarde (Managing Director of the IMF) applauded Beijing’s announcement of a debt sustainability framework for the Belt and Road Initiative in April.

Exporting Surveillance and Censorship Technologies

• Digital Authoritarianism: Chinese investment has made surveillance tech cheaper for other regimes.     * AI facial recognition technology has been sold to Ecuador, Iran, Kenya, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.     * Tanzania’s Perspective: Deputy Minister for Transport and Communications (2017) praised China for blocking Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram in favor of "homegrown sites."
• ZTE in Venezuela: Criticized for helping develop a national identity card system to monitor citizen behavior, inspired by a 2008 visit to Shenzhen.
• Complexity of Tech Diffusion:     * Technology like electronic identification is also exported by Western nations (e.g., British-made ID cards for Rwandans).     * U.S. companies argue that surveillance tech also protects digital networks from intruders.     * Ecuador Case Study: The monitoring system installed in 2011 failed to cut crime because the state didn't hire enough police to monitor the footage. The administration that came to power in 2017 began investigating the system for alleged abuses.

Influence Operations and "Sharp Power"

• Confucius Institutes: Since 2004, Beijing has funded hundreds of these institutes to teach Mandarin, though many have closed due to concerns over academic freedom.
• Discourse Power: Investing in English-language media (e.g., China Daily inserts) to control the narrative.
• Economic Coercion: Forcing international corporations to follow the CCP line.     * Airline examples: American, Delta, and United removed references to Taiwan from their websites under pressure.
• Sharp Power Definition: Coined by Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig to describe tactics that co-opt, intimidate, and suppress criticism, particularly within the Chinese diaspora and overseas Chinese-language media.
• Case Studies: Australia and New Zealand. Australia recently passed laws against foreign interference following controversy over Beijing-linked political donations.

Internal Weaknesses and International Rejection

• Ethnocentric Nationalism: Xi’s "Chinese Dream" is self-centered and lacks universal appeal.
• Repression in Xinjiang: The establishment of a dystopian police state and internment camps for as many as $1,000,000$ Muslim Uyghurs has drawn international condemnation.     * Statements of concern have come from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey.
• Public Opinion (Pew Research Center): In 2018, across 25 countries, an average of $63\%$ of respondents preferred U.S. leadership, while only $19\%$ preferred Chinese leadership.
• Domestic Discontent:     * Conformity is promoted via the "Study the Great Nation" smartphone app.     * Chinese elites and scholars express fear of a "new Cultural Revolution."     * Xu Zhangrun: A law professor at Tsinghua University who was suspended after publishing an online critique of Xi’s removal of presidential term limits.
• Regional Backlash: Aggressive actions in the South China Sea have stoked resentment in The Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia.

Strategic Responses for the United States

• Avoiding Overreaction: Framing the competition in civilization or ideological terms risk turning China into the enemy Washington fears.
• Defending Democracy: The best way to counter authoritarianism is to restore faith in democratic principles: the rule of law, fair elections, free speech, and freedom of the press.
• Selective Cooperation: Necessary for global challenges like climate change.
• Precision in Action: The U.S. and allies must be precise about what China is doing. The goal should be to make democracy work better so it remains an example for others to follow, allowing the democratic world to compete with China’s true sources of power: economic and technological might.