Rational Choice and the Presidency: Veto Bargaining — Study Notes
Why Models?
Conference framing: theory and rigor are praised but often undefined; multiple valid ways to do social science exist (data gathering, case studies, data analysis, theory-building).
Aim of the book: produce useful and interesting theory about the presidency in an age of divided government using rational choice institutionalism focused on veto bargaining.
Core claim: there are many ways to contribute meaningfully to social science; however, building theoretical models to explain why things happen is a central scientific activity.
What is a model? A model is a structure of logical inferences from assumptions that establishes a causal link between the persons or entities involved and the phenomenon of interest. It is distinct from mere statistical description.
Distinction between theoretical and statistical models:
Theoretical model: explains causal mechanisms, not just summarize data patterns.
Statistical model: describes patterns in data without necessarily providing a causal mechanism.
The role of models in shaping interpretation: facts and data gain meaning within the context of competing models (e.g., responsible party government vs. Downsian spatial model). Facts depend on the framework used to interpret them.
Quotes and ideas about model-building and interpretive flexibility come from Edwards et al. and related debates about theory vs. data.
Takeaway: models frame puzzles, supply explanations, and set the background against which puzzles are identified.
Rational Choice and the Basic Idea
The book emphasizes rational choice theory as a toolkit for building theoretical models of political phenomena.
Focus phenomenon: veto bargaining, explored through interdependent actors (President and Congress).
Three guiding assumptions of rational choice (the “threefold”):
The actor assumption: behavior of aggregate social outcomes reflects the behavior of individual actors.
The intentions assumption: we explain behavior by reference to goals and constraints, not by fanciful psychological quirks.
The aggregation assumption: aggregate phenomena arise from the interaction of intentional actors; you cannot explain collective outcomes without considering the agents and their interdependence.
Why these matter for veto bargaining:
Vetoes occur because members of Congress pass bills and the President vetoes them; not because of a vague zeitgeist or social forces beyond agency.
The President’s veto decisions are tied to policy objectives, reelection concerns, or signaling to Congress; not random or purely habitual actions.
The President and Congress are interdependent; vetoing is jointly produced.
Important caveats about intentionalism:
Intentions do not imply perfect optimization; actors can be constrained and misinformed.
Outcomes can be unintended consequences of interactions between intentionally motivated actors.
Some discussions raise ethical concerns about rational choice models challenging civics platitudes or justifying harmful action; readers may form their own stance.
The Reach of the Tools: Decision Theory and Game Theory
The rational choice toolbox comprises two main pillars: decision theory (utility theory) and game theory.
Core questions: Do these tools provide a credible psychology of decision-makers? Can they accurately infer aggregate outcomes from individual actions? The author’s cautious stance: a qualified maybe.
Decision Theory as Psychology
Decision theory is often described as the “psychology of decision-makers,” but it is essentially folk psychology formalized.
Problems with treating decision theory as real psychology:
Real decision-makers (humans or organizations) systematically deviate from folk-psychology predictions.
Applying individual-level psychology to organizations can be misleading.
Why decision theory remains appealing:
In highly structured environments, even weakly rational actors behave like decision theorists.
Strong feedback environments can align subrational or arational behavior with decision-theoretic outcomes (e.g., house-purchasing in a tight budget scenario).
The money pump parable: transitivity violations can lead to exploitable cycles; if people act on inconsistent preferences, protective mechanisms emerge (self-control, rules, procedures) to resist exploitation.
Takeaway: environment and structure can make actors appear decision-theoretic, even if their internal psychology diverges from folk psychology.
Life as a Game: The Role of Game Theory
Game theory asks whether aggregate social outcomes can be recovered from strategically interdependent actions.
Key concepts for applicability:
Interdependence: each actor’s outcome depends on others’ actions.
Shared expectations: actors must anticipate how others will act.
A Nash equilibrium is a central solution concept: a strategy profile where no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate given others’ strategies.
Limitations and concerns:
Real-world strategic settings often involve imperfect information and dynamic learning; traditional Nash equilibrium assumes a level of common knowledge and information sharing that may not hold.
Many situations require strong, sometimes unrealistic, assumptions about knowledge, beliefs, and communication.
Critics point to an overemphasis on atomistic, highly informed players; the author argues that this critique misreads the aims of game theory.
How to judge applicability of game theory:
Must have a defined strategic situation where players care about interdependent outcomes.
The relevance depends on the presence of shared knowledge or a history that can anchor expectations.
In practice, researchers rely on intuitive judgments about plausibility to apply game-theoretic reasoning to a specific setting.
When Is Rational Choice Likely to Work?
The author offers a practical set of conditions for when rational choice tools are likely to be informative:
(1) The players act roughly like decision theorists (consistent, predictable behavior under similar incentives).
(2) There are substantial rewards for consistent, game-theoretic behavior and penalties for inconsistent, non-game-theoretic actions.
(a) The environment is not overly complex, enabling players to mentally model the situation.
(b) Players have a history of interaction and shared culture or experience with the setting.
(c) Structural incentives or processes (competition, natural selection) reinforce stable, strategic behavior.
In short, actual applicability depends on structural incentives, shared history, and culture.
Veto Bargaining and the Applicability Scale
The author introduces a continuum: from low-applicability (one-off, trivially strategic decisions by atomistic actors) to high-applicability (complex, interdependent, deeply strategic decisions by actors with shared culture).
Examples:
Low end: casting a ballot on a minor bond referendum; voting for an obscure local office.
High end: major congressional decisions, where veto power interacts with institutional norms and long-term strategic considerations.
The Presidency’s veto politics sit at the high end of applicability because of high stakes, complex strategic interaction, and deep institutional context.
The Constitution creates a two-actor game with codified rules and long-standing practices, making veto bargaining a prime candidate for rational-choice modeling.
The Presidency as a Domain for Rational Choice?
The question of whether a general theory of the presidency exists is rejected: there can be theories of weather or planetary formation, but not a single universal theory of the presidency.
The author emphasizes the value of multiple, smaller-scale theories focused on specific institutional settings within the presidency (the institutional presidency).
The small-n problem is addressed: while there are many presidents, there are many fewer cases than in some other fields; however, looking at specific decision-making contexts (e.g., legislative programs, cabinet management, treaty decisions) yields richer observations.
In Chapter 2, the author notes that veto-related observations are abundant when focusing on specific decision-making settings, with hundreds of observations per presidency.
Conclusion: Rational choice can contribute meaningful insights when applied to specific institutional settings, rather than attempting to model the entire presidency as a single unit.
Criteria for Success… and Failure of Models
What makes a model good? The author advocates for a plural, pragmatic standard rather than demanding dramatic, novel predictions.
Five (and related) criteria discussed:
Solves empirical puzzles it was designed to solve.
Solves empirical puzzles that rival explanations cannot.
Turns apparent counterexamples into solved problems.
Does not require or demand stunning, counterintuitive predictions.
Richness and unity: integrates disparate problems under a common causal mechanism; economy of explanation.
The author cautions against the positivist expectation that good models must deliver novel, non-obvious predictions; scientists often rely on unity and coherence to explain many phenomena with a single mechanism.
Normative kick: good models should address real-world relevance and normative implications; models should engage with political ethics, public values, and practical consequences.
The normative dimension is an important feature of good models, illustrating that theories can inform our understanding of civic life while acknowledging political values.
The Reach of the Tools: Normative and Practical Considerations
Decision theory and game theory are powerful but not universally applicable; their usefulness depends on real-world structure, incentives, and cultures.
The author emphasizes that models should be grounded in observable phenomena and normative concerns, not just abstract mathematics.
Concluding thought: rational choice offers a flexible toolkit for analyzing political decision-making, but its applicability must be evaluated case by case, especially in complex institutions like veto bargaining within the presidency.
Key References and Concepts to Know
Foundational works and ideas cited:
Downs, H. (1957). Theory of Public Choice; spatial models of party competition.
Shepsle, K., Bonchek, M. (1997). An introduction to rational choice: political economy.
Bronowski, J. (1977). The Ascent of Man; unity of science and simplicity.
Carr (1961); the contingent nature of historians’ facts.
Elster, J. (1983); rational choice and political theory.
Pettit, P. (1991); theories of rational choice and political psychology.
Kreps, D.; Osborne & Rubinstein (1994); game theory foundational texts.
Nash, J. (1950s); Nash equilibrium concepts; Subgame perfection and equilibrium refinements.
Aumann, R. (1985); equilibrium concepts and coordination.
Olson, M. (1965); logic of collective action and normative implications.
Core concepts to internalize:
The three axioms: actor assumption, intentions assumption, aggregation assumption.
The difference between theoretical and empirical models; causal mechanisms vs. pattern description.
Decision theory as folk psychology; limits of applying individual psychology to organizations.
The money pump as a pedagogical illustration of irrationality and self-protective mechanisms.
Nash equilibrium: orall i,orall si \, ui(si^, s{-i}^) \ge ui(si, s{-i}^*), \, \forall si \in S_i.
Dominant strategy equilibrium: a strategy that is best regardless of others’ choices.
Subgame perfect equilibrium: Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
Real-world stakes and normative concerns:
The logic of democratic accountability; implications for how I interpret veto behavior.
The emphasis on general theory vs. context-specific, institutionally grounded analysis.
Illustrative Examples and Metaphors
Lightning causes thunder: illustrates that a mere empirical regularity does not constitute a theoretical model; one must explain the mechanism.
The Downsian spatial model vs. responsible party government: different baseline models produce different expectations; “facts” are context-dependent.
The money pump parable: a story about irrational preferences leading to exploitable cycles, and how institutions or reflexive behavior mitigate such vulnerability.
The weather vs. planetary formation analogy: there are not universal single theories for complex systems; instead, a network of models explains how the world works.
Practical Implications for Classroom Study and Exam Preparation
When analyzing veto bargaining, expect to justify the use of rational choice tools by appealing to the actor, intentions, and aggregation assumptions, and by showing how the institutional setting creates a high-applicability context.
Be able to distinguish between theoretical explanations (causal mechanisms) and descriptive statistics; understand why a model’s value lies in moving beyond description to explanation.
Recognize the limits of decision theory and game theory; discuss environments in which these tools yield reliable predictions and those in which they do not.
Be able to articulate the normative dimension of modeling: how models relate to real-world values, democratic accountability, and public understanding.
Recall key references and the big picture: rational choice offers a powerful but context-sensitive framework for presidential studies; success hinges on coherence, explanatory power, and normative relevance, not just mathematical elegance.
// Equations to remember (for quick reference)
Nash equilibrium: for all players i, ui(si^, s{-i}^) \ge ui(si, s{-i}^*), \forall si \in Si.
Dominant strategy equilibrium: a strategy si^* is dominant for player i if for all s{-i}, ui(si^*, s{-i}) \ge ui(si, s{-i}).
Subgame perfect equilibrium: Nash equilibrium that holds in every subgame of the original game.
This set of notes captures the major and minor points from the transcript, including the motivations for modeling, the core assumptions, the reach and limits of the analytical tools (decision theory and game theory), the applicability to veto bargaining, and the criteria by which models should be judged. It also places important ideas in context with foundational scholars and practical implications for studying the presidency.